2024.11.26

Inputs to White Paper on European Defence

Andrius Kubilius, MEP, Commissioner-Designate for Defence and Space

In my Mission Letter as a new Commissioner for Defence and Space I got a task, together with High Representative Kaja Kallas, during the first 100 days to prepare a “White Paper on European Defence”, which will define how EU is readying itself and Member States for the most extreme military contingencies. Preparedness is the task for everybody: for EU leadership and for national governments, for industries, experts and citizens. That is why in each meeting which I have with different people or different communities, I am asking everybody to give us their input into forthcoming White Paper.

The first input, which we got came from the very important partner – from ASD (European AeroSpace, Security and Defence industries Association), with a lot of very valuable ideas. Thanks to ASD and welcome to everybody else who is ready to follow ASD example and to send their ideas to us. We are ready to discuss them.

Input of European AeroSpace, Security and Defence industries Association to the White Paper on European Defence.

Other inputs:

Input of the Wilfried Martens Centre.

2024.11.20

Andrius Kubilius. Keynote Speech At The Berlin Security Conference

Andrius Kubilius, MEP, Commissioner-Designate for Defence and Space

Berlin, 20.11.2024

Dear Participants of the Berlin Security Conference,

Let me thank the organizers of the Conference for inviting me, at the moment still just a Commissioner-designate.

Nevertheless, it is quite certain – the EU will have its first-ever EU Commissioner for Defence and Space.

Until now the European Union was not considered an important player in European defence issues.

However, this notion is changing.

I will not elaborate on why the EU needs a Commissioner for Defence. Putin’s war against Ukraine provides the biggest share of answers to this question.

Let’s concentrate instead on what the European Union needs, wants, and can do to strengthen European defence.

Until now it looked like the European defence is a business for NATO and Member States only.

But the times are changing.

For me, it is crystal clear – no matter the changes in our security environment, one thing will not change: the European Union has never competed, is not competing, and will not compete with NATO on European defence. It is NATO that prepares and implements our defence plans, it is NATO that takes care about high military command. The EU does not seek to compete with NATO on those issues.

What the EU can do, is to bring added value to assist EU Member States (that are also NATO members) in developing defence capabilities and defence resources needed for the implementation of NATO defence plans. The EU can do what NATO cannot: raise additional funds for defence and introduce new legal regulations, which can help Member States to develop their defence resources.

What are those capabilities and resources that the EU can help to develop and sustain?

There are four types of defence resources, necessary for defence both before and during the course of a war:

– defence equipment and services, including space services; they must be ready and available at the stage of preparation for defence;

– trained military personnel, which could be mobilised in case of war;

– military mobility and logistics;

– military industry capability on European soil, able and ready to produce what is needed, located close to a frontline, if the war comes;

As things stand, we in Europe have some challenges with regard to all those capabilities and resources.

To better understand those challenges, we need to look into threats to our security:

First of all, as you may know, the Mission letter, which I received from the Commission President, tasks me, together with High Representative Kaja Kallas, during the first 100 days of our mandate to prepare and publish a “White Paper on European Defence”. This White Paper shall define the measures to help Europe to ready itself for “the most extreme military contingencies”. In other words, the White Paper must describe how the EU will prepare itself for the possibility of Russian aggression against EU Member states.

This is a strong, open, and realistic language about the biggest threat that we are facing.

As you know, various recent intelligence assessments, including a German one, suggest that Russia may test the resolve of the EU or NATO by the end of this decade, meaning until 2030 at the latest.

The Kiel Institute, also a German research centre, in its recent paper has revealed a sobering conclusion – Russia, with its war economy, in a 6 month period can produce everything the German Army has in its stocks.

According to another expert assessment, if evaluated in Purchasing Power Parity terms, in the next year Russia will spend more for its military than all EU-27 MSs will.

On the other hand, analysis of our own defence capabilities’ situation demonstrates that we are quite below the so-called NATO Capability Targets.

As openly articulated in the Report of President S.Niinistö: “Currently, the collective inventory of the capabilities of EU Member States (most of which are also NATO allies) continues to show serious gaps and shortfalls, including long-standing dependencies on the US, especially in high-intensity operations. As identified in recent experiences and reflected in capability planning processes, the EU-27 are lacking in nearly everything from ammunition and strategic enablers to high-end capabilities.”

In the light of low level of our preparedness, there are two strategic factors, that we need to have in mind when discussing Europe’s defence needs:

firstly, we must urgently prepare ourselves for the possibility of Russian aggression against the EU;
secondly, we need to prepare for a longer-term challenge, that the US will be forced to shift more and more from defence of Europe towards mitigation of China’s rising military power.

In my personal view, that is what our “White Paper on European Defence” will need to be about: how we will prepare to meet, deter, and defend ourselves against the most extreme military contingencies in such a “reality landscape”, both in the short term and also in the longer-term timeframe.

Today, I will concentrate my comments on the short-term challenge. That means Russia, its war against Ukraine and the possibility of Russia’s aggression against the EU.

Personally, I would like to see the upcoming White Paper to focus on 3 most important blocks, where we need to come to an agreement on urgent common decisions, necessary to be implemented either to diminish the threats or to be ready to defend ourselves.

Those 3 blocks should focus on:

1. our military support for defence of Ukraine;

2. ramping up our defence industry production in order to meet NATO Capability Targets not until 2044, but by 2030;

3. defence financing – how will we finance the urgent needs of our defence preparedness.

Before moving to a short description of the content of those 3 building blocks, I would like to remind you that, if you feel the need to employ your intellectual potential during Christmas vacation, you are welcome to use it on drafting some of your ideas and proposals for the White Paper. I cannot promise you, that we will be able to include all of your ideas, but we will be very grateful for your input.

Now, let me share with you my own thoughts on those 3 building blocks of the White Paper.

First of all – on Ukraine.

Why defence of Ukraine is such an important part of our plan for our readiness to meet the most extreme military contingencies, i.e. Russia’s military aggression against the EU?

First, because Ukraine’s defence depends exclusively on the Western, including the EU’s, military support.

Second, if we fail in our support, and Ukraine is forced to surrender and accept the so-called “peace” treaty, drafted according to Putin’s conditions, Russia can turn against the EU or NATO much sooner than we are expecting.

As NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has recently commented in “Politico”: “So far, our support has kept Ukraine in the fight. But we need to do much more in order to shift the conflict’s trajectory”.

That is why, when we are talking about our readiness to “meet the most extreme military contingencies”, first of all, we need to do everything to “shift the trajectory of Russia’s war against Ukraine”. We need to understand that such a shift depends only on us. Our support for Ukraine must be larger and more effective. As the Commission President has declared in the Political Guidelines for the new Commission: “The best investment in European security is investing in the security of Ukraine.” Let’s start to invest much more in the security of Ukraine!

Few thoughts on the Second building block: on ramping up defence industry production to meet NATO Capability Targets until 2030, instead of the current target date of 2044;

First of all, within the EU we need to build a clear understanding on what is the actual gap between the so-called NATO Capability Targets (which NATO is currently redefining after 3 years of Russia’s war against Ukraine), and the currently available defence capabilities of the EU Member States. As President Niinistö has warned us, there are “serious gaps and shortfalls” in the defence capabilities of EU Member States. After some exchange of information, which I had with some experts and officials, I would like to stress: those are “very, very serious gaps and shortfalls”.

Recently “Die Welt” published an article on the upgrade of NATO defence plans. It is said that NATO is asking its Member States to prepare additional 49 brigades, which will need further 1200 tanks, 900 pieces of artillery, 2700 Infantry Fighting Vehicles, 3000 Armoured personnel carriers; 1170 Anti-aircraft ground-based units, etc.

If we fail to fill the gaps and shortfalls between what is and what should be, we will continue to create a temptation for Putin to test us.

Once we have a clear quantitative evaluation of the gaps across the capabilities and types of weapons, we must answer a clear political question – how will we fill those capability gaps most urgently?

Should we continue as before, slowly and incrementally? Such development of defence capabilities has led us to the gaps and shortfalls we are discussing today.

Or should we rather start to radically change our way of doing things in defence and understand the need of a radical “overhaul” of the European defence, as the Commission President urged all of us in her statement for the Globsec Conference in Prague this summer?

A threat analysis I quoted earlier, warns all of us, that Russia can be ready to test us before the end of this decade. The warning was issued. We don’t have the luxury of proceeding with incrementalism in defence any longer. The challenge and the urgency of the “overhaul” of the entire defence system requires a kind of “Big Bang” approach.

Such a “Big Bang” approach requires producing a clear Industry Output Plan, based on the analysis of capability gaps according to NATO evaluations and covered by European production of defence equipment where we have capability gaps, with a clear target date to fulfil this Plan around 2030.

The most politically sensitive issue will be how we will approach the European defence industry with the European Industry Output Plan: should we continue as before – each Member State decides how to fill its capability gaps and traditionally approaches the industry on its own; or should we push and incentivise Member States to use more of the joint procurement, which will then lead to an incremental improvement of the situation; or should we go for the “Big Bang” approach – all the Member States agree for immediate joint procurement of all the needed defence equipment for Member States? A similar approach was used by EU Member States during the pandemic when the Commission had a mandate from all the Member States to procure the needed vaccines.

The “Big Bang” approach will have several very important advantages: the European industry will see our united and clear vision, it will see what is needed and how big is the aggregated demand, and that will bring long-term contracts to the industry, as a real much-needed guarantees to the industry for the expansion of their production capacities; and because of the scale economy, it will significantly cut the costs of production and the equipment price for Member States.

We need to agree that we can accomplish the “Big Bang” in our defence. And we need to declare it publicly and loudly now, to send a message to Putin that he will lose the war, which he wages against Europe.

In addition to the “Big Bang” on conventional capabilities, which demands prompt and large-scale ramp-up of our industry production capabilities, we need to decisively move into the area, where our defence capabilities can be created only with realisation of Defence projects of Common European Interest, such as “European Air Defence Shield” or “European Space Defence Shield”, which cannot be realised by any country alone. The same goes for filling the gap on strategic enablers, achieved only if we work together. The same goes for modernisation and innovations in our defence industry: we can do it only together or if not, we will continue losing in competition to the United States or China.

Togetherness is a very practical thing, – with togetherness, we can replenish and build up much more of what we need in terms of traditional and advanced defence capabilities with the same amount of money when comparing with what we can procure if we continue to do it separately each on our own.

As it was said by a well-known historical personality decades ago: “it’s the economy, stupid!”

And finally – on the Third building block of the White Paper: financing of defence – how will we finance our urgent needs for defence preparedness?

In my view, defence financing is the most important block among the 3 building blocks, because without proper investment into defence we will achieve nothing: there will be no much-needed support for Ukraine’s defence and no “Big Bang” in overhaul of European defence systems.

There are 3 issues, of the same importance, which we need to tackle without delay as regards the defence finances:

1. Defence spending line in the next MFF, which will become operational in 2028. This defence spending line should be significantly larger comparing with the same line in the current MFF (only 10 bln EUR for defence);

2. It is obvious, we have no luxury to wait until the new MFF comes into force in 2028. During 2025, we need to agree on how we will finance the so-called “additional 500 bln euros for defence during next decade”, as it was argued in the Draghi Report. We need to understand – either we all find an agreement on a financial defence package, or we will stay unprepared to meet those urgent, most extreme military contingencies. We need to remember, that preparedness costs a lot of money, but non-preparedness costs much, much more.

3. Finally, we need to find a constructive solution on how to convince the EIB, other IFIs and private banks in Europe not to be afraid to invest more actively into the European defence industry. The deficit of such financing is one of the most painful obstacles for European defence industry plans to expand their production lines and capabilities. It puts European industry into a totally uncompetitive environment compared with the defence industry in the United States.

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These are my thoughts on the forthcoming White Paper on European Defence.

Once again, I invite you to use your Christmas break to produce an intellectual contribution to the White Paper. I am very pleased with the very first such contribution sent to us by the European Defence and Space Industry Association and containing a number of interesting suggestions.

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Let me conclude by stressing again: we ALL are in the same boat – militaries, industries, CEOs and politicians, citizens of the EU, and citizens of Ukraine, all of us. And we find ourselves in very stormy waters.

So, either we row in a synchronised way and by joining all our forces to overcome the storms of today, or each one of us will stay alone at the mercy of the storms and our aggressive adversaries.

I am in favor of rowing together. I am in favor of the “Big Bang” approach! And I am strongly in favor of putting such a strategic language in the upcoming White Paper on European Defence!

Thank you for your attention.

2024.11.18

Andrius Kubilius. On Peace In Ukraine And EU Military Support To Ukraine

Russia’s war in Ukraine, which will soon pass the 1000-day mark, and a little later the three-year mark, remains the biggest geopolitical crisis not only in Europe but also in the world. As some experts say, this war has already entered the stage of the Third World War.

Every day of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine is another day of bloody tragedy. The war is now in its third year. There is a sense of frustration in Western societies – why cannot we achieve quick victories? There are voices saying that Ukraine’s military victory by liberating the occupied territories can no longer be seen as a realistic option for ending the war in the near future. And that is why the debate on the ceasefire, on possible peace agreements with Putin, is gaining momentum. It seems to some that if we cannot achieve a quick victory in Ukraine, then we must strive for a quick peace, even on Putin’s terms. The election promise, popularised by US President Trump, to end the war within 24 hours is adding to the heat of the debate.

Alongside the real and tragic war on the Ukrainian front, there is a global psychological war of perception. That is, there is also a hybrid propaganda war of narratives about how the world should perceive this war and its course: Putin is making great efforts to spread the narrative that Ukraine is losing, that Ukraine is fighting a hopeless war and will be forced to concede anyway, that Russia is impossible to defeat, that for Ukraine, any peace is better than a desperate war, and so on and so forth.

This war of perceptions is also affecting some Western leaders, who are also starting to repeat the same narratives. This creates a dangerous narrative that Ukraine, with all the support of the West, is the weak side in this war, even though the combined West is economically 25 times stronger than Russia (Russia’s GDP in 2023 will be 2.0 trillion USD; while combined GDP of the EU and the US is USD 45.7 trillion).

This pervasive narrative of “Western weakness” is one of the greatest threats to the West’s own security, as it only creates temptations not only for Russia, but also for North Korea, Iran and even China to increase their aggressiveness.

The West must therefore be concerned not only with the material foundations of its defence and not only with how to develop its specific defence capabilities, but also with how to win, or at least not to lose, in today’s war of perceptions or narratives.

Peace on the European continent, including in Ukraine, is a natural aspiration of the European Union, its institutions and the majority of its citizens. Ukraine itself needs peace even more. The only question is: how will this peace be achieved and what content will it have?

It goes without saying that, in theory, peace (or the end of the war) in Ukraine can be achieved in two ways: by forcing Ukraine to surrender without giving it enough weapons; or, on the contrary, by forcing Putin to realise that he is not going to achieve anything, that he is waging a desperate war, and that he will have to withdraw from Ukraine. The only thing Putin needs today to come to such an understanding is clear evidence that the West will not tire of supporting Ukraine.

The first path to ending the war would be a victory for Putin and is completely unacceptable to Europe, because it would be a fairly exact repetition of the Munich Agreement of 1938, when, in order to achieve a supposed peace with Hitler, Western leaders forced Czechoslovakia, which was ready to take up arms in its defence, to accept Hitler’s occupation of part of its territory. This eventually led to World War II across the whole European continent.

The second path is the path of victory for Ukraine and the West, but it requires a new and determined effort in support of Ukraine throughout the West, and especially in the European Union. And such efforts must be based on a clear strategy.

Today’s ongoing bloody war is taking place in a context in which significant changes may be taking place in the democratic West: the new US administration is promising to bring the war in Ukraine to a halt very quickly, perhaps by simply forcing a freeze on the current front, and, according to the US experts, the instruments of US support for Ukraine may also be used to do so, with a warning to Ukraine, both publicly and in private, that such support may be suspended if Ukraine does not agree with the plans of the new US administration.

Meanwhile, the new European Commission announces that it will take significant initiatives to strengthen the European Union’s defence capabilities and to create a European Defence Union: for the first time in its history, the leadership of the European Commission, in its Mission Letters to the new Commissioners, openly states that the European Union must be prepared for the most extreme military contingencies, that is, for a potential military aggression against an EU Member State. This of course refers in particular to the aggression from Russia. And the likelihood of such an aggression is very closely linked to the course of the war in Ukraine.

After almost three years since the beginning of the war, it is clear that Russia has built up a large-scale “war economy” and is mass-producing weapons for the war, and that the Russian army (together with the North Korean troops) on the Ukrainian front is effectively learning how to fight modern warfare. Today, European Union and NATO intelligence agencies warn that Russia could be ready for aggression against any European Union country as early as 2030.

If the European Union allows Putin to see that the West is really weak and incapable of helping Ukraine to defend itself, if Ukraine is forced to sign up to the terms of a peace “on Putin’s terms”, it is clear that the chances of Russia being tempted to launch an aggression against an EU country could increase very significantly. If the war in Ukraine is brought to an end “on Putin’s terms”, Russia could start its aggression against the EU much earlier than 2030.

Meanwhile, if a joint Ukrainian-Western effort forces Russia to end the war on terms unfavourable to the Kremlin, then Putin’s current plans to choose an EU country as the next target of aggression could be irreversibly scuppered.

Thus, the likelihood, scale and likely date of a Russian aggression against the EU or NATO depend unequivocally on one factor: the course of Russia’s war against Ukraine. And that means – from the level of Western support for Ukraine.

Therefore, in order to avoid a potential Russian aggression, the European Union must have a clear strategy as to what specific objectives the European Union is pursuing in terms of supporting Ukraine’s defence potential with its own resources, because it is no longer enough to say that we will support Ukraine as much as it is necessary. Although the European Union’s overall support to Ukraine so far has been greater than that provided by the US, as the new NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, recently said: “So far, our support has kept Ukraine in the fight. But we need to do much more in order to shift the conflict’s trajectory”.

The European Union must first decide what further trajectory it itself will pursue in the conflict (Russia’s war against Ukraine), so that the likelihood of Russian military aggression is significantly reduced rather than increased. To do this, the EU must agree on a targeted “Ukraine strategy” to be implemented by the EU itself and it must find the necessary resources to implement such a strategy. Once such a strategy is in place, it would also be time to negotiate with our transatlantic partners on joint action to implement such a strategy. This would also allow the European Union itself to be ready to embark on the implementation of such a strategy if no agreement is found with its partners.

What kind of “Ukraine strategy” does the European Union need in terms of military support for Ukraine?

The answer is simple: we need a strategy that today shows Putin that the European Union is strong and ready to counter any aggressions by Putin. Such a demonstration by the European Union must begin with the European Union’s increasing support for Ukraine and end with a radical strengthening of the European Union’s own sufficient defence capabilities.

Putin’s aggressiveness is escalated by the evidence of our weakness he sees in the West, not by the evidence of our strength and readiness to defend ourselves. Putin must be shown that his aggression, both against Ukraine and against the European Union, will not bring him or Russia any victories or any success.

For the time being, Putin still thinks that he can achieve a military victory in Ukraine, that he can break through Ukraine’s defence front, that he can wait for the moment when the West tires of supporting Ukraine. Putin sees today’s situation on the Ukrainian front as evidence of the West’s weakness.

Putin’s expectations are triggered by the fact that not only has the West’s support for Ukraine so far been insufficient in scope, but the support itself has also appeared to lack a clear strategy, with no clear objectives and no long-term plans. All of this allows Putin to think and hope that the flow of such Western support will soon dry up.

To change this impression, we need a “Ukraine Strategy”: not only to guarantee greater and more effective Western military support for Ukraine, but also to make Putin finally realise that he will not be able to achieve any victories.

Such a “Ukraine strategy” must be an integral part of a “European Defence” strategy, which is also the focus of the new White Paper on European Defence, to be prepared by the new European Commission during its first 100 days in office. The European Defence Strategy must provide for all the means at the European Union’s disposal (industrial, economic, financial, legal) to help the countries of the European Union to build up the necessary defence resources to be ready to counter any potential Russian aggression, as well as to provide Ukraine with the necessary military support. Such a European Defence Strategy is also needed so that Putin realises today that his dreams of testing the EU or NATO by attacking one of their members are futile – the EU together with NATO will defend itself.

The broader European Defence Strategy can be discussed later. The current text is primarily devoted to a more detailed discussion of the “Ukraine Strategy”. Both the “Ukraine Strategy” and the broader “European Defence” strategy must be seen as components of what former Finnish President S.Niinistö, in his recent report, identified as the EU Preparedness Strategy, which, according to the author, the European Union needs to develop and start implementing in the near future.

The “Ukraine Strategy” must be based on a clear understanding that European military support to Ukraine to date has been based on individual efforts by individual EU Member States, coordinated as far as possible by the so-called Ramstein format. This has helped to achieve a lot, but the time is coming when, without abandoning the Ramstein format, the organisation of assistance to Ukraine must gradually move from coordinated voluntary efforts to increasingly planned and strategic collective action. This would be the hallmark of the “Ukraine Strategy” – a collective EU effort to strengthen Ukraine’s defence and, by extension, the defence of Europe as a whole.

The “Ukraine strategy” does not have to be something very complicated: it simply has to provide for the volume of arms to be provided to Ukraine over the next few years, where they will be produced and how they will be financed.

The EU urgently needs a “Ukraine strategy” also in order to be adequately prepared in the near future for the dialogue and discussion, both with the new US administration and with Ukraine. The political priorities of the collective West and the EU’s support for Ukraine cannot depend solely on changes in the United States administration and its strategic priorities.

The “Ukraine strategy” can be developed in different ways: the strategy can be broader and more detailed, focusing on longer-term, broader objectives; but it can also be narrower in scope during its initial phase, focusing on the implementation of specifically defined military assistance objectives.

For example, it could focus on the EU assuming a specific responsibility to finance the production and supply of the military equipment needed to equip the new Ukrainian army brigades currently being trained (Ukraine is currently training 14 new brigades), including with heavy military equipment.

According to Western experts’ estimates, such armaments would require a considerable amount of weapons: 100-300 new tanks of the same model; up to 1 000 infantry fighting vehicles; about 500 new artillery systems (155 mm); up to 250 Gepard air defence systems to defend the army units; and a significant increase in the production of drones. There is also an urgent need to create and develop a Western logistical and industrial infrastructure in Ukraine itself, in order to be able to effectively maintain, repair and upgrade the military equipment produced in the EU defence industry and used on the Ukrainian front.

Such equipment could be produced by both European and Ukrainian military industries. Three years of war have made it clear: which military equipment, produced where, is the most suitable and most needed by the Ukrainian army. Much of this equipment can also be produced by Ukraine’s own military industry, which is already capable of producing armaments of a quality in line with Western production standards. Another part would be produced by European companies or by Ukrainian-Western joint ventures, combining the technological know-how of modern warfare acquired by the Ukrainians with the industrial might of the West.

This would be particularly necessary in cases where, for example, the Ukrainians can produce modern “Bohdana” artillery systems, which are about twice as cheap to produce in Ukraine as similar artillery systems in the European Union, but the Ukrainians lack the self-propelled platforms on which the Ukrainian artillery systems have to be mounted. Such platforms could be produced in the EU and supplied to Ukrainian manufacturers. Similarly, the production of the various drones needed could be developed – the technological know-how acquired by the Ukrainians on the front line, combined with the potential of the EU defence industry, would guarantee a strong manufacturing breakthrough and a military advantage for Ukraine.

How much and which specific military equipment should be produced and supplied to Ukraine as a matter of priority is a matter for the Ukrainian military leadership to decide together with EU and NATO experts. However, this must be part of a strategic plan for production and delivery of the “Ukraine Strategy”, based on clear EU financial resources and long-term contracts with both the EU and the Ukrainian defence industry.

Preliminary calculations by Western experts on how much and what kind of equipment such a “Ukraine Strategy” should commit to producing and delivering to the Ukrainian army show that the initial cost of implementing such a strategy would be around 50 billion EUR.

EUR 50 billion is a large amount of money, but it is bearable for Western finance. Even if such funds were to be mobilised by the EU alone, it would be bearable, especially given that funds of this magnitude would not be spent in a single year.

It is worth remembering that in the almost three years of the war, the European Union’s military aid to Ukraine has already reached EUR 43 billion, and that of the United States of America has reached EUR 57 billion (while pledges already made in support of Ukraine’s other budget expenditures are as follows: the EU – EUR 84 billion; the United States – EUR 31 billion). So – in one year, the EU’s military support to Ukraine amounted to around EUR 14 billion and the United States’ to around EUR 19 billion. For both the EU and the US, this annual expenditure is just under 0.1% of their respective GDP.

Both the EU and the US are certainly economically capable of providing more military support to Ukraine, especially given that Russia spends 7% of its GDP on military expenditure, while Ukraine is forced to spend as much as 25% of its GDP on its defence.

Peace comes at a high price because, as the ancient Romans rightly said, if you want peace, prepare for war. It is expensive to prepare for military defence, but it is even more expensive to find oneself in the war without having prepared for it.

Europe’s readiness to face potential Russian aggression starts with today’s support for the defence of Ukraine. Such support is expensive, but it would be even more expensive not to support Ukraine and the consequences this “not support” would have for the whole of Europe.

It is worth repeating once again: we can only avoid Russian aggression if Putin first of all realises that he will achieve nothing in Ukraine, that he will not defeat Ukraine and that he will not subjugate Ukraine. Equally, that he will not overcome the will of the European Union and our will to support Ukraine. That is the true path to peace, both in Ukraine and on the entire European continent.

Whether we can overcome such a path depends above all on ourselves and on our political will to implement both the Ukraine strategy and the European Defence Strategy without delay.

2024.10.04

Andrius Kubilius. On the Future of the European Defence

Based on the speach of Andrius Kubilius during EPP Group study days, 25 September 2024

We are living through the major crisis of geopolitical security on European continent.

Authoritarian, aggressive Russia is the biggest threat to the security of Europe. There also are, of course, other threats.

This is the reason, why both European People’s Party in its Election Manifesto and the Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in her Political Guidelines, has declared Defence, together with Competitivness, as the most important priority for the new Commission.

“European Defence” can become the new “flagship project” of the new Commission, thus in the future defining historical legacy of the Commission.

It is not a surprise that such an understanding of the significance of the European Defence was followed by the decision to establish a post of the Defence Commissioner.

As you know, Ursula von der Leyen offered me to become a Commissioner for Defence and Space, the first one in the history of the European Union. Thanks a lot for your trust in my personal experience.

I would like to share some thoughts about how I see the issue of the European Defence and the role of the EU in developing common European Defence, taking into account definition of my responsibilities in the “Mission Letter” sent to me.

I see 2 different timeframes and specific goals in the issue of the European Defence:

a) what do we need to do during the next 5 years, in order to deter possible Russian aggression against the Member States of the European Union or NATO; and
b) what do we need to do during the upcoming decades in order to be prepared for potentially diminishing role of the United States in the European Defence.

I would like to begin by stressing a simple truth – Defence is a common responsibility: responsibility of the Member States of the European Union or NATO and of the European Union itself.

There is no and there will be no competition between the EU and NATO. NATO is doing an important job with its Defence and Deterrence plans and with its High military command. Meanwhile, the EU can bring added value with additional resources, which are needed for the Defence. The EU, unlike NATO, has specific financial and legal instruments, which can bring the resources.

What a situation do we have today with the European Defence, and what do we need to overhaul in the nearest future?

During the last 10 years, EU Member States have under-invested more than 1 trillion euros into general defence, and around 300 billion euros were under-invested to the EU Defence industry (those resources would have been available if the defence spending of all the Member States had reached 2% of their GDP).

From the beginning of Russia’s war against Ukraine, EU Member States started to increase their military spending from 200 billion euros (per year) before the war up to 300 billion euros (by the way, the USA is spending more than 800 billion euros for the defence). Despite the increase in military spending, EU Member States are still buying only 20% of the necessary military equipment from the EU military industry. This means that our industry is left without our money.

Capacity of the EU military industry is below the level needed for the conventional defence. In 2022 we were able to produce only 300 000 artillery shells per year. Ukraine alone needs at least 4 million shells per year. With the assistance of EU ASAP (Act in Support of Ammunition Production) programme, we will be able to increase our production up to the level of 2 million shells, but only at the end of 2025. Russians together with North Korea will be able to produce around 10 million shells in the nearest future.

The combined West is 25 times economically stronger than Russia. However, we are still not able to military support Ukraine up to the level of its victory.

According to the recently published Kiel Institute Report, in 6 months Russia can produce an amount of military equipment equal to the whole amount today used by the German Army. We ourselves are tempting Putin to test capabilities of the EU and NATO to defend Europe.

Defence Minister of Germany Boris Pistorius (as well as NATO Generals) is warning that, according to German intelligence and experts, in 6-8 years Russia will be ready to test us. Estimates of other experts is that we have only 3-5 years until this “test”.

Ursula von der Leyen in the “Mission Letter” sent to me, asked that I, together with HR/VP Kaja Kallas, during the first 100 days of my mandate prepare a “White Paper on the Future of European Defence”, and “identify investment needs /…/ to deliver defence capabilities /…/ readying EU and MS for the most extreme military contingencies”.

In order to be ready for the most extreme military contingencies (that is, for the military aggression) we need to take care of 4 types of most important defence resources (capabilities): military equipment; military personnel; military logistics (military mobility); and defence industry capacity to deliver equipment during long lasting war. The last one (defence industry capacity) unfortunately, often stays forgotten. American experts claim that after 10 months of intensive battles the USA would be left with only 2 heavy brigades – out of 15 brigades it currently has. US industry will simply not be capable to replace the damaged equipment.

What do we need to do and how to prepare ourselves for the most extreme military contingencies?

First, we need precise information – what resources do we currently have, and what will be needed to defend our territory. It seems that at the moment the European Commission has no direct access to such an information. Maybe NATO has, but they are not sharing.

Lithuanian experts, together with NATO experts and with former US generals have recently conducted a military simulations exercise. According to its results, if Lithuania in 2028 needed to defend alone its territory against a serious Russian aggression, it would have capacity to withstand the aggression for the first 10 days only in case it starts from today spending for its defence more that 6% of its GDP, and not 3% it is spending now. Do we have such data for the whole European Union?

Second, in order to be able in the nearest future to overcome the shortage of resources (including the shortage of industry capacity), we need to take immediate actions:

We need to radically increase investments into defence industry up to 500 billion euros for the next 10 years. Out of those, 400 billion euros should be allocated for the EU defence industry, while the remaining 100 billion euros must strengthen the defence potential of Ukraine. There are many possible (although not necessarily obvious from the first sight) sources to find the needed funds: joint borrowing (so-called “Defence Bonds”), EU Recovery and Resilience Facility, European Stability Mechanism, European Investment Bank. Moreover, more than 100 billion euros may be dedicated to the defence in the next EU Multiannual Financial Framework, although we do not have the privilege of waiting until 2028 for the new MFF.
Faster establishment and development of the single defence market. The European Parliament must without any delay approve the European Defence Industry Programme, thus paving the way towards the standardization and common certification in the defence industry.
Ukraine’s defence industry must without delays be integrated into the EU defence industry.
We must clearly understand, what military support is needed for Ukraine to win the war. We need to publish not only the data on how much we have delivered to Ukraine, but also how much of Ukraine’s Victory Plan we managed to implement.
It is crucial for Europe to create the long term stable demand for the production of the European military industry. I suggest using the experience of Energy Union Security criteria and to introduce similar European defence security criteria, thus obliging Member States to keep in their storage facilities a certain agreed amount of military equipment and ammunition. This can also be implemented by the European Union and the European Commission themselves: buying and storing the equipment in storage facilities managed by the EU.
The European Union must prepare a Peace Plan or a Victory Plan (similar to the US Victory Program, adopted in 1941) on how it would act in case of the Russian aggression against it. We already have some experience reacting to the Covid-19 pandemics with joint purchases of vaccines and medical equipment. However, it is better to be prepared in advance.

In any case such investments do pay off: we would not only deter Putin, but we would also significantly strengthen competitiveness of the European economy. The report on the future of European competitiveness by Mario Draghi clearly shows that the defence industry is a driver of innovation worldwide.

Our main obstacle is that we still don’t know how to implement a COMMON defence. This results in us not exploiting the EU’s and the Single Market’s combined potential for defence. There is a single way to overcome this: we need to begin by investing in Defence Projects of Common European Interest from the European Sky Shield Initiative and Cyber Defence Common Projects to the European Ammunition and Missiles Initiative and the NorthEastern Defence Shield. Success of Galileo and Copernicus space projects is a proof that we are able to achieve this.

These projects will be particularly important in assessing the longer-term prospects and challenges as Europe assumes an increasing responsibility for the European Defence in the same way as Cyber Defence and Hybrid Defence become even more important for Europe.

We are facing the biggest security crisis on the European Continent since World War II. But we must remain optimistic. Crises are the best time to tackle problems we have not tackled before. As Jean Monet said, Europe will be forged in crises, and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises. We must come out of this crisis with a new Community instrument: the European Defence Union.

I was Prime Minister of my country twice, and both times it was during crises. I was even called “Crisis Prime Minister”. We have overcome the crises of that time, and we will overcome this one – with the assistance of the leadership of the EPP and with the EPP Defence Paper.

If we want to avoid the war, we need to show convincingly that we are ready for the war.

(Photo: Secretariat of the EPP Group in the EP)