

**STRATEGY FOR THE
CONTAINMENT OF
PUTIN**

INTRODUCTION

A great many people and even politicians worldwide are astounded by Kremlin's aggressive actions against Ukraine. Yet, one should better wonder why so many of them are taken aback. The answer, however, is not comforting.

Until now, we have lived in an illusionary world refusing to see the evident – Vladimir Putin and the entire KGB structure took over the control over Russia in order to restore the empire. We should have been alarmed for the first time when Putin revived the Soviet national anthem. Afterwards, he declared that the fall of the Soviet Union was the greatest tragedy of the 21st century. In 2008, no one even blinked when at the Bucharest NATO Summit Vladimir Putin made a cynical comment about Ukraine regarding it as “an artificial country”.

During his first terms of office, Vladimir Putin took up Russia's occupation. It was relentlessly cleaned from the first sprouts of democracy. A controlled political system was built with controllable communist and chauvinist “oppositions”. The true democrats were marginalised, and the mass media was destroyed and replaced with a manipulative system of convincing propaganda. Putin's team tightened its grip on all energy resources and set up corrupt systems in order to make use of energy for the achievement of their political goals in all countries importing Russian gas. The most brutal suppression and discrediting of freedom aspirations of the Chechen people eliminated any possibility of Russia's federalisation.

Foreign policy was based on the “divide and rule” principle. With the coinage of “the near abroad”, Kremlin pursued quite different foreign policies in respect of the Western countries and the countries that have recently broke free of the former Soviet empire. Now it is clear that even such a different positive cooperation with the West was mainly needed for access to gas markets and Western technologies. While efforts were made to resovietise Russia, the West was distracted by quick profit generating economic cooperation.

Like other states that broke free of the Soviet occupation, Lithuania, quite soon, received Putin's team's attention, especially, through its energy independence, dirty money, and corruption of the political system and mass media. Kremlin's structures, more or less successfully, always participated and still participate in all parliamentary or presidential elections. Their responsibility is to achieve that pro-Kremlin politicians get as much influence in the governance as possible.

In 2012, after his return for another term as the president, Vladimir Putin specifically strengthened and centralised the structure to keep exerting dirty influence on the neighbouring countries and significantly increased its funding. Kremlin was quite self-confident to give it an American name – soft power – and, in the person of Konstantin Kosachev, openly declare that Kremlin considered soft power as “integration without incorporation”.

As now it became clear to everyone who is willing to see, integration through dirty soft power was most evidently manifested in Ukraine. Viktor Yanukovich was the key instrument of Ukraine’s integration into Putin’s empire. Hard power was resorted to as soon as annoyed Ukrainians overturned the instrument of soft power. Rebuilding and modernisation of hard power started back in 2007. The reform of the Russian armed forces was implemented after a remarkable increase in funding and basically using money received from the West for gas and other resources.

This strategy was drafted and announced in early February 2014, before the bloodshed in Maidan, which made the EU and NATO states open their eyes.

Even with the eyes wide open, we must see much more and stay shoulder to shoulder in order to handle the new and, at the same time, old major Europe’s problem – Russia’s imperialism.

The Soft Strategy for the Containment of Russia is the continuation of our 2007 Russia Containment Strategy that pays special attention to another relevant topic – energy independence – without which neither we nor Europe will be able to contain Russia’s aggression.

Going through the both documents, you will understand how we, Lithuanian politicians, saw and still see Russia’s threats, its changing powers and the new technologies of their use. Quite for a while, we encountered Europe’s incomprehension and were referred to as Russophobes, and today, we have only to regret that we were right. President Putin proved it. Now we need the real European strategy for the containment of the Russian imperialism. We hope that our work will be a valuable contribution.

Rasa Juknevičienė
MP, Former Minister of National Defence (2008-2012),
Vice-Chair of Homeland Union-Lithuanian Christian Democrats

SOFT STRATEGY FOR THE CONTAINMENT OF RUSSIA

7 February 2014*

“Don't be afraid to see what you see”

Ronald Reagan

This analysis, which has been prepared through the joint efforts of persons interested in the problems of Russia's soft power, does not constitute an official document of the political party. Instead, it is intended for better defined and more specific discussions with the public, while the “Proposals” section is the most open for discussions and proposals as to the response of our state to this soft power. The document has been drafted by the working group led by Ms Rasa Juknevičienė and consisting of Mr Andrius Kubilius, Mr Arvydas Anušauskas, Mr Audronius Ažubalis, Mr Dainius Kreivys, Mr Mantas Adomėnas, Mr Kęstutis Škiudas, Mr Justas Šireika, Mr Andrius Vyšniauskas, Ms Indrė Pociūtė-Levickienė, Ms Ugnė Naujokaitytė, Mr Jaunius Petraitis, Mr Petras Mendeika, etc.

INTRODUCTION

In 2007, Tėvynės Sąjunga (Homeland Union) published a document titled “Russia Containment Strategy”¹, which is based on the name of the famous Russia containment doctrine coined after the World War II by American diplomat George Kennan. This post-war American strategic doctrine did not change over the entire cold war period until the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1990.

In 2007, after the first three years with the EU and NATO, the Homeland Union clearly stated in its strategic document that Lithuania could not be naïve and ignore the threats that are not eliminated by the EU and NATO membership. The document also marked the path of our energy independence which we started following after the 2008 parliamentary election. Then, after the impeachment of Rolandas Paksas, the strategy indicated threats posed by easy access to unhindered control of Lithuanian political institutions or the information space.

* First published (in Lithuanian) as: „Putino sulaikymo strategija“, Tėvynės sąjunga – Lietuvos krikščionys demokratai, 2014, ISBN 978-609-8120-05-9. References were updated in 2021.

¹ Available online (in Lithuanian) at: <https://tsajunga.lt/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Andrius-Kubilius.-Rusijos-sulaikymo-strategija-2007.pdf> Also available in English as a second part of this publication (from p. 35)42.

Over the last seven years following the publication of the Russia Containment Strategy, a number of goals set in the document were successfully attained. That is not all, and this is due to the crisis and the lack of experience. There is work that has been commenced, yet needs to be continued.

And today, we also need to state firmly that there are sound reasons to claim that the Russia Containment Strategy 2007 is not enough. First of all, this is because over the last years Russia underwent changes, regrettably, for the worse. It switched to different measures to attain its goals, posing new threats for us. Recently, Russia has been using increasingly effective means, to which it refers as “Russia’s soft power”. This is why we need to counterbalance Russia’s soft power by our own new Soft Strategy for the Containment of Russia. Just as in 2007, we expect that this our project will also receive attention from other political parties and that a large-scale political agreement may be achieved in relation to the principles and implementation of the Soft Strategy for the Containment of Russia.

I. CONTINUITY OF THE RUSSIA CONTAINMENT STRATEGY

1. *The neighbourhood of Russia has been the largest challenge to Lithuania for several centuries. The nature of Russia’s goals may change in the future from occupation of a territory to the occupation of governments’ and people’s minds. It would be irresponsible not to see those threats.* These are the opening words of the Russia Containment Strategy 2007 drafted by a working group led by Andrius Kubilius. They are still highly relevant today. At that time, the Homeland Union developed the Strategy expecting that it would become an agreement between political parties. Regrettably, since then no other political powers have understood Russia’s influence on Lithuania’s development and, in particular, its political processes.

2. Although encountering series challenges presented by the global crisis, the 15th Government (2008-2012) was determined to weaken the power of the major Russian instruments operating in Lithuania and focus specifically on the paths marked in the Russia Containment Strategy, energy, in the first place. Our Strategy 2007 says: *Russia is strengthening its influence across the region, including Lithuania, by increasing energy dependence on Russian resources. For this reason, Lithuania has to implement the strategy for reducing political Russian energy dependence by making this strategy the key priority of its foreign and domestic policy.*

3. In 2008-2012, not only a new energy strategy was adopted, but also the implementation of major projects precluding independence from Russian raw materials and influences started in electricity and gas sectors. Quite expectedly, this aroused fierce opposition, because energy has been officially

recognised as the main political instrument of the Kremlin foreign policy, and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation has referred to Europe's efforts to secure its energy independence as the greatest military threat.

4. *In the West, Lithuania should, first of all, seek realistic prevalence of Western states' approach to Russia's threatening development trends, says the Strategy 2007.* We have been continuously seeking the attainment of this goal with President Dalia Grybauskaitė. We succeeded in obtaining the EU's approval of the funding of major energy projects of our region. After the war against Georgia, assassination of Alexander Litvinenko in London, unrelenting scattering of rallies in Bolotnaya Square in Moscow and especially after desperate Kremlin's attempts to stop the success of the EU's Eastern Partnership policy, Western capitals informally state that no further illusions should be fostered in relation to Kremlin's policy as long as Putin is in power.

5. Regrettably, after the change of the attitude of the Polish political elite now in power the role their country plays in the region, Poland refrained from taking any organic leadership actions in our region in order to reduce its energy dependence on Russia. In 2007, we expected Poland to take such a role and even started talking of energy "Zzechpospolita".

6. Following the Russia-Georgian war, which dispelled the illusions of the NATO states as to possible changes of the present Kremlin's policy, we succeeded in convincing our partners of the necessity of defence planning and serious military training in our region.

7. After 2007, the EU adopted the Eastern Partnership programme, which was approved by the Government headed by Andrius Kubilius as the key priority throughout the Lithuanian Presidency of the Council of the European Union. *Together with its neighbours and U.S. policy architects in this region Lithuania should also become an active architect in shaping new neighbourhood policies. Lithuania should seek that the EU clearly understands the notions of good neighbourhood in the EU and in the EU's neighbourhood,* we said in our Russia Containment Strategy 2007.

8. The majority of insights of the Russia Containment Strategy 2007 concerning Russia's authoritarian path and the intention to intensify its influence in the neighbouring countries proved to be more than true. Russia, even though through indirect involvement, managed to stop the NATO enlargement process at the 2008 Bucharest Summit. This had an immediate impact on further development of Georgia, Ukraine and other states.

II. SOFT POWER ACCORDING TO KREMLIN

1. Kremlin's attempts to exert influence on the spirits of Lithuanian society and the societies of the neighbouring states and political processes are now referred to as the use of soft power. However, even according to Joseph S. Nye, an American political scientist and the author of the term, Russia's endeavours to exercise the so-called soft influence are not attractive and thus could hardly be considered as the soft power in its true meaning.

2. In order to find a proper definition for the Russian policy in respect of the neighbouring territories, specifically, territories controlled by the Soviet Union, one should first understand the goals of the present Kremlin. When resigning as the United States Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton gave Europe a very straightforward warning about the direction taken by Putin's Russia: *There is a move to re-Sovietise the region. [...] let's make no mistake about it.*

3. Anne Appelbaum, a journalist and communism expert, has recently defined what truly lies behind the demonstration of Kremlin's influences and powers: *Russia does not intend to start a war. Russia, rather, intends in the short term to undermine regional confidence in NATO, in U.S. military guarantees, in West European solidarity. In the longer term, Russia wants Scandinavia, the Baltic states and eventually all of Europe to accept Russian policies in other spheres.*²

4. By extending this new Cold War (according to the book by E. Lucas), Russia is ready to develop and use powerful strategic soft policy instruments from active exploitation of the potential of Russian-speaking compatriots³ in the neighbouring states to the enhancement of Russia's image abroad and direct influence on political processes in the near abroad by making use of "friendly" local media, local business related to Russia or services of local politicians. Russia admits that the use of soft power is becoming its major instrument of foreign policy. Full details are given in the concept of the Russian foreign policy approved in 2013, which provides for the allocation of large amounts by the Russian government and defines "the substantial state support" to be given to the Russian media and other communication channels with which cooperation is established in order to enhance Russia's image or otherwise attain the goals of strengthening the Russian soft power.

² Anne Applebaum, China and Russia bring back Cold War tactics, The Washington Post, 25-12-2013, The Atlantic Council, 03-01-2014. Available online at: <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/china-and-russia-bring-back-cold-war-tactics/>

³ The compatriots' policy is the Russian policy associated with V. Putin's coming to power and seeking to categorise all Slavonic people who have been historically living in Lithuania and other states occupied by the Soviets or who came here in the occupation period as belonging to their cultural civilisation and to mobilise, through various channels of public support, and use them for political goals that are antagonistic to the statehood of Lithuania or other countries.

5. The article “Stating the Russian Soft Power” by Oleg Surkov published in 2013 says that the world did not show interest in the Russian soft power until February 2012, where in his pre-election article Vladimir Putin emphasised that soft power was an instrument and the matrix of methods employed to attain foreign policy goals by making use of information and other influence instruments rather than weapons. V. Putin also noted that he understood the Russian soft power as *the possibility of exerting influence on the domestic policy of sovereign states*.

6. Konstantin Kosachev, a prominent Russian politician with many years’ service as the chair of the State Duma Committee on Foreign Affairs and now the head of the special agency of the Russian Federation “*Rossotrudnichestvo*”⁴, speaks of Russia’s soft power even more openly. In his article “The Specifics of Russian Soft Power”⁵ published in 2012, he argues that resorting to hard power against another state in modern times negatively affects the image of the state exercising such hard power, and for this reason, attempts to use soft power, to undermine the image of the rival state and to develop anti-brands designed to discredit foreign and domestic policy, economy, history, culture and education of the opponent states and which become effective foreign policy instruments, are much more effective. K. Kosachev develops the strategy of “integration without incorporation”, which is formulated as the key principle of the Russian foreign policy in the near abroad. K. Kosachev also openly explains that Russia started developing and using its soft power strategy, first of all, in order to preclude the elite of the near abroad countries (influenced by the West) from turning these countries into allies or even members of the Western alliance. This is why the societies rather than the elite of those countries of the near abroad have been chosen as the target for soft power, as affecting the spirits of the societies might destroy all elite efforts to seek further separation of these countries from Russia. In this regard, Russian-speaking compatriots, to which K. Kosachev refers as to a powerful seven-digit resource of the Russian soft power, play a special role, and Russia will, above all, attempt to show this resource that it has the power to determine their residents states would be less negatively disposed towards Kremlin, in other words, that the political elite of those states would be more favourable to Moscow. Therefore, K. Kosachev claims that the main today’s trend of international processes is the ability to make use of the possibilities of the soft power policy in order to promote own interests. According to K. Kosachev, at present, the soft power policy is best suited to the goals of the Russian foreign policy.

⁴ Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation.

⁵ Konstantin Kosachev, The Specifics of Russian Soft Power, Russia in Global Affairs, 07-10-2012: <https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/the-specifics-of-russian-soft-power/>

7. The long-term goals pursued by Kremlin in the Baltic states may also be defined more strictly. The nearest goal is integration without incorporation, which is to influence the political development of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia so that the pro-Moscow political elite would take the dominant position there. The article “Legacies, Coercion and Soft Power: Russian Influence in the Baltic States”⁶ by A. Grigas says that *Russia attempts to constrain the independence of the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and to undermine their political, economic and civilizational choices.* In other words, this is the endeavour to limit the sovereignty of the Baltic states by preserving or increasing their energy, economic and, finally, political dependence on or at least loyalty to Moscow rather than undermining their independence. Another goal formulated by the nationalists of the A. Dugin school is “integration with incorporation”: independence and statehood of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are temporary, they will not survive as states, therefore, it is expected and actively encouraged that the disappointment with their own governments will grow to the disappointment with the European Union and, when the time comes, for instance, with breaking off of the Euro-Atlantic relations within NATO, serious cataclysms in Europe or the global change in the balance of geopolitical powers, Russia will be able to get back lost territories.

8. As the last empire in Europe that still has not finally collapsed, Russia suffers from the post-imperialistic syndrome, which is more acute than in the case of other European empires that fell half a century ago. It is still committed to the geopolitical doctrine that has not changed since the times of Peter the Great – besides other territories, Russia necessarily needs to control the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea.

III. INSTRUMENTS AND MEASURES OF THE RUSSIAN SOFT POWER

1. Measures by which the Russian Federation pursues its goals in our state are well defined in the report of Lithuania’s State Security Department of 2012 to the public: *states that hostile to Lithuania attempt to undermine Lithuania’s sovereignty, history, power, foreign and domestic policy and seek to impede the implementation of the major strategic projects that are capable of ensuring alternative supply of electricity and energy resources. In pursuance of their goals, foreign states employ conventional power policy instruments and control of energy and economic resources and aim at forming influence groups in Lithuania capable of affecting decisions of Lithuanian political forces. Information, ideological and historical revisionism policy is being actively carried out against Lithuania. Apart from foreign power entities and organisations supported thereby,*

⁶ Agnia Grigas, Legacies, Coercion and Soft Power: Russian Influence in the Baltic States. Chatham House, 2012. Available online: https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Russia%20and%20Eurasia/0812bp_grigas.pdf

*security and intelligence services are also engaged in this process through active and aggressive intelligence activities.*⁷

2. Actions of Kremlin controlled by President Vladimir Putin were specifically disclosed to the Lithuanian society through the publication of information of the agency BNS concerning preparation for the coming Lithuanian presidential election: *The Baltic States Division of the Public Process Analysis Department of the Presidential Directorate for Interregional Relations and Cultural Contacts with Foreign Countries (...) plans, in the nearest future, to disseminate information purportedly discrediting the Lithuanian President, as new details of her background are being allegedly found out in Russian archives. According to the State Security Department, Russian special services are tasked with active search in Russian archives in order to collect discrediting information about high-ranking officers of the former Soviet Union with a view to having effect on them. Information published by BNS also says that Russia would use usual methods for these attacks – disinformation and discrediting by disclosing falsified documents, allegedly found in the Russia’s State Archive or by publishing evidence given by newly established witnesses. This information may be published also by making use of relations of the said Russian Presidential Directorate in Lithuania. The State Security Department claims that the Directorate has relations with the representatives of certain Lithuanian political parties and media and political scientists. According to the data of the State Security Department, last year, the Presidential Directorate for Interregional Relations and Cultural Contacts with Foreign Countries was visited by the representatives of the Lithuanian Poles’ Electoral Action and Lithuanian Russian Union; it is also said that representatives of the Directorate could get in contact with representatives of other Lithuanian political parties.*

4. Kremlin is intensely developing its “working tools”, and one of the latest was also identified in information from the State Security Department, which came to hand for BNS: *In 2013, this Directorate [...] established and now control the portal “rubaltic.ru”, which continuously provides anti-Lithuanian propagandistic information and disinformation and, at the same time, seeks to spread portal information in the public sphere of Lithuania.*

5. In Russia, soft power instruments and institutions controlling and coordinating them are being centralised. These processes are aimed at increasing the effectiveness of activities in financial and organisation terms and more efficient use of funds allocated by the Government for the

⁷ Annual Activity Report of the State Security Department, 2013. Available online at: <https://www.vsd.lt/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Veiklos-ataskaita-2013.pdf>

dissemination of information useful for Moscow. Funding is also being centralised in order to reduce embezzlement of funds and keep stricter control over institutions' actions.

6. In 2013, the agency “Rossotrudnichestvo”, one of the pillars in the coordination of soft power, directly received from the Russian federal budget by about 15% more than in 2012, while in 2014 funds were allocated in a greater amount. In her article “Making Sense of Russia’s “Soft Power”” published in 2013, Yelena Osipova⁸ says that in 2013 the budget of the said institution reached USD 500 million. This institution plays a crucial role in the preparation of the soft power doctrine and coordination of humanities programmes abroad. There is a steady tendency for the soft power policy implementation budgets to continue increasing. But this is only the amount of one budget item. Money also comes under other programmes, joint projects implemented with other services and a variety of “non-governmental” funds. Besides “Rossotrudnichestvo”, Y.Osipova also mentions “Russkiy Mir” and A.Gorchiakov foundations and such powerful instruments of the state propaganda for the abroad as television network “Russia Today”, radio station “Voice of Russia”, “Russia behind the Headlines” and “RIA Novosti” (before reorganisation). In addition to these, television channel “Perviy Baltiysky”, radio station “Russkoye Radio”, recent internet portal “rubaltic.ru” and other means are also dedicated to Lithuania.

7. The truth is that it is nearly impossible to determine how much Russia allocates for its information campaigns and other means for spreading soft power, as these are considered to include campaigns coordinated or supported by Russian security services and activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other ministries of the Russian Federation.

8. Notice should also be taken of “the rights protection centres” established, funded and controlled by Russia and operating in Lithuania – Independent Centre for Human Rights and Centre for the Protection and Investigation of Fundamental Rights.

9. For a few years, Kremlin’s focus has also been on young persons, both Russian-speaking and non-Russian speaking. Camps are organised, publications are provided for schools and diverse projects are supported to foster the Russian culture and introduce the concept of the Russian history policy.

10. There is no direct evidence, but it is likely that some of the popular Russian television and radio projects accessible in Lithuania are coordinated and funded, whether fully or partially, by various

⁸ Yelena Osipova, Making Sense of Russia’s “Soft Power”. Archived copy available at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20130819050832/http://www.globalinterests.org/2013/07/10/making-sense-of-russias-soft-power/>

Russian foundations or the agency “Rossotrudnichestvo” itself. Young persons are also targeted at through “national” Russian events, special programmes organised with the help of the Russian Orthodox Church and Russian-speaking schools.

11. The main goal of all these activities carried out in Lithuania is to stay in Lithuania’s cultural and information sphere, be visible and heard, keep the ideological position, find sponsors, make use of inaction on the part of local institutions and politicians and fill niches.

IV. INFLUENCE THROUGH THE MEDIA

1. In Lithuania, there are attempts to use Lithuanian media as the key instrument of soft power. Kremlin, which compromises each and every principle of democracy or freedom of speech and keeping in its hands all most influential Russian means of information, is still quite successfully using democracy rules in our state and a strong need for money in the media business.

2. According to experts, Kremlin annually allocates approximately USD 1 billion for the worldwide spread of information. USD 300 million a year is spent on the television channel “Russia Today”, which is among the most expensive projects with the strongest effect. It is accessible to 630 million people in over 100 states all over the world.

3. By drawing on pluralism of views fostered by the European democracy and by disguising under the allegedly different approach and the diversity of opinions, Russia actually seeks to promote its interest. This tendency is not new. The role of media in exerting influence on the public opinion is best reflected in the story of “Mažeikių nafta”. Former US ambassador to Lithuania has described Russia’s powers to exert, through energy, its influence on media, politicians and the public in his study published in 2014: *Back in 1999, when it became evident that LUKOIL would not become the owner of “Mažeikių nafta”, LUKOIL, via Moscow, replaced Russian ambassador to Lithuania with an intelligence officer whom they hoped would be of more help in securing control of Lithuania’s oil infrastructure. The new ambassador was Yuri Zubakov, a 25-year veteran of the KGB who had spent the previous year as liaison officer between the KGB and LUKOIL. Zubakov has never before been assigned outside Russia. Not long after Zubakov’s arrival, Williams Company and its supporters in Lithuania discovered that the number of negative press articles and rumours spread among by opposing parliamentarians increased significantly. It became clear that Zubakov’s*

*assignment was to preclude Williams from taking from LUKOIL its dominant partnership in Lithuania's oil sector.*⁹

4. Russia actively uses its soft power against our nationals and citizens not only in Lithuania, but also abroad by allocating increasingly greater amounts, acquiring (buying) Lithuanian newspapers issued there or by forcing them to go bankrupt and by establishing new free of charge publications seeking to generate hostility among Lithuanian emigrants towards their own state and its values. The weekly “Čikagos aidas” (Echo of Chicago), which has been published in Chicago, USA, since 2007 and is distributed free of charge (across the United States through more than 1,000 distribution points), is a case in point. It is directly funded by the same publishing group that also publishes the Russian newspaper “7Dnei”. Articles published in the weekly are directed against Lithuania's ability to follow the path to progress, undermine the achievements of the independence period, attempt to thrust the opinion that the present Lithuanian leaders, especially those with the right-wing views, are worthless and that they do harm to Lithuanian people and the state prosperity. Likewise, Russian soft power is used in the United Kingdom and other countries.

5. Kremlin has created its own directly controlled Russian channel “Perviy Baltiysky”. Russian channels make a considerable part of the programmes of all cable televisions registered in Lithuania. Kremlin's financial support is substantial for the local Russian-speaking media and possibly for the media of other national minorities. The content of such newspapers and portals are in complete accord with Kremlin's interests in the Baltic states.

6. The Independent Baltic Centre for Investigative Journalism “ReBaltica” established in Latvia has published the valuable study “Moscow has Woven a Web of Media and Politicians in the Baltic States”¹⁰, which provides a detailed analysis of the history of the channel “Perviy Baltiysky”, its interrelations with Kremlin and processes related to the channel's major influence owing to which Nils Ušakovs, a former journalist of this channel, became the mayor of Riga and the leader of the strongest Latvian political party “Harmony Centre” (Saskaņas Centrs), while in Estonia Edgar Savisaar has won Tallinn mayoral election for a few successive times.

7. Nevertheless, the strongest possible influence on the views of the Lithuanian society is exercised by the Lithuanian-speaking media. It differs, just as various groups of the society consuming it. For

⁹ Keith C. Smith, Russian Energy Politics in the Baltics, Poland and Ukraine, Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2004.

¹⁰ Inga Springe, Sallija Benfelde, Miks Salu, Moscow has Woven a Web of Media and Politicians in the Baltic States. Delfi.lt, 16-04-2012. Available online at: <http://www.delfi.lt/news/ringas/abroad/maskva-baltijos-salyse-yra-surezgusi-ziniasklaidos-ir-politiku-voratinkli.d?id=58138186#ixzz2sYICvFMq>

instance, in village shops, absolute monopoly is maintained by the “Respublika” publications group, which doesn’t even attempt to disguise its anti-European, ant-Western and often pro-Russian orientation. Taking into account the financial standing of the owner of the publications group, one could take an easy guess that such orientation is not a merely idealistic altruism. Regrettably, the Lithuanian law and order system still fails to go deeper into the scope of corruption and cash flows within the media acting against the national interests of Lithuania. Potential corruption in the Lithuanian “fourth power”, unlike the first three powers, is still neither made transparent nor prevented by laws. This creates the most favourable environment for the Russian soft power to develop and effectively operate in Lithuania. The scope of new, modern, democratic and transparent media is increasingly extends in Lithuania, however, the negative effect of the conventional media, which is unable to set for itself high standards of transparency and objectivity, on the Lithuanian society achieved through the spread of the Russian soft power is still dramatic.

8. On 8 January 2014, David Satter, an American journalist and expert on the Soviet Union and Russia, published his study “The Last Gasp of Empire: Russia’s Attempts to Control the Media in the Former Soviet Republics”¹¹, which focuses on Russia’s attempts to influence the information space across the entire territory of the former Soviet Union, including the Baltic states, and reads as follows: *The Russian regime is also finding ways to increase its influence on the news media in the independent [post-Soviet] states. The objective appears to be to manipulate their media environments in order to promote dependence on Russia and distrust of the West and to help Russia to pursue its political and commercial objectives [...]. The push by Russia to influence the media among its near neighbours not only marks an important thrust of Russian foreign policy, it also poses a major challenge to the international media development community, which over the past two decades has spent hundreds of millions of dollars trying to help build sustainable and independent media institutions in the former Soviet space. [...] Russia’s growing success in extending its influence through the media creates a complex and at times hostile environment for anyone who is trying to support independent media and the free flow of information, ideas, and opinions.*

9. In relation to the Lithuanian media, the said study by D. Satter points out that it is too small to attract the kind of investment from the West that might improve its quality. As a result, media outlets are generally owned by local businessmen who often treat their media properties as adjuncts to their business activities. According to D. Satter, media organisations – including important ones – may be sold to Russian-owned groups. For instance, in 2009, the Russian-owned Lithuanian bank

¹¹ David Satter, *The Last Gasp of Empire: Russia’s Attempts to Control the Media in the Former Soviet Republics*. Centre for International Media Assistance and National Endowment for Democracy, 2014. Available online at: https://www.cima.ned.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/CIMA-Russia%20report_David%20Satter.pdf

“Snoras” took control of 34 percent of the “Lietuvos Rytas” media group. The author also mentions that the owner of “Lietuvos žinios” is “Achema”, a fertilizer producer, and the largest consumer of natural gas in Lithuania. “Achema” receives natural gas at a sharp discount from the Russian gas monopoly, “Gazprom”. A similar discount is not enjoyed by any other Lithuanian producer. These are only a few examples showing how influence is exerted on the Lithuanian media.

10. Television still has the most significant impact on the views and moods of the Lithuanian society. For this specific reason, when taking over of the position in Kremlin, Vladimir Putin, first of all, took the main TV channels into his hands. Because of a relatively large number of channels operating on a small market, Lithuanian televisions face fierce competition, which, with the use of money, opens endless possibilities for dictating to televisions such internal policies that offer benefits. The best proof of this phenomenon is Christmas and New Year evenings of 2013, when the programmes of nearly all commercial televisions were exceptionally reserved for the Russian production, which is often subsidised by Kremlin. This provoked general discontent in social networks and discussions among journalists and observers. Regrettably, this is not enough to bring about changes.

11. Two years ago, Kremlin took a decision to pay special attention to social networks. A separate budget item is allocated for this purpose every year, and the development of special information attack systems have also started. Direct information attacks may also be identified among Lithuanian social networks, containing “Facebook” profiles created to aggressively spread Kremlin’s propaganda or internet pages developed with the help of persons cooperating with Russian intelligence services (e.g. movement “Būkime vieningi” (Let’s Be United)). Distrust of the state and hostility towards the EU, USA and NATO advocated by hired commentators (“30 centų kariauna” (The 30 Cent Soldiers)), spread of the pro-Russian propaganda, instigation of discord and dissemination of conspiracy theories through comments in information portals should be considered as continuous and uninterrupted information attack.

12. Information warfare through the media is directly related to cyber threats. In Lithuania, there were instances of cyber attacks against the portal that provided negative information to Kremlin’s disadvantage (e.g. the largest Lithuanian news portal “DELFI”).

13. Experts forecast that cyber threats will become major global threats of the 21st century and taking into account the fact that the Russian Federation makes sizeable investments in the development of cyber warfare tools, Lithuania, including its democratic media, is likely to suffer from a greater number of more severe cyber attacks. Threats of cyber attacks, as the possible

Kremlin's weapon against its neighbours, are well worth individual discussions at the governmental level.

V. POLICY FOR THE IMPEDIMENT OF LITHUANIA'S MAJOR STRATEGIC PROJECTS

1. Russia makes a particularly active use of its soft powers to achieve its energy policy goals which, according to the present Russian geopolitical doctrine, is the key instrument in Russia's attainment of its geopolitical goals. Russia seeks to maintain its energy empire irrespective of the fact that the political and economic empire fell back in 1990. The preservation of the former energy empire is the major instrument enabling Russia to influence the development of states that are still dependent on this empire.

2. In 2000, after the inauguration of Vladimir Putin as the Russian President, energy became the main instrument in implementing Kremlin's foreign policy in the post-Soviet space. Economic pressure, as the instrument implementing the foreign policy, is quite openly discussed even in the most important documents of country. For instance, the concept of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation published in 2008 says that, in order to safeguard its national interests, Russia *employs all available economic leverages, resources and competitive advantages*. Due to the absence of an alternative to Russian natural gas, in Putin's foreign policy, a particularly prominent role was given to the gas concern "Gazprom" and local companies acting in its interests.

3. For the first time, Lithuania encountered specific Russian soft power in energy matters in 1998-1999, when it invited the American company "Williams" to invest in "Mažeikių nafta" and opened negotiations in this relation. For the purpose of propaganda against investors in "Mažeikių nafta", tremendous efforts were channelled in order to prevent the signing of the contract, and, as a result, even Rolandas Paksas, the then Prime Minister, was compelled to withdraw from his office. It was for the first time that it became clear to which extent Russia controls enormous possibilities offered in the Lithuanian media and the political sphere, however, the result was not achieved due to the failure to affect the parliamentary majority of the Homeland Union and Lithuanian Christian Democrat parties then in power. On the other hand, hostility towards western capital artificially aroused among some parts of the society impaired the investment climate in Lithuania, and Rolandas Paksas, who received his political dividends from the opposition to "Williams", subsequently became the Lithuanian President. According to the certificate published by the media, with the help of Yuri Borisov, the businessman associated with the Russian intelligence service,

USD 6 million were granted for this purpose by “Lukoil”, which struggled against the appearance of “Williams” in Lithuania¹².

4. Even greater soft power resources were through by Russia in order to halt the Visaginas NPP project in 2012. Lithuanian special services succeeded in recording Russia’s decisions to spent millions in the Lithuanian information space in order to compromise the project and its major promoters – Homeland Union-Lithuanian Christian Democrats. For the sake of propaganda, Russia, seeking to interfere with the Visaginas NPP project, allegedly started developing its own Kaliningrad NPP project pouring into it hundreds of millions or even billions of US dollars. As soon as Lithuania said no to the Visaginas NPP project in a referendum, Russia decided that it achieved its propagandistic goal and, in the end, stopped the construction of the Kaliningrad NPP. The greatest success of the Russian soft power was achieved in the summer of 2012, where the approval for a referendum concerning the discontinuation of the Visaginas NPP project was given in the Seimas by the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party and its leader, present Prime Minister Algirdas Butkevičius. Originally, the main initiator of the decision-making by the Seimas concerning the referendum was member of the Seimas Vidmantas Žiemelis, whose son’s, Gediminas Žiemelis, concern has been recently developing billions worth business projects in Russia (see Chapter VII).

5. Russia was equally successful in implementing the soft power operation against shale gas exploration and investments of the American company “Chevron” in Lithuania. Not only the local media or green groups concerned about environmental protection, but also anonymous participants of social networks were used in order to prevent American investors from exploring our country’s oil and gas resources. Internet networks of agents of influence established during events in Garliava turned into an effective measure for shaping a negative opinion of active, but trusting Lithuanian citizens as to investments from the Western countries (first of all, USA).

6. In comparison with the first soft power operation against the participation of the company “Williams” in “Mažeikių nafta”, the recent two campaigns against the Visaginas NPP and “Chevron” were remarkably softer and milder, more sophisticated and better funded, as they succeeded in involving representatives of the artistic and cultural elite, moulding the opinion of the quasi-independent experts serving Russia’s interests. The major difference between the story of

¹² This certificate drafted in the Russian language was published in the Lithuanian media in 2003. Further information is available at “R.Pakšą rėmė Rusijos energetikos kompanijos? ”, delfi.lt, LNK, 26-11-2003. Available online at: <http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/rpaksa-reme-rusijos-energetikos-kompanijos-video.d?id=3241569>

halting of the recent two energy projects important to Lithuania, which finally ended in Russia's triumph, and the Russian failure, in 1999, to stop the plan of the then Government to attract American investors and prevent the transfer of "Mažeikių nafta" to the Russian company "Lukoil" is that in 1999 the project was supported by the Homeland Union-Lithuanian Christian Democrats coalition in the Seimas, which had a solid and substantial majority. In the meanwhile, in 2012, the four-party coalition led by TS-LKD, which supported the Visaginas NPP project, worked under conditions of the coalition of the actual governing minority with less than half of the votes. In 2013, the investment plans of "Chevron" received no clear support from the Government. In such cases, wide possibilities are opened up for the manifestation of the Russian soft power and manipulation of the public opinion of Lithuanian people.

7. The plan to reform the gas sector implemented by the Lithuanian Government in 2008 and the project of the liquefied natural gas terminal constructed with the state's efforts also encountered considerable resistance. The Russian soft power failed to stop these projects, as Lithuania managed to counteract the Russian soft power with Brussels' soft power, which is primarily directive power and also negotiation and anti-monopolistic investigative powers.

VI. RUSSIAN CULTURAL POLICY IN LITHUANIA

1. Evident Russia's attempts to influence Lithuania through cultural projects need a separate discussion. These make part of the Russian soft power policy and, objectively, this is one of the most successfully implemented areas of Kremlin's soft power policy.

2. A decade ago, it was noted that during Lithuanian national holidays the biggest indoor arenas hosted concerts of Russian performers with the programmes including chauvinistic or imperialistic songs, which are a matter of some controversy. The recent concert of Oleg Gazmanov held at the end of 2013 and considered as a provocation is a case in point.

3. Apparently, the classics of the Russian culture who have nothing in common with the present Kremlin's imperialistic policy also become political instruments intended to maintain the influence of the Russian culture on Lithuanian minds, especially those of the young generation.

4. Kremlin's goals in implementing the cultural soft power policy are clear: by making use of the Russification which took place in the period of the Soviet occupation and the gravitation of some part of the society of its own accord towards the Russian cultural sphere, to seek to fuel fears and psychological insecurity of Lithuanian people, to erase the boundaries between Lithuanian and

Russian cultural spheres, to make every effort to keep Lithuanians as much integrated in the sphere of the Russian popular culture, variety shows, television films, programmes, classical culture and sports (even basketball) culture as possible, thus implementing the strategy for integration without incorporation defined by Konstantin Kosachev. Such imbalanced and heavily subsidised invasion of the Russian culture in the Lithuanian cultural sphere has not been yet offset by equally strong Western cultural soft power.

VII. EXERCISE OF SOFT POWER THROUGH BUSINESS

1. The most precise definition of the threats posed by the Russian influence is provided by Edward Lucas, the British expert and observer of the magazine “The Economist”, who says: *What is the biggest threat posed by Russia? The single biggest threat is Russian dirty money. Russian dirty money going to political parties, politicians' personal pockets, think tanks, academia and NGOs. And then also Russian clean money. Russia doing deals with companies in EU countries with the result that the company says we have this big deal with Russia - politicians please don't jeopardize it. I think it's easier to cope with the clean money. The dirty money comes with a sort of heavy load of intelligence connections and manipulation and information gathering and information warfare, which makes it more difficult.*

2. Until now, discussions about the Russian soft power and business, as a rule, traditionally referred to large Russian energy companies operating in Lithuania or having considerable indirect interests in Lithuania, including “Gazprom”, “Lukoil”, ‘Rosneft’, “InterRAO”, “Rosatom”, etc. The endeavours of these companies to exert influence on Lithuania’s political decisions, their politicised price or supply policies or the policy for the impediment of Lithuania’s strategic projects are already quite well visible, continuously watched and well analysed by both Lithuanian special services and foreign analysts¹³. Apparently, these companies were, are and will be the instruments implementing the Russian soft power, and Russia itself does not make any secret of this fact. Lithuania’s Energy Independence Strategy is primarily the strategy for independence from thus implemented soft power. In 2008, Lithuania started implementing this Strategy and encountered strong resistance from Russia. Although various Russian soft power and other instruments were used for the purpose of resistance, a considerable part of this Strategy was or still is successfully implemented.

3. Until now, little attention was paid to the involvement of the Lithuanian businesses, in particular, businesses with considerable business interests in Russia, in the implementation of the Russian soft

¹³ See works by A.Grigas (fn6 above) and K.Smith (fn9 above).

power. Specifically, these include businesses, which are exclusively dependent on the supply of Russian raw materials or energy resources, which occupy a significant part of the Russian market in individual sectors or import and sell on the Baltic markets large quantities of specific products originating from Russia with a high profit margin, thus maintaining a long-term trade monopoly in this sphere. New Lithuanian businesses are set up in Lithuania with an exclusive right to develop in Russia billion worth infrastructural projects implemented by the Russian government. All these businesses are distinguished in Lithuania for their specific public and political activities.

4. Back in 2012, Lithuanian special services prepared and submitted official information about one large company which, during its negotiations on the supply of necessary energy resources in Moscow, received an offer for the requested lower rates of energy resources in exchange for its actions to be taken in Lithuania in order to discredit one large Lithuania's strategic energy project. As reported, the company actually fulfilled the condition.

5. Over the last two years, there were at least three well-funded major public political campaigns organised in Lithuania to impede large Lithuania's strategic energy projects or to create new problems at the time of Lithuania's integration in the European Union:

- (1) referendum on the Visaginas NPP project;
- (2) campaign protesting against "Chevron" investments in the shale gas sector;
- (3) referendum initiative to prohibit sale of land to EU nationals.

These political campaigns were aimed at achieving the goals of the Russian soft power strategy – to reduce Lithuania's efforts to achieve its energy independence and to arouse distrust among the population in the chosen western orientation.

6. Large Lithuanian businesses or associated persons also intensively participated in the abovementioned political campaigns. Publicly available information alone contains supporting facts:

- (1) The referendum on the Visaginas NPP project was initiated by member of the Seimas Vidmantas Žiemelis, whose son Gediminas Žiemelis runs large business both in Lithuania and Russia;
- (2) The initiative on a referendum was supported by the Lithuanian Peasant and Greens Union and its leader – Ramūnas Karbauskis, the major importer of Russian fertilisers and the country's largest agricultural businessman;
- (3) The concern "Achema" provided a generous financial support to the Lithuanian Greens Party and its leader Linas Balsys for speaking out against the Visaginas NPP. "Achema" also actively opposed the construction of the LNG terminal;

(4) Resistance to “Chevron” investments were actively upheld by the Lithuanian Peasant and Greens Union, its leader Ramūnas Karbauskis and artists supported under cultural projects set up on his own initiative;

(5) The referendum initiative to prohibit sale of land to EU nationals is also supported by Ramūnas Karbauskis himself.

4. The said businesses cultivate very close relations with or are directly dependent on Russia:

(1) Gediminas Žiemelis’ company “Avia Solutions Group”, according to the press, entered into a cooperation agreement with the largest Russian state-owned corporation “Rostec” on the establishment of a joint company which is expected to develop the new Moscow international airport in Ramenskoe. In 2014, “Avia Solutions Group” plans to continue its development. Until now, “Avia Solution Group” mostly operated in the CIS countries. The goal of “Avia Solutions Group” is to enlarge the circle of customers in growing Central and Eastern European markets and in the CIS countries. In 2011, “Avia Solutions Group” owned by G. Žiemelis was recognised as the leader of air transport in Russia and won the “Golden Chariot” award, which Gediminas Žiemelis received in Kremlin on 12 September 2012. The “Golden Chariot” award is jointly established by the State Duma and the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation.

(2) Companies owned by R.Karbauskis annually earn hundreds of millions as profit margin on profitable trade in nitrogenous and potassium fertilizers produced in Russia. In 2012-2013, companies of the Agrokocernas Group owned by R.Karbauskis generated LTL 782 million from the sale of fertilisers in Lithuania and Latvia. Profits from the sale of fertilizers make the largest and strategic part of the company’s income. Notably, the prospects of this business directly depend on the good will (interests) of Russia’s political and business elite.

(3) The profitability of the “Achema” business is determined by the prices of gas purchased from “Gazprom”, which are regularly negotiated by the representatives of “Achema” with the Russian gas monopolist. Gas imported from Russia is the main raw material in the production of “Achema” nitrogenous fertilizers (80% of the content), as a result, the competitiveness of “Achema” products and, at the same time, the profitability of the plant, directly depend on the Russian gas pricing and Kremlin’s good will (interests). The “Achema” group is most actively engaged in the Lithuanian chemical industry and transport sector. The backbone activities of the concern’s business are directly associated with Russia and Belarus.

5. The aforementioned and other similar Lithuanian businesses cultivating the same relations with Russia actively and directly engage in Lithuania’s politics and various elections and, in this way,

radically differ from the Lithuanian businesses which either operate only on the Lithuanian markets or successfully export to the Western markets:

- (1) Ramūnas Karbauskis, one of the largest importers of Russian fertilizers, is the Chair of the Lithuanian Peasant and Greens Union;
- (2) Viktoras Uspaskich, who both directly and indirectly leads the Labour Party, started building up his business from the import of Russian gas to Lithuania, where the authorisation for the import of Russian gas is always to be approved by Kremlin;
- (3) Until 2008, Rimandas Stonys and his company “Dujotekana” importing Russian took part in the political and public life both openly and in a number of non-public forms;
- (4) In 2003, Rolandas Paksas won the presidential election. A million worth support was provided to him by Jurijus Borisovas, the owner of Russian helicopter repair businesses in Lithuania and Russia. After the electoral success, he did not avoid taking control over the President himself, who, under such circumstances, was removed from his office after the impeachment. The construction company owned by R. Paksas also received a number orders in Russia;
- (5) In 2004, Kazimira Prunskienė, who was highly successful in the second round of the presidential election, was traditionally supported by “Arvi”, a large company with considerable business interests in Belarus and Russia involved in import and export of Russian fertilizers;
- (6) Vilnius City Mayor Artūras Zuokas, who is known for his particularly close relations (also referred to as “subscriber” relations) with businessman Andrius Janukonis and his concern “Icor” (formerly “Rubicon”), is also preparing for the 2014 presidential election. The utility services company “City Service” owned by the concern of A. Janukonis is one the largest providers of such services in Russia. For a few recent years, A. Janukonis has actively, strongly and visibly criticised energy independence policy pursued by President Dalia Grybauskaitė and the 15th Government and major strategic energy projects (Visaginas NPP, LNG terminal, implementation of the EU Third Energy Package in the gas sector, etc.) and publicly advocated for energy projects implemented by Russia (Baltiskiy NPP in Kaliningrad and Ostrovets NPP in Belarus). Vilnius City Mayor Artūras Zuokas, a presidential candidate, also actively participated and still participates in these campaigns against Lithuania’s energy independence policy.

6. Businesses related to Russia also own major means of mass media, which are often used for the spread of soft influences. Lithuanian businesses exporting to the West either are not engaged in these practices or are involved to a significantly smaller extent:

- (1) Viktoras Uspaskich or associated persons control the internet media group “Interneto žinios” (including the portal “balsas.lt” and a wide network of regional media portals);
- (2) The concern “Achema” controls the daily “Lietuvos žinios”, which previously actively conveyed a critical approach of “Achema” to efforts made in relation Lithuania’s energy independence;
- (4) Ramūnas Karbauskis controls and invests in the production of popular television series and sponsorship of cultural projects. The projects also involve prominent cultural players and artists, who then readily offer their support for public political campaigns initiated or backed by R. Karbauskis;
- (5) Vladimiras Antonovas and the bank “Snoras” (before bankruptcy) controlled more than 30% shares of the concern “Lietuvos rytas”;
- (6) Vladimiras Romanovas had a shareholding in “Baltic Media Holding”, i.e., “Diena Media News”, which published newspapers and controlled portals;
- (7) Until 2010, Gediminas Žiemelis, via the “ŽIA Valda” group, controlled the newspaper “Valstiečių laikraštis”;
- (8) There are other means of mass media owned by large Lithuanian businesses, which have not been identified as having direct relations with Russia, that also operate as if they were the instruments of the Russian soft power.

7. With reference to the use of Lithuanian business related to Russia for the attainment of soft power goals, the following summary conclusions may be drawn:

- (1) Lithuanian businesses which are largely dependent on their interests in Russia play an active role in Lithuania’s public and political life, while businesses cooperating with the West are far less active in Lithuania's public life;
- (2) Lithuanian special services have facts that businesses dependent on their interests in Russia were requested to perform certain tasks in Lithuania in order to achieve Russia’s goals;
- (3) Businesses that are dependent on their interests in Russia often initiate or support large public political campaigns which generally serve Russia’s interests, for example, hindering Lithuania's energy independence or its European integration;
- (4) Businesses related to Russia control a considerable share of Lithuanian national mass media.

These conclusions indicate the paths and tendencies. Business is as diverse as life is; different examples may be found in both the segment related to Russia and segments following other directions. One needs to understand the vulnerability of businesses having relations with Russia. Taking into account Kremlin’s practice of using economic means and sanctions for the attainment

of political goals, such business becomes highly vulnerable, as for political reasons, it may be threatened with restrictions, which, if imposed, result in significant business losses. Such businesses may be offered to become an instrument of soft power as a condition of their better performance. In order to avoid losses, such businesses naturally seek to exert influence on Lithuanian public institutions and induce them to take decisions beneficial to Russia. Normally, this leads to self-censorship and willingness to favour the Russian government and, at the same time, to attempt to influence decisions of the Lithuanian government.

VIII. HISTORY: ONE OF THE KEY TARGETS OF KREMLIN

1. Efforts to re-write main historical events play a special role in the Russian foreign policy in respect of the Baltic states. With its Reform Movement (Sajūdis) and restoration of independence, Lithuania recovered its historical memory, because the historical truth about occupation, partisan resistance, exile, tragedy of Lithuanian Jews, Russification and Sovietisation was brought back to the main legal documents and history textbooks. The 13th January became a moral backbone of the modern state of Lithuania.

2. Kremlin's attacks are now focused on all these historical events significant to the whole nation and all loyal Lithuanian citizens. They aim to undermine the moral foundations of the state, split and influence the society, keep it back in the Soviet times and discredit the Baltic states worldwide by showing them as pro-fascist, pro-Nazi, etc. For this purpose, special organisations have been created (e.g. pro-Soviet organisations "Lietuva be nacizmo" (Lithuania Without Nazism), "Latvija be nacizmo" (Latvia Without Nazism) and "Estija be nacizmo" (Estonia Without Nazism)) and pseudoscientific conferences funded by Kremlin are organised. Such a policy of historical revisionism primarily seeks integration without incorporation. By reminding own version of history, efforts are made to keep the Lithuanian society in the cultural-historical space controlled and historically interpreted by Kremlin. Special attention is devoted to the negation of occupation; post-war resistance is described as fratricidal civil war among Lithuanians rather than resistance to occupation, the Soviet period is portrayed as "the golden age" of Lithuania's industrialisation and cultural prosperity, the Reform Movement of Lithuania (Sajūdis) is defined only as an instrument of Mikhail Gorbachev's Perestroika and the 13th January is called a tragedy of "shooting among fellows". These attempts are made to eliminate the most important landmarks in the history of Lithuania and undermine the foundations on which the society is developing the new conception of the state, as no longer belonging to the Soviet system. The second goal, which is continuously pursued, is to portray the Baltic states in the West as nationalistic and fascist nations and Jew murderers in order to convince the West that nothing we say about Russia and Eastern Partnership

should be trusted and that the Baltic states are allegedly unreliable and failing to comply with the western standards of democratic values.

3. The expert analysis of articles about Lithuania published by the Russian media reveals that approximately 60% of such articles deal with history issues. Russian and Belarusian historians devote special attention to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania trying to prove that all its rulers were of Slavs and that the true Lithuanians of those times are now the residents of Belarus. Lithuanians residing in Vilnius are not those who could make any territorial claims in relation to Lithuania of the times of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. There are already political statements made that historically Belarus could claim Vilnius.

4. The most vivid and recent example of the attempt to discredit history is the attack against the “Forget-me-not” campaign. *“Sons of the motherland will rise remembering the great past, the past of painful challenges and noble sacrifices, with good examples of love for fellow men – that’s the major threat to someone”* – this is how Prof. Vytautas Landsbergis described the essence of the attack against the “Forget-me-not” campaign. The 13th January come under special attack because this is the historical date is considered by the young generation as the best symbol of patriotism and love for the motherland. This is not in Kremlin’s interests, as their goal is to promote disappointment and indifference in Lithuania. Nevertheless, the “Forget-me-not” campaign demonstrates that a great number of people miss unity and community and that they see the history of Lithuania as a crucial uniting factor.

5. One of the key goals of historical revisionism is the negation of occupation. With the development of Putin’s Eurasian policy, i.e. policy for the restoration of the new empire, Kremlin intensified its efforts even to deny the fact of occupation of the Baltic states. This is reflected not only in expert publications, but also in official statements of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Notably, the ideas of Aleksandr Dugin, the main Eurasian ideologist, are already quoted and promoted on web pages accessible in Lithuania, which are of some obscure origin and are funded by unknown sources.

6. The tragedy of Lithuanian Jews is a special target in discrediting Lithuania from the historical perspective. Various anti-Semitic attacks are used or even especially provoked to show Lithuania and other Baltic states to the world as pro-fascist and pro-Nazi countries. Such a wide-scale propagandistic tactic is also employed by Kremlin against Ukrainians struggling in “Euromaidan”.

7. Degrading and defamation of Lithuanian partisans who fought against the Soviet occupation is also the tactic that has been employed since the post-war years.

8. History was, is and will long remain the target of Kremlin's policy, because Kremlin makes every effort to prevent the formation of the clear patriotic foundation of our state that might unite the nations for further building up of the state.

IX. IMPACT ON THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

1. Since the very restoration of independence, attempts have been made to prevent Lithuania from developing a strong pro-Western political system. Special propaganda attacks were and are directed towards the politicians advocating for the reduction of the Russian influence and Lithuania's deeper European integration, in particular – for energy independence. The Kremlin's actions on the Lithuanian political stage are related to influences brought by business and local media (see Chapters IV and VII).

2. Action mechanisms are varied – through public organisations of Russian speakers and other organisations or through political parties. Some pro-Russian formations act and implement the Kremlin's policy openly (for example, Algirdas Paleckis' Socialist People's Front), while some political formations have gained influence by manipulating the feelings of people who are nostalgic about the Soviet times and not avoiding cheap populism to which these people are highly susceptible.

3. Lithuania has gone through several major political upheavals, when it turned out that the most important Lithuanian political institutions may easily be taken over by persons or money whose origin can be traced to Russia. Thus, in 2003 it turned out that the elected President of the Republic, Rolandas Paksas, was completely seized by Yuri Borisov, linked with a Russian military complex, and his advisers hired from the company "Almax". During the presidential elections, Borisov spent millions to support Rolandas Paksas, and the state managed to put an end to this seizure only by the impeachment process, which was painful to the public. Later, Uspaskich demonstrated his ability to take control over a considerable part of the Seimas through the use of the millions earned with the help of "Gazprom" and LTL 24 million accumulated by unclear and illegal means and used to fund his party's activities. The investigation of this case in Lithuanian courts has not been completed, however it is the largest political corruption case in the history of Lithuania.

4. Lithuanian special services have detected close relations of representatives of some parties with the relevant institutions of the Kremlin. The Russian embassy in Vilnius has also been observed on a number of occasions as actively taking an interest in and possibly affecting the activities of some parties or individual politicians. It becomes particularly active when Lithuania considers or adopts decisions on key energy projects. Judging by the explicitly favourable opinion regarding Lithuania's continued dependence on Russian energy systems and sources as voiced by some politicians or supposedly independent experts, it can be presumed that these individuals are under the influence of Russia's soft power.

5. Recently, the Kremlin has changed its tactics and particularly intensified its activities attempting to influence and to promote pseudo-patriotic and anti-European attitudes. Patriotism is a nice feeling which needs to be supported, it should not antagonise nations, and it does not contradict in any way Lithuania's integration into the EU. Upon acceding to the EU, Lithuania not only did not lose its identity, but is successfully recreating a genuine, sincere nationality ravaged during the Soviet era. The type of Russian nationalism promoted by Vladimir Putin is aggressive and is based on anti-European and anti-Western views. Manifestations of this aggressive Russian type of nationalism are increasingly often observed also in Lithuania. It is being actively disseminated through social networks and is manifested by the initiation of anti-European referenda.

6. One can observe a new action strategy being implemented in Lithuania: radicalisation of society through the formation of radical networks, often in social networks, and the radical communities created within them. High-profile public scuffles (Kedys' case) or initiatives (the referendum on the Visaginas Nuclear Power Plant, protests against shale gas, the initiative of holding a referendum on the sale of land to foreigners), which are promoted in the public space using large funds of obscure origin, become a catalyst for the formation of such communities. Reasonable concern over one or another issue is converted into conspiracy theories, which unite radical, self-assertive, and loud-mouthed communities of supporters. It may be noted that value themes to which the radical networks being set up appeal are used as an excuse; as a rule, they are a part of the repertoire of the conservative right: land, patriotism, family, ecology. The conspiracy theories used for the purpose of the formation of radical communities are based on the polarising scheme: (ordinary) people against the (corrupt, conspiring) elite. The established radical networks are used to spread the news and information weakening Lithuania's statehood and targeted against membership in the EU and NATO, with the largest share of the news and information having been taken directly from Russian sources. The information channels controlled by them comprise a single dissemination network which is used to implement an information campaign hostile to Lithuanian strategic interests. Radical communities and the information channels controlled by them as well as

the forms of political action used by them seek to impose the required topics, issues and ideas in public space and to infiltrate them into the political agenda of the state. Their emergence creates an almost irreducible non-systemic pressure on the unity of traditional political ideologies, which in its own turn polarises society, splits the electorate of traditional parties, promotes polarisation, also radicalises separate groups within systemic parties. Radicalisation of political issues and the entire public political field is taking place, the space of rational political discourse is narrowing down, attitudes of resentment and alienation from the State are encouraged and are becoming increasingly dominant in the political environment. Political attention is diverted from topical political problems (for example, the agenda of necessary reforms), while the possibilities of achieving strategic objectives (such as energy independence) are dramatically reduced or even eliminated (the cases of “Chevron”, Visaginas NPP). The role of traditional political forces defending statehood (and capable of doing so) is becoming weaker, and preconditions are created for the emergence and consolidation of extremist political forces. Lithuania’s reputation is being damaged (information is being disseminated depicting Lithuania as a “fascist state” or as a hyper-corrupted and authoritarian state which is governed by “the Clan”). Trans-Atlantic ties are being weakened, anti-Western and anti-American views are being disseminated and are becoming well-rooted, while the interests of “Gazprom” and “Rosatom” are directly defended with the help of such radical networks.

7. We see the increasing number of efforts of the Kremlin to demonstrate that Russia is the only defender of Christian values against the “evil” coming from the West. Its purpose is well served by the European left, who promote in Europe their policy directed against a traditional family. Putin not only successfully uses this to threaten the Eastern Partnership countries choosing the European course, but also attempts to unite under his wing the individuals and organisations sincerely protecting family values across Europe. Such a policy of the Kremlin is a cunning disguise, but it is not easy for everyone to perceive it.

8. It is worth noting that all political forces have encountered attempts to influence political processes in Lithuania through political parties. The TS-LKD is not an exception. Parties have neither their own special think tanks nor any possibilities of obtaining information on such attempts from the relevant services in order to timely assess the activities of their members. The resilience of the political system to external influences through Russia-related business increased thanks to changes introduced to the principles of funding of political parties, when support offered by legal persons was refused, however special attention still needs to be devoted to this dimension of influence and to the enhancement of the resilience of the political system.

9. In Lithuania, there also act radical pro-Russian political groups openly seeking Lithuania's connection to the Russian Federation. One of such movements is "Let's Be United", which fought fiercely against the investments of the American company "Chevron" in shale gas exploration in Lithuania, wrote open letters to Vladimir Putin and Alexander Lukashenko, and is currently involved in a provocation inviting to connect the Klaipėda Region to Russia.

X. PROPOSALS

(1) General provisions

1. While in the area of energy security it is absolutely clear what Lithuania needs to do, what homework it has to perform, what common policy of the European Union it has to seek, in the area of information warfare not only there has not been formulated any clear strategy yet, but there is also the lack of a uniform perception of politics and society when it is needed. To this end, amendments to the "Television Without Frontiers" Directive could be initiated.

2. Publicity and provision of information to the public are a key tool in countering the Kremlin's propaganda attacks and information warfare. People need to know how the propaganda machine and soft power work, not only when their actions are clearly visible, and be much more resistant to them. This requires not only the continuous monitoring of what is happening in our public information, cultural or political space, but also a much deeper analysis and study, which would allow people to develop a much better understanding of how to resist the integration without incorporation strategy.

3. Education is also one of the most important tools in fighting against Russia's soft power. Therefore, fostering of a modern patriotism understandable to the present-day younger generation at all levels of the education system must be encouraged and consolidated. In the politics of memory, the history of the exile and resistance of the 20th century plays a significant role, however with the change of generations, one needs to look for other forms of its presentation: not only by means of traditional events (hosting of memorial days at schools, commemoration events at monuments), but also using symbols or images. The age of the Internet and social networks requires direct involvement of youth in the dissemination of certain information, for example, computer applications can be designed for historical and cognitive games, development and education.

4. Young people are already much more resistant to propaganda, receive more comprehensive information and are interested in it. However, it is necessary to take account also of the other

party's efforts to focus specifically on youth. Therefore, it is necessary to inform people about each explicit attack and implicit processes of soft power at work. It is necessary to pay attention to this situation at secondary and higher education institutions in fostering the young generation's resilience to propaganda.

5. Involvement of partners in the EU and NATO. It is necessary to act more confidently and more broadly in talking, at all levels, about the influence of Russia's soft power with representatives of the states which are friendly to Lithuania. One needs to clearly understand that in respect of Lithuania, Russia uses much more profound and more effective soft power instruments which it does not use against old Europe or the United States. Therefore, those countries still have a very low awareness of what we have to deal with. Latvia has proposed, and NATO has supported the establishment of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Riga to analyse influences on the security environment using information channels as a tool.

6. It is necessary to propose that the EU formulate its policies, helping to counter propaganda warfare in countries in Russia's neighbourhood.

(2) Neutralisation of the main tools of the Kremlin in the public information and cultural field

1. In Lithuania, it is necessary to reduce the network of Russian propaganda tools. Lithuania has ratified one of EU directives on the limitation of products from third countries in information channels. Lithuania must seek to reinforce the directive by incorporating provisions against third-party propaganda.

2. At the EU level, it is needed to evaluate and modify a system of registration and control of the media disseminating the interests of third countries by propaganda means.

3. It is necessary to change the procedure for broadcasting the films having a particular propaganda impact and subsidised by the Russian government on Lithuanian television channels:

(1) The broadcasting of such films must be subject to the appropriate tax policy so that their broadcasting on the Lithuanian television channels would not be a profitable business;

(2) The products originating from outside the EU and NATO countries must make up not more than 30 per cent of Lithuanian television channel airtime, and Russian-made products must be labelled "Made in Russia";

(3) Films which are clearly of a propaganda nature, especially those which praise perpetrators of crimes against Lithuanian citizens or the Soviet period must not be allowed to broadcast at all;

(4) A programme for promoting media resilience to the influence of the Russian soft power must be adopted. This programme must provide an objective evaluation of specific media or programmes by their compliance with the Russian soft power strategy, together with publication of the results of this regular evaluation and a list of the media or individual programmes being under the Russian influence and imposition of higher taxes on the media disseminating such products, as it is done in respect of erotic, pornographic or violence-inciting media;

(5) The media should formulate benchmarks that could be relied upon when providing and shaping the cultural and information content; media compliance with these benchmarks would be used as a criterion when allocating state support.

4. It is necessary to expand in Lithuania the scope of the Western information field. The films broadcast in the English language must be translated by displaying Lithuanian subtitles, as it is done in neighbouring countries, rather than by dubbing. The more so that such a practice already applies to the films produced in Russia.

5. It is necessary to allow the Lithuanian audience to watch also Latvian and Estonian national television channels in Lithuanian or English, or at least the core programmes of these countries' national television channels (possibly translated into the Lithuanian language, or displaying subtitles in Lithuanian). This would promote a broader understanding of events in the neighbouring countries, common threats and problems and the ways of solving them.

6. With a view to consolidating the overall media resilience to corruption and money influence and enhancing the transparency of media activities:

(1) EU funds used for publicising of EU programmes must be managed centrally, rather than through separate ministries;

(2) Data on the amount of EU funds allocated to the media must be centrally stored at the state level. The data must be regularly published on a yearly basis;

(3) The media must annually publish data on the number of contracts on the provision of communication services concluded and the parties to the contracts. These reports must be audited using state funds and be available to the public;

(4) State funds must be used to perform an annual study of the circulation and audience of each media.

7. The Lithuanian Government must establish an institution responsible for monitoring of vulnerability of the cultural and information space to Russia's soft power. This authority must conduct investigations of dumping in respect of Russian cultural projects.

8. It is necessary to provide funds in the state budget for effective resistance to Russia's soft power targeted at Lithuanian emigrants and to draw up and implement a plan for the provision of information to the emigrants, while supporting and maintaining traditional information channels and media long established in diasporas and seeking the establishment of new channels in response to new technological opportunities and challenges.

9. The Ministry of Culture must set up a division to be in charge of the preparation and implementation of a strategy for the development of Lithuania's soft power in the country's cultural and public space. State funding must be ensured for the implementation of the programme. The funding and promotion of the cultural and educational programmes fostering a positive, unifying and pro-European patriotism and historical memory programmes must also be ensured.

10. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs must complete the improvement of historical memory policy recommendations and a guide on the historical issues topical for Lithuania as prepared in 2012 and presented for the improvement to the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This information must be communicated to all Lithuanian diplomats and politicians.

11. We propose that the Minister of Foreign Affairs institutionalise an informal interdepartmental historical memory policy group set up by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the previous term to draft annual historical memory fostering plans, carry out monitoring and prevention of historical propaganda in the international policy, and coordinate cooperation of Lithuanian departments with foreign partners on the issues of historical memory and justice.

12. The Government must initiate the resumption of activities of the Commission for Negotiations on the Compensation for the Damage Inflicted on the Republic of Lithuania by the Army of the former USSR during 1940-1991 and by the Army of the Russian Federation during 1991-1993 as approved on 28 September 2012. Lithuania's position regarding the compensation for the damage is, although not in the most active mode, nonetheless an important long-term policy guideline or landmark which needs to be preserved through protection against the consequences of the policy of integration without incorporation.

13. Ideological works of the Soviet period must be removed from Lithuanian public spaces.

(3) Obligations for businesses protecting against their use for the dissemination of Russia's soft power

1. Additional transparency and publicity requirements must be applied to the companies operating media, the companies owned by state politicians and the foreign funds operating in Lithuania. The mentioned legal entities should additionally declare the share of their profits which is obtained from business in Russia, the share of their acquisitions which consists of raw materials or finished products purchased in Russia, the amount of sponsorship funds which they provide and the public organisations which receive them.

2. Lithuanian businesses having large business interests in Russia and engaged in cultural charity and patronage of cultural projects in Lithuania must publicly declare their business interests in Russia;

3. Lithuanian businesses having extensive business interests in Russia and supporting important political, social or public processes must publicly declare the projects supported by them and their business interests in Russia;

4. At the requirement of the Government or the Seimas, the State Security Department must investigate and make public the sponsors of public political processes and their business interests in Russia.

(4) Implementation of Lithuania's soft geopolitical doctrine – convergence with the Nordic countries

1. Lithuania must make conscious efforts to find an effective mechanism for the development of Western soft power in Lithuania thus seeking to reduce and balance the dominance of Russia's soft power. Conscious efforts by Lithuania in aiming at a faster and more effective convergence with the successful Western countries which are geographically closest to Lithuania, namely, Scandinavian countries, would contribute the most to achieving this goal. Their economic, social, cultural and quality of life success could become an inspiration and a new national ambition for the society and political community of Lithuania.

2. Such efforts focused on the consolidation of Nordic soft power should begin with a much greater visibility of Scandinavian countries in the Lithuanian cultural and information space. All possibilities are available, given an extensive participation of Scandinavian companies in the Lithuanian economy. This participation must be manifested through the dissemination of information in the areas of culture, art, film, theatre, television and other areas in Lithuania.

3. Such a convergence with the Nordic countries must be perceived by the Lithuanian political elite as a task of particular importance. Approaching Scandinavian soft power implies moving away from Russia's soft power. In order to achieve this, a much intellectually stronger national elite is needed, and a conscious effort is necessary for its mobilisation, fostering, and education in the Nordic spirit. A weak national elite is our Achilles' heel, which is effectively exploited by Russia for the dissemination of its soft power in Lithuanian society.

4. On the example of Scandinavian and other Western countries, conditions must be provided for the emergence and development of political parties' think tanks. The state budget must provide for a specific share of the budget grant as allocated to political parties which the parties could use exclusively for the maintenance of the mentioned think tanks.

(5) Reform of activities of the State Security Department and other special services. Political attention to soft threats

1. It is necessary to analyse the legal framework and to formulate the provisions which would create for the State Security Department and other intelligence institutions legal possibilities to inform the public about the threats to national security observed by them, including the Kremlin-funded propaganda.

2. The State Security Department must have the obligation to carry out monitoring of Russia's soft power at work in Lithuania from the security perspective and to publish annual public reports.

3. The State Security Department must develop a procedure for providing information to state leaders which would allow the persons who have received such information to make it public easily, without compromising the intelligence and counter-intelligence work done by the State Security Department. The current practice, according to which the secrets of the Russian Federation and other countries concerning the influence on our country's political and economic processes are becoming Lithuania's state secrets, and their disclosure is subject to prosecution and punishment, is flawed.

4. The Seimas must annually organise comprehensive discussions of the reports of the State Security Department and the Government – “debate on Lithuanian security”.

5. The practice of intelligence institutions reporting to the public on a biennial basis is a commendable one. However, the reports could be even more confident and more informative.

6. We propose holding on security issues not only closed-door international conferences, such as the annual security conference “Snow Meeting” hosted in Trakai, but also national-level professional seminars for Lithuanian politicians and experts on issues of the security policy.

RUSSIA CONTAINMENT STRATEGY

PLAN FOR DIMINISHING RUSSIA'S INFLUENCE ON LITHUANIA

9 May 2007

Introduction

For several centuries now, having Russia in its direct neighbourhood was and continues to be the greatest challenge for the Lithuanian state, and this will remain so in future. The nature of Russia's intentions - from territorial occupation to occupation of government and minds - may be changing with time; however, it would be unwise to discard the threats Russia poses altogether. Lithuania does not have the right to lose sight of its interests in midst of the discussions and arguments between Russophobes and Russophiles. Lithuania should remain realistic in its approach towards Russia; we should be able to openly identify the present and possible threats it poses to our national security. We should have a strategy to tackle the threats. In order to guarantee its own safety, Lithuania should implement the strategy at a variety of areas and sectors.

In recent times, particularly during Vladimir Putin's Presidency, Russia became increasingly capable of reaching its geopolitical aims through wielding institutional and economic influence, and Russia's geopolitical goals and objectives are often related to Lithuania. Therefore, the Homeland Union is convinced that our nation should have a clear resistance strategy to resist the increasing influence from Russia.

1. Russia is consistently becoming an increasingly authoritarian state with policies shaped and implemented by power structures. Recent "Freedom House" reports identify Russia as a non-democratic state comparable to Belarus and North Korea. The latest developments in Russia's relations with its neighbourhood, particularly Estonia and Georgia, clearly demonstrated that Russia is becoming an authoritarian state and tends to adopt an aggressive approach to its neighbours. The instruments Kremlin employs to demonstrate its aggressiveness are many and multifaceted, starting with instigating unrest in Tallinn, blocking transit of goods by rail and staging attacks against the Estonian embassy in Moscow, and finishing with the economic blockade of Georgia, persecution of Georgian citizens in Russia, the bans on meat imports from Poland, and discontinuation of oil supply to Lithuania through the *Druzhba* pipeline branch. Apart from posing a danger to its direct

neighbourhood, Russia is becoming a danger to itself. The West is starting to realise this as well, and that was evident in the US Vice President Dick Cheney's speech in Vilnius in spring 2006.

2. So far, Russia's development scenarios leave little room for hope that Russia will be transformed into a European democracy in the near future. By no means does Russia's aggressive ruling elite want this to happen. Therefore, Russia is gradually turning away from the European democratic traditions towards the Asian-type autocracy, which is more characteristic to traditional Russia. It is now evident Russia has so far failed to come to terms with the loss of its territories, i.e. the states that regained independence, and continues to claim they had not been occupied in the first place. The pressures resulting from the deconstruction of the empire and the loss of former continental colonies further stimulate the shift towards autocracy in Russia and transform the country into an aggressive state. In its own turn, Russia's aggressiveness directed at its neighbours and its own regions calling for more autonomy may further encourage the destructive internal processes as well as pressures in Russia's neighbourhood and inside the Russian Federation. These in their turn will further reinforce the shift towards an aggressive and authoritative regime in Russia.
3. The Russian society fails to provide any resistance to the authoritarian and aggressive Kremlin actions. The authoritarian regime of China, and not the European democratic model is the example a major part of Russia's intellectuals prefers to follow. Unlike China, however, Russia's authoritarian regime is not central to this country alone. The drift towards authoritarianism is Russia's answer to the nation's disillusionment with the period of democratic reform leading to a major loss of territories previously owned by the empire. Russia reacts to the failures of democracy by shifting towards an authoritarian rule and territorial revanchism.
4. Russia is increasingly serious and determined in its attempts to wield more influence in the post-soviet region. The measures Russia uses to attain its ends are becoming progressively more effective, aggressive and better funded. Russia is more active in the Baltic States, Lithuania included. Russia's attempts at pulling the strings of Lithuania's political life are becoming bolder still. Now that the West and Russia are no longer in confrontation over the EU and NATO enlargement, Russia's position in the Baltic Region is increasingly similar to the one it enjoyed in the cold-war era.
5. An increasingly invasive cultural propaganda of Russia can be observed in Lithuania at the moment, whereas the local resistance to this type of attacks is waning. The Lithuanian society largely tends to think our EU and NATO membership will naturally provide us with a safe shield from Russia's influence. The political system in Lithuania, however, is still a far reach from the European model. The old red tape coupled by the cynicism of the new bureaucracy and dire corruption create a sense of increasing disillusionment in the nation, evident in several waves of electorate support for a number of varying populist leaders. Such a democracy is consistently discrediting itself. Under these circumstances, it is fairly easy for Russia to wield an ever-increasing influence over Lithuania's political system. The Lithuanian politicians can thus be frequently seen fighting for a status of Kremlin's favourite and not for getting support of the electorate. Within the recent years two trends could be observed in Russia and Lithuania. Though concurrent, they clearly differed in nature.

Russia tended to concentrate power in the hands of a single leader, with the state policy growing more aggressive and sophisticated. Concurrently, in Lithuania erosion of the political system and major state institutions could be observed. The influence of the *Dujotekana* company which is in the process of being revealed, clearly demonstrates how far the erosion progressed: the interests of the *Gazprom* mediators backed by high officials from Kremlin are served through influential informal political power centres in Lithuania, the major state security institutions and the media that shape the public opinion.

6. Russia is using new power levers, i.e. the information resources, the telecommunications, the media, and educational institutions for the purpose of increasing its informational expansion in the information spaces of Lithuania. A neo-colonist policy is implemented both in Lithuania as well as in the rest of Russia's near neighbourhood. The share of Russian-made programmes and Russian-language content in the Lithuanian television has increased rapidly. This said, the free market based explanations for the phenomenon do not seem convincing. This year the Russian legislators have allocated nearly a billion Roubles "for the purpose of combating the colour-revolutions" and spreading propaganda in the Baltic States. Therefore, in this context it would be naïve to put the blame on the free market and the growing demand for information alone.
7. Upon our accession to the EU and NATO we were hopeful of becoming the Western citadel in the East, however we hardly succeeded. Concurrently, Moscow spares no effort to make us an Eastern citadel in the West. As members of the EU and NATO we have proved to be even more interesting to Moscow. Russia has a clear strategy for implementing its citadel strategy. With NATO and EU enlargement to the Baltic region now completed, the Western democracies tend to believe they have made a lasting contribution to our security and therefore do not intend to take any part in the psychological warfare. Even the US has discontinued its broadcasts in Lithuanian. Western democracies, with the exception of the USA, do not care about our ambition to become the Western citadel; therefore we are left alone to confront a powerful, effective and well-funded citadel strategy backed by expensive Russian oil and gas.
8. Our forecasts on the future relations between Lithuania and Russia should be based on the understanding of Russia's interests and objectives relating to our bilateral relations. In theory, the Kremlin officials may employ three scenarios vis-à-vis Lithuania. The first would be a Lithuania completely free from Russia's influence; the second would promote a Lithuania's total dependence on Russia, and the third would be an intermediate scenario, where the Finland approach, or Finlandization would be applied to Lithuania.
9. Account taken of the prevailing opinions in Russia that a strong country will always start expanding its territory, the first scenario is historically and geopolitically unviable. Ever since the Middle Ages, Russia had never demonstrated any lack of interest in making an impact on Lithuania. Therefore, there is little room for hope that in the near future the relations between Lithuania and Russia will become similar to the relations between Germany and Luxembourg, or France and Belgium.

10. The implementation of the second scenario, based on which Lithuania would completely submit to Russia's influence, is also not likely. Even if Lithuania would drift towards this scenario, Russia would find it strategically disadvantageous and finally the West would provide its own political reaction to it as well.
11. The third scenario is by far the most realistic one. Lithuania's Finlandization, or rather encouraging its dependence on Russian gas means that Russia will continue to put major efforts aimed to win the war with the West over political influence on Lithuania through the use of Lithuania's EU and NATO membership and through establishing the Kremlin citadel in the West. Undoubtedly, this type of influence would remain undercover and Lithuania could officially continue to rejoice at its outward independence. This scenario is particularly realistic provided the US are drawn towards concentrating their political focus and resources on Asia and the Middle East due to geopolitical reasons and therefore the US presence in the European matters dwindles.
12. With this perspective in mind, Lithuania should draft a realistic long-term action plan that could be termed the **Russia Containment Strategy**. The strategy should be aimed to ensure Russia is unable to implement its objective of Finlandization in Lithuania. This strategy should cover three areas of Lithuania's national interests, including:
 - Lithuania's foreign policy-related national interests in the West;
 - Lithuania's foreign policy-related national interests in the East;
 - Reinforcement of the internal political and social resistance to any influence from Russia.
13. **In the West**, Lithuania should first and foremost strive to make sure the Western democracies adopt a *realistic* approach to the development and dominance of dangerous trends in Russia. We need to work towards changing the approach of the West towards Russia, which so far has been based on treatment of Russia as a separate case with separate criteria for evaluating relations with Russia. Europe continues to be dominated by the approach best represented by the former Chancellor of Germany Gerhard Schroeder, i.e. an excessive political investment in the purportedly peaceful future relations with Russia. This approach was based on the idea that the economic cooperation between Europe and Russia and particularly their cooperation in the energy sector would draw Russia closer to the European values. However, so far a contrary phenomenon can be observed. Europe is increasingly dependent on Russia's rules. Europe was forced to turn a blind eye on Russia's war in Chechnya. As we saw back in 2006, Europe remained a silent observer of Russia's actions in Ukraine and unwilling to continue the gas supplies because of the choice Ukraine opted for during the Orange revolution (a choice which was not pro-Russian). Now we can see the belated actions of the EU in defence of its member state Estonia from the aggressive and defiant attacks from Russia.
14. Lithuania should support a single and strong EU, because the increase of importance of the EU institutions and formation of a common foreign policy and energy strategy would diminish the role of the states which continue to be excessively sympathetic with Russia (e.g. Chirac's France and Italy governed by Berlusconi) in shaping the EU-Russia relations.

15. Therefore, Lithuania should be a determined partisan of the new Constitution for Europe. Equally, Lithuania should be a firm supporter of the EU budget review allowing to increase the budget and to allocate sufficient resources for funding of the new EU policies, including the energy policy and the new East Neighbourhood policy.
16. The more pro-American Europe is, the less it will be influenced by Russia. This guideline should consistently inform Lithuania's actions. It is within Russia's interests to see growing tensions between the US and the EU with subsequent decrease in the US influence on European policy. This would allow Russia to increase its influence over Europe. Lithuania should be consistent in defending the good prospects for EU-US relations. The conditions that may lead to worsening of transatlantic relations should be considered by Lithuania to be posing a danger to Lithuania's national security.
17. Lithuania should be equally active in Central Europe and at the EU level in promoting the implementation of joint European energy projects leading to a decrease of European energy dependency on Russia. Equally, Lithuania should encourage Central European cooperation in the policy area with the purpose of making the region a shaper of the basis for the EU- Russia policy. This work should stand at the top of the Lithuanian foreign policy agenda.
18. Lithuania is located in a region that throughout history was always an easily exchangeable card when Lithuania's large neighbours played their territorial games with their own interests at heart. Lithuania can never be sure Germany and France will not pay a blind eye to Lithuania's problems. Russia's efforts to wield influence in Europe are getting more aggressive. Lithuania may remain an area where further expansion of Russia's influence will be seen. Therefore, it is particularly important for Lithuania to retain and reinforce its strategic partnership with Poland in order to encourage Poland to take up the role of a regional leader and provide shelter from Russia's influence.
19. "The Energy Union between Lithuania and Poland" is the most important strategic infrastructural project for Lithuania. It should cover Lithuania and Poland, as well as other supportive countries that are resistant to pressures from Russia. Lithuania's energy independence may only be ensured after the Baltic Region is also connected to the electricity system of Europe, namely the UCTE system. The construction of a new nuclear power plant should also be an integral part of an extended system of insuring energy independence and integration of the Baltic region with the European energy systems.
20. Equally, only in pooling efforts with Poland, Lithuania will be able to create and have an independent gas supply infrastructure independent from the *Gazprom*.
21. **IN THE EAST**, Lithuania has little hope to effectively attain any objectives through acting on its own. Therefore, Lithuania should not remain deluded about its purportedly active work in the new EU neighbourhood. Conversely, Lithuania should take up a more active stand inside the EU and NATO for the benefit of the Eastern neighbourhood. The expert advice, support and educational work in the states of the region should be better targeted and better funded. Through a more active

role in the West, Lithuania should traditionally aim to spread the European values and democracy to the East to the largest possible extent. This can only be achieved through leaving the door open for these states to get closer to the EU, and by promoting and reinforcing the importance of these relations for the EU itself. The brutal and occasionally successful Russia's attempts to put a halt to the expansion of this area are the price the region should pay for the European awakening.

22. Lithuania together with its neighbours and the US policy architects in the region should become the architect of a new neighbourhood policy. We need to strive for the EU to make a clear distinction between the new neighbourhood in Europe and the European Neighbourhood Policy.
23. Lithuania may continue to believe that Russia's aggressiveness vis-à-vis its neighbours will produce a reaction of the EU and NATO. The aggressive actions on Russia's part encourage the formulation of a more unified policy of EU relations with Russia. After Russia suspended gas supplies to the Ukraine, Europe was slow yet effective in embarking on the shaping of a single energy policy. In the same vein, Russia's political attacks against Georgia and Estonia should stimulate the EU to adopt a single policy. It is high time for Lithuania to propose the EU to deliberate on the European Russia containment strategy and to turn a deaf ear on the intimidators saying these actions are anti-Russian and will not produce a positive reaction from Russia.
24. Lithuania can hardly be expected to be influential enough to change the political guidelines in Russia or shape any changes in Russia's interests, however, Lithuania may hope that in the long term Russia will be forced to come to a better understanding of the fact that its major policy areas and defence of its interests should be Eastward-driven, and not Westward-driven. Kremlin will not be convinced by discourse on the importance of democracy and human rights. Russia can only be convinced by arguments concerning the possible increase of the importance of Eastern Europe and the threat that this influence represents to Russia.
25. **LITHUANIA** should make all efforts to reduce the room for the people's disillusionment with their state as disillusioned people most rapidly lose the immunity against Russia's attempts at brainwashing. Disillusionment evokes the nostalgia of the past, and of the Soviet past as well. Disillusionment provides room for populism, and the experience of several recent years shows that populism provides a solid ground for Russia to push its influence to Lithuania. In Lithuania, the extent of Russia's strength depends on the disillusionment of Lithuanian people with their state.
26. Therefore, special attention should be given to the fight against corruption as it is one of the major reasons for increasing the people's disillusionment with their state. Unchecked corruption provides also a direct possibility for Russia, without any control, to make use of dirty money for pulling strings of Lithuania's political life. As the story of *Dujotekana* in Lithuania shows, the prevailing tolerance for shady ties, influences and selfishness has reached such a level that individual state institutions can be very easily taken over. Shady influences exist ominously close to Russian influences, which take shape really effectively with the help of Russian energy companies and their intermediaries.

27. The control of financial activities of parties during various political campaigns exercised to this day is insufficient. As the recent story of financing the Labour Party shows, within a year, the Party can illegally spend LTL 8 million of funds, which are not officially registered, and this remains absolutely unnoticed by the state institutions responsible for the supervision of the legitimacy of party financing. Party financing must be controlled by the specific division of the Special Investigation Service, which has all necessary authorisation.
28. The state does not defend its citizens' minds against Russian brainwashing at all. Mass media, which is one of the public institutions prone to fall under the corrupted influence of the "dirty" money, is least inclined and most difficult to succumb to the state anticorruption activities. Mass media, however, is the most powerful weapon in the war for minds. Russia has obtained and employed very dangerous weapons in Lithuania. Meantime, the state seems to be absolutely helpless in this war. The state should undertake a very effective control of financial flows in mass media and ruthlessly block the activities of mass media illegally influenced by Russian funds.
29. In order to change the situation, a special national programme is required to shape and foster the demand for another type of mass media, which would reflect European traditions and avoid the manipulation of people's minds and educate an independently thinking individual and strengthen the civil society. Therefore, it is not sufficient to just talk about hypothetical threats coming from the East; an active Lithuanian policy is needed to ensure information security of an individual and the society, thus remaining the fully-fledged constituent of the European information area.
30. Russia is augmenting its influence in the region as well as in Lithuania by increasing energy dependency on Russian resources. Therefore, Lithuania must implement the political strategy for reducing energy dependency on Russia by making this strategy a key priority of the foreign policy and internal policy.
31. Immunity against the Russian influence is getting lower due to the declining Lithuanian patriotism. The state must have and implement the complex strategy for indoctrinating with patriotic mentality. School and culture are the most important instruments of this strategy.
32. Patriots are brought up in healthy and strong families, conscious school and active communities. The love for homeland starts with the love for the birthplace and community. The strategy for education of the family and community corresponds to the Russia Containment Strategy.
33. The disillusionment with the own state remains and increases, first of all, among the poor people. Poverty is one of the major sources of communism, fascism, populism and everlasting nostalgia for the Soviet past. Up till now, the strategy for the fight against poverty implemented by the state has proved to be absolutely ineffective; it just swells the layer of the society infected with the mentality of social dependency, the life tragedies of which do not worry the authorities.
34. The disillusionment with the own state will decrease and patriotism will become more explicit and deep-rooted when the state and the society will have great ambitions and, first of all, an ambition not to lag behind Europe. The extent of Russia's influence in Lithuania will depend on the level of

stagnation in Lithuania. Therefore, a new and ambitious agenda for Lithuania and a true leadership mobilising for such an agenda are needed.

35. Lithuanian political life is extremely easily influenced by Russia through individual personalities, who are popular in the society and who by making use of the society's vulnerability to populism can obtain high positions in the state. The election of Rolandas Paksas as President can serve as the best example. Russia pushes its way to Lithuanian political life through the presidential election. The year 2009 will see the end of Valdas Adamkus' term, and during the following presidential election Lithuania will dive into uncertainty again. Since 1997, each presidential election has become a moment of existential test for Lithuania. By making use of presidential election and investing into the propaganda of new populist statesmen, Russia creates a long-term and almost permanent crisis. All parties must make an analysis and decision on what method of presidential election – direct or by election at the Seimas – would allow to cushion the Russian influence. Latvian and Estonian examples show that the President elected by the Parliament can be an effective and authoritative leader of the state.
36. Lithuania must finally find possibilities to stop the erosion of its political life. This is the main condition for drawing up a genuine Russia Containment Strategy.

Conclusion:

Russia's growing influence will be stopped provided the Russia Containment Strategy becomes an effective informal national agreement. We do not have any other choice except for joint resistance against Finlandization (gasification) so that Russian attempts at building the western citadel of the East in Lithuania will cost dear and end without notable success.