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Tag: Ukraine

2024.07.29

A.Kubilius. Ukraine And The Agenda Of The East of Europe In The Newly Elected European Parliament: Lithuania’s Challenge

We start our new mandate at the European Parliament. What challenges await Lithuania’s representatives? What should Lithuania strive for in the next five years of the new European mandate? Where can we, as Lithuania’s representatives, bring the greatest added value to the common European Union?

First impressions of the new European Parliament are that there are many new members and a great deal of interest from new members in issues of security, defence and Ukraine.

The European Parliament of this mandate seems to have a good international potential to work together jointly and to pursue key objectives and ideas. We need to be able to make good use of this situation so that, over the next five years, the European Union is able to achieve major breakthroughs in the security issues that are most important to us, all of which are related to Ukraine and to the Russian aggression.

The question naturally arises as to what specific objectives we, the representatives of Lithuania, will pursue in the European Parliament in this term of office, with a view to the whole period of this term of office up to 2029.

The experience of the first term of office suggests that, although we represent a small Lithuania, we can achieve a great deal and influence the overall policy of the European Union, provided that we are able to formulate clear ideas and clear objectives and that we are able to build coalitions of like-minded people who support such ideas.

It is therefore very important for the Lithuanian representatives in the European Parliament to agree at the very beginning of the new term of office on such common objectives that are most important for Lithuania and Europe. Then it will be easy to build a wider network of parliamentarians from different parties and different countries to influence common EU policies.

In this text, I will try to summarise how I see the main objectives that we need to achieve in this new European Parliament.

  1. Ukraine – A Strategic Priority For Europe

I remain convinced that during the next 5 the fate of Europe will be decided in Ukraine. And the fate of Lithuania. Ukraine’s victory in the war, reconstruction, membership of the European Union and NATO will be at the heart of European security policy. A secure and successful Ukraine is a key instrument of Western geopolitics, through which the European Union can influence positive change in the much wider Eastern European area, including Russia and Belarus. Change in this wider region is a key prerequisite for a sustainable peace on the European continent. And it is in these matters that we in Lithuania, together with our counterparts in other countries, can bring the most added value to Europe as a whole. And for our own security.

  1. The European Union Needs A “Ukraine Strategy” And A “Grand Strategy For Eastern Europe”

2.5 years after the start of the war, it is clear that Western military support to Ukraine so far has enabled Ukraine not to lose the war, but has been insufficient to achieve victory. One of the main reasons why aid to Ukraine from the West, which is much richer than Russia, has amounted to only 0.1% of the West’s total GDP, is that the West still does not have a clear “Ukraine strategy”, nor a clear “Europe East strategy”. In the absence of such strategic choices, the fear of Russian escalation and the fear of what will happen to Russia after Putin if Russia loses the war are the main obstacles to Western (including EU) decisions to provide more and more significant Western support to Ukraine.

In order for the West to overcome such fears, the European Union in particular needs to develop and start implementing the “Ukraine Strategy” and the “Grand Strategy for The East of Europe” without delay. They are interlinked and must be implemented together.

Lithuania’s representatives in the European Parliament, through their political groups, committees and delegations, must work together to make the European Parliament the epicentre for the development of such strategies.

  1. The Importance Of Networks Of Peers

Any political idea can only become a reality if the initiators of the idea are able to build a wide circle of like-minded people around the idea, which helps to make the idea a reality. This is how United for Ukraine, an international network of parliamentarians and experts, was able to come together during the previous parliamentary term. It has gained wide international recognition for its active role in providing Western support to Ukraine. Equally successful has been our informal “Friends of European Russia Forum”, which has brought together all those concerned about the future of democracy in Russia.

This experience and the networks of like-minded people that we have already built up make us hopeful that in the new European Parliament we will be able to bring together broader coalitions of representatives of major parties and countries, while at the same time inviting them to join us in our initiatives to develop a “Strategy for Ukraine” and a “Strategy for the East of Europe”.

  1. Strategy for Ukraine

The “Ukraine Strategy” should be a joint strategy, implemented by both Ukraine and the EU (together with the wider West), aimed not only at helping Ukraine to defend itself, but also at creating the preconditions for a fundamental political transformation in the wider Eastern European region, including Russia and Belarus. The “Ukraine Strategy” must consist of 2 essential parts: a “Ukraine’s Victory Strategy” and a “Ukraine’s Success Strategy”:

4.1. “Ukraine’s Victory Strategy”: a key element of the “Ukraine’s Victory Strategy” is the EU’s Roadmap for Ukraine’s Victory (as I have written about before). It must provide for at least €100 billion of Western military support to Ukraine each year (in 2023, this amounted to only €40 billion). Such funds must also be used to immediately and radically expand the production of weapons, both in Ukraine and in the EU.

A further plan to strengthen economic sanctions and the establishment of the International Tribunal for the Crime of War of Aggression must also be part of Ukraine’s victory strategy.

“The Ukraine’s Victory Strategy” must also include a global effort to force Putin to accept the peace terms drawn up by the international community, the key provision of which must be unchanged: the complete withdrawal of Russian troops from the occupied Ukrainian lands.

4.2. “Ukraine’s Success Strategy”: this is the EU’s strategy for building Ukraine’s economic, social and geopolitical success. Such success can only be achieved through the implementation of two strategies: the “Ukraine Reconstruction Strategy” and the “Ukraine’s EU (Euro-Atlantic) Integration Strategy”. The implementation of both is intrinsically linked. A strategy for Ukraine’s success is not only necessary for Ukraine, but also for the EU as a whole, as Ukraine’s example of success would play a key role in promoting change in the wider Eastern European area.

4.2.1 The strategy for Ukraine’s reconstruction will focus on three aspects:

– Adequate funds for reconstruction;

– the implementation of European rules (acquis communautaire) in Ukraine to make them applicable for reconstruction projects;

– the entry of Western private capital into Ukraine;

Ukraine’s reconstruction must be carried out in a way that synergistically promotes Ukraine’s modernisation, inclusive reforms and creates opportunities for Western businesses to see that Ukraine is the best destination for Western investment.

4.2.2 Ukraine’s EU integration strategy has two equally important strands: what Ukraine needs to do, and what the EU itself needs to do. Ukraine’s EU integration strategy will correlate very closely with those of the other candidates for EU membership, but the success of Ukraine’s strategy will have particular geopolitical significance, as Ukraine is an ice-breaker in opening the door to integration for the other candidates. The success of Ukraine’s integration will depend on many factors, only some of which are up to Ukraine itself. Many of these factors will operate outside the immediate format of the accession negotiations, but will have a very strong influence on the negotiations themselves. Our challenge is to find ways to strengthen those factors that can accelerate the integration process and to reduce the influence of those factors that can hinder integration.

What is most important on the integration path, will have to happen on the Ukrainian side:

– Ukraine will need European experience and European support for the necessary reforms, in particular focusing on the transposition of at least ten key European regulations (especially in the field of business operations), the creation or restructuring of the institutions necessary for their implementation, and the preparation of human resources for the implementation of such regulations; and Lithuania can play an important role in transferring its integration experience;

– For Ukraine and the other candidates, it will be essential to focus first on reforms that would lead to rapid integration into the Single Market, which would not only open the door for Ukrainian businesses to operate in a much richer market, but would also open the door for European businesses to invest much more confidently in the Ukrainian economy.

– The heavy investment in Ukraine by businesses from EU Member States is what could most effectively weaken the doubts or silent political resistance of some EU Member States to accelerated Ukrainian integration.

– It will be crucial for Ukraine to seek synergies with other candidate countries, both from the Eastern Partnership and the Western Balkans. This would significantly strengthen the geopolitical leverage of Ukraine and the other candidates on the EU Member States that will have to take decisions on integration, while reducing the scope for tensions or unhealthy competition between the candidates and the EU Member States supporting them.

Of course, it will be up to Ukraine itself to decide what strategy to pursue on the path of integration, but in trying to help Ukraine along the path in the most effective way, we need to agree among ourselves and with our peers in other EU countries on what strategic priorities we advise Ukraine to pursue. Because there is nothing worse than a cacophony of conflicting advice, even if the advice-givers mean well.

More important than our advice to the Ukrainian side is what we need to do and achieve on our side, that is, on the EU’s side, for the sake of Ukraine’s rapid integration. Because, up to now, EU enlargement and the integration of Ukraine and the other candidate countries have been stalling, first of all, because there has not been enough political will on the European Union’s side to carry out such enlargement. And it was only Russia’s war against Ukraine that fundamentally changed the situation on the EU side. On our side, however, there are more obstacles to enlargement, already known and still to come, than we dare admit to ourselves. Overcoming them requires preparation now and a collective effort by all stakeholders. Here are a few actions that should be the focus of our attention and efforts in the near future:

– A common political campaign must be launched in all EU Member States, explaining that the enlargement of the European Union, and in particular Ukraine’s membership of the European Union, is not only necessary for Ukraine itself, but is strategically necessary and beneficial for the European Union itself.

– In order to most effectively influence the consolidation of the political will needed for enlargement among EU Member States, the creation of a joint European Parliamentary/Expert Forum on European Enlargement should be initiated in the near future, bringing together like-minded people from EU Member States as well as from candidate countries. The global parliamentary/expert forum “United for Ukraine” (U4U), which we have initiated, works in a similar way.

– Central Europe may be the biggest obstacle to enlargement, even though it would seem that it is the countries of this region that should be the most enthusiastic about enlargement. Unfortunately, as the experience of both the last decades and the last few years shows, some Central European countries’ departures from basic rule of law and democratic values are turning the “old Europe” countries against enlargement, as they are beginning to fear that further enlargement will only increase the number of similarly behaving countries; some Central European countries are openly opposed to any support for Ukraine, including its EU membership; in recent years, it has become clear that many Central European countries fear economic competition (especially in agriculture) with Ukraine; Central European countries do not shy away from resolving their historical disputes with their neighbours by blocking the European integration processes of such neighbours; Central European countries are the biggest supporters of the veto right, which could be the most serious barrier to further enlargement.

Such obstacles to Ukraine’s accelerated integration, or potential obstacles, emanating from Central Europe, require special political attention and a specific strategy to remove, or at least to reduce, such obstacles. Such a strategy must be born and implemented in the Central European region itself. We belong to this region and we must not shy away from talking openly with our partners in the region about the obstacles that we ourselves pose to EU enlargement and how they need to be overcome.

– Although we have so far avoided talking about it, it is clear that EU enlargement will also require institutional and budgetary changes within the European Union itself. We need to be the ones looking for solutions, not the ones holding back the search for such solutions.

5. EU Grand Strategy for The East of Europe

The successful implementation of the “Ukraine’s Strategy” would be one of the key instruments for the equally successful implementation of the “EU Grand Strategy for the East of Europe”. The “EU Grand Strategy for the East of Europe” is essentially a strategy to help Europe’s East, in particular Russia and Belarus, to transform themselves into normal states.  This can only be achieved if the dictatorial and aggressive regimes of Putin and Lukashenko are no longer in place in either country. This requires a clear strategic objective of “regime change”, even though the West is both afraid and reluctant to talk about it and to use such a term. The West itself will not change the regimes in Moscow and Minsk, only the Belarusians and the Russians themselves can do that, but the West, and the European Union in particular, can create all the conditions for such a transformation to take place in the East of Europe. That is what the “EU Grand Strategy for the East of Europe” is all about.

Such a Grand Strategy must be subordinated to the EU’s “Ukraine’s Strategy”, because Ukraine’s victory and its subsequent success could be the main trigger that would lead to the collapse of the Putin regime and, for the Russians and the Belarusians themselves, Ukraine’s success could be the inspiration for transformation within themselves. The implementation of the “Ukraine’s strategy” is 99% dependent on the political will of the West and the resources it allocates to such a strategy. The West does not have the capacity to directly change the situation or bring about change in Russia or Belarus itself, but the West does have a unique and unique instrument that can bring about positive change in Eastern Europe (i.e. Russia and Belarus) – the implementation of the “Ukraine’s Strategy”.

Why does the West need change in Eastern Europe?

There are two main reasons why such change is needed, not only for ordinary Russians or Belarusians, but also for the European Union as a whole.

The first reason is that such changes in Russia and Belarus are the only way to eliminate the permanent threat of authoritarian Russia, in other words, they are the only way to a sustainable, permanent, real peace on the European continent, and not to imitate “peace” by accepting Putin’s conditions for such peace.

The second reason is that the formulation of the objectives of the “Grand Strategy for The East of Europe” and the implementation of such a strategy would help the West today to overcome the fear of a Ukrainian victory and a Russian defeat (and what will happen to Russia without Putin), which is the main obstacle to the West’s hesitation to provide more military support to Ukraine. The “EU Grand Strategy for The East of Europe” is therefore necessary for the West to finally achieve victory in Ukraine.

Such an “EU Grand Strategy for the East of Europe” would have five essential components: (a) a strategy for Ukraine’s victory; (b) a strategy for Ukraine’s success; (c) Ukraine’s invitation to join NATO; (d) support for the Russian and Belarusian opposition and civil society; and (e) a strategy for the EU’s future relations with a democratic Russia and a democratic Belarus, to be developed and published in the near future;

5.1 and 5.2. The first two parts – the “Ukraine’s Victory Strategy” and the “Ukraine’s Success Strategy” – are described above and their essential role is to act as a trigger and inspiration for change in the East of Europe. Their implementation depends entirely on the political will of the West.

5.3 The invitation to Ukraine to join NATO is necessary not only to guarantee Ukraine’s security, but also to send an unequivocal Western signal to the Russian elite and ordinary Russians – forget your dreams of “reclaiming” Ukraine; Ukraine has left Russia’s post-imperial space for ever and, with such an invitation, Ukraine becomes an integral part of a democratic West. This would begin to fulfil the prophecy formulated by Zbigniew Brzezinski: Russia, which has the opportunity to control Ukraine, will always remain an empire; Russia, which loses control of Ukraine, has the opportunity to become a democracy. Inviting Ukraine to become a member of NATO would help Russia to get rid of its imperial nostalgia for control of Ukraine and would help Russia to become a normal state in the long term.

5.4 Supporting the Russian and Belarusian opposition and civil society is something that the European Union and its Member States seem to be already doing intensively. This needs to continue and increase the volume of such support. There is a need to develop formal and informal dialogue structures between the institutions of the European Union and the Russian and Belarusian opposition. Such support and ongoing dialogue is also necessary for the West itself, so that it can return as quickly as possible to the belief that democracy is possible in Russia and Belarus. Only with such a return to faith will the West cease to fear Russia’s defeat, the collapse of Putin’s regime, and that a Russia without Putin will be even more aggressive. All these fears are widespread and deep in the thinking of Western leaders today, and this makes them fearful of a Ukrainian victory too.

It is essential that the Ukrainians take the lead in mobilising the combined political and intellectual potential of the Transformation Triangle (Ukraine, Russia and Belarus), to which the West would also contribute. Because the Ukrainians have the greatest interest in the eventual collapse of the Putin and Lukashenko regimes, and thus the disappearance of the threat to Europe as a whole, and to Ukraine in particular, that emanates from Eastern Europe.

5.5 A strategy for the European Union’s future relations with democratic Russia and Belarus is something that the European Union, in consultation with Russian and Belarusian civil society, should draw up and publish without delay. Ordinary citizens in Russia and Belarus need to know that after the fall of the Putin and Lukashenko regimes, they will have the opportunity to build their own success with the strategic support of the European Union, just as Lithuania, the Baltic States, Central Europe and now the EU candidate countries Ukraine, Moldova and the Western Balkan countries have done. The European Union must now make it clear that democratic Belarus will be invited to join the EU, and an Association Agreement with the future democratic Belarus could already be drafted now. Democratic Russia will not be offered formal integration into the European Union, but the economic and technical partnership between the EU and democratic Russia could be quite a deep partnership. Ordinary Russians must now believe that, together with the European Union, they will be able to realise the dream identified by Navalny as “the wonderful Russia of the future” in a democratic Russia after the fall of the Putin regime.

  1. Instead of conclusions: In the Beginning Was The Word

Some may think that the matter of the “Ukraine’s Strategy” and the “EU Grand Strategy for the East of Europe” may be important, but it is certainly not for little Lithuania to have the ambition to develop and implement such EU strategies. Because when Lithuania talks about this, it is beautiful and romantic, but at the same time it is naive, because Lithuania supposedly does not have the power and the ability to implement such strategies.

My answer to all such “disbelief” is very simple. I always urge you to remember the very precise first words of the Holy Scriptures: In the beginning was the Word. Scripture is the best textbook on political management to this day. The importance of the Word (or the idea) remains as primordial then as now. If the right word (idea) is born, then all the others follow.

Lithuania can be the birthplace of the right words on some of today’s most important geopolitical issues. Especially when it comes to Ukraine and Russian aggression. We are not only capable of being the progenitors of the right starting words (ideas) in these matters of Ukraine and Russia, but we are also capable of getting others to follow our word, in other words, we are capable of building broad coalitions of like-minded people around such right words (ideas).

So let’s do it! Let’s start by agreeing among ourselves on the right words. Then let’s try to translate them into the common faith of wider Europe.

It will not be easy.

But the easy way is not our way!

2024.07.25

Andrius Kubilius. Summer of Capitulation Shift

Andrius Kubilius, MEP, former PM of Lithuania

On 5 July, writing about the leadership problems of the Great West, from Macron to Biden, I said: “US President Biden is one step away from capitulation.”

Capitulation has happened. There are major political shifts taking place in America, both in the short term and in the long term. It is difficult to predict what they will bring. In the short term, only one thing is clear – Kamala Harry is predictable, Donald Trump is unpredictable.

Whatever the outcome of the elections in the United States, the key questions to be answered throughout the transatlantic community, and especially in the European Union, will remain the same: Ukraine and the Russian war. Only they may become even more acute. And they will require us to have clear arguments, which we need to start making now.

Looking at the whole picture, and in particular at the political debate in the United States, but also in the European Union and in Ukraine itself, there are two fundamental debates to be prepared for: a) on the scope and duration of Western military support for Ukraine, and b) on the terms and consequences of peace talks with Russia, both for Ukraine itself and for Russia and the West as a whole.

This debate could lead to major geopolitical shifts around the world, both in the East and in the West.

The two topics are closely interlinked: declining Western military support for Ukraine will inevitably force Ukraine to the negotiating table on terms that are unfavourable to it. The consequences of such negotiations will be catastrophic for both Ukraine and the West.

ON MILITARY SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE AND ON WESTERN CAPITULATION

On the American side, and especially in the Trump camp, it is often argued that the US should stop its military support for Ukraine, because the European Union should bear the entire burden of such support. And anyway, it is a hopeless business to provide Ukraine military support, because Russia will still produce more artillery shells than the West can produce. Therefore, according to those who talk like this, the only way forward is to do what Mr Trump is promising to do, which is to end the war in one day, by some miracle. This is how the fundamental difference is formulated: weapons and a costly war or a mystical peace without weapons.

And the main argument for the second option is very simple: there are no weapons in the West and there will be none. This argument most consistently was made by Senator J.D. Vance (now Trump’s choice for Vice President) in his famous speech to the US Senate this year. His main argument is that US industry has moved to China and that the US is therefore incapable of producing either the number of artillery shells or the number of air defences needed to defeat Russia in Ukraine.

Such arguments, combined with strong oratorical skills, sound impressive and convincing enough at the beginning. But very soon you realise their capitulatory shift.

Talks of the US or the European Union not being able to produce the number and type of weapons needed for Ukraine’s victory are in no way consistent with simple economic facts: the combined economic potential of the US and the European Union is 25 times stronger than Russia’s potential. The West produces a surplus of top-quality cars, passenger and military aircraft, and is on an unstoppable drive into the vastness of outer space, all of which is technologically and economically beyond the reach of the aggressor, Russia. Therefore, from an economic point of view, the explanation that the West is incapable of producing as many weapons as it needs sounds completely unconvincing. The only logical argument could be that if the West lacks the production of some weapons today, then tomorrow or the day after tomorrow that production must have already been developed.

Obviously, there are other (non-economic) reasons why such arguments are being put forward in the West: a general lack of understanding of the importance of the Ukrainian war; a lack of basic political will and leadership (“it’s no skin off my nose”); the fear that losing the war could make Russia more dangerous than it is today.

Each of these reasons can be analysed separately and in depth, but the kind of in-depth analysis that Western pundits love to engage in makes it easy to escape from the main, simple conclusion: if the West is unable to produce and supply Ukraine with enough weapons to force Russia to pull out of Ukraine, it will only mean that the West, despite the West’s economic power, is politically and geopolitically weaker than Russia. If it is weaker than Russia, that means it is also weaker than China. It would be difficult to understand why, in the face of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the West is incapable of producing the necessary weapons, but in the face of China’s aggression against Taiwan, it would already be capable of doing so. Moreover, if the West is not capable of repelling Russian aggression in Ukraine, why should Lithuanians believe that the West would be able to do so in the event of Russian aggression against Lithuania?

Capitulation by the West, and by the US in particular, to Russian aggression in Ukraine would only weaken the geopolitical potential of the US and encourage aggression not only from Russia but also from China. The shift towards capitulationist thinking in the West on Ukraine would be a shift towards the defeat of the fundamental geopolitical interests of the West, including the US.

ABOUT CAPITULATORY PEACE

The increasingly loud talk in the West about peace talks, diplomatic solutions and a mystical end to the war in one day is a “beautiful” continuation of the same arguments for not giving arms to Ukraine: we don’t need to give arms because we don’t have them and we can’t make them, and besides, arms only delay peace, and peace is the most important humanistic goal, no matter by what the means and with what consequences. We hear such arguments with increasing frequency. The apologists for such a peace do not explain how and under what conditions such a peace can be achieved, because it is enough for them to say that it can be achieved by diplomatic means. But it is clear that behind the so-called “humanist” arguments there is a simple logic: Ukraine must hand over the occupied territories to Russia, and in return, Russia will promise to cease its aggression, as if this will save thousands of lives and preserve the destruction of cities.

Putin will see such a peace as a victory for him and will treat it as a surrender by the West.

Any alleged commitment by Putin to guarantee the inviolability of the remaining territories of Ukraine will be completely null and void, like Hitler’s promises not to touch the remaining territory of Czechoslovakia after Chamberlain and Daladier promised to give up the Sudetenland to Hitler at the Munich Peace Conference (the real name of the “Munich Agreement”). Six months later, Hitler occupied the rest of Czechoslovakia, despite his earlier promise.

If not stopped in Ukraine, Putin will behave just like Hitler. Only in this case, the “new Hitler” of the 21st century will have been created by the West, by choosing the path of conscious or unconscious capitulation.

Putin will become ten times more aggressive after such a “peace” and the Russian victory. And he will choose new targets in the neighbourhood. Putin will certainly not become a peace dove. China will take its cue from Russia and consider the West to be just as politically and geopolitically weak. The West’s geopolitical weakness has so far only served to strengthen the aggressiveness of an authoritarian Russia or China.

Peace is absolutely necessary for Ukraine and Europe. But not just any peace. A Western capitulatory peace with Putin on Putin’s terms would not be a peace for Ukraine, but an incitement to Putin’s aggression. It would only fan the flames of war even further.

The West must finally realise that a real peace with an undefeated Putin is impossible, especially if there is a capitulatory slide towards peace on Putin’s terms.

HOW TO AVOID CAPITULATION SHIFT?

It is now 2.5 years since the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine. The West has had enough time to wake up to the fact that Putin’s Russia is the greatest threat to European security, and to reflect on what strategy to pursue in this war. Unfortunately, no clearer strategy has emerged so far. Or no one is naming one.

Simple common sense tells us that if you are attacked by an enemy who is your greatest threat, your strategy can only be threefold: a) capitulate and surrender; b) defend and wait for the enemy to tire; and c) attack and destroy the threat yourself.

So far, despite the plethora of strong and loud statements and visits to Kiev, the West has essentially balanced only between the first two options: some have suggested that Ukraine should not be armed and that it should pursue a capitulatory peace; others have looked for ways to help Ukraine defend itself. And all the military support given so far has been just enough to barely allow Ukraine to defend itself.

Why is Ukraine not receiving more support?

It is not because the West is economically incapable of providing such support. I have already written about this.

My answer is that it is only because the West still does not dare to have a strategy for attacking and destroying the threat. And in the West they themselves are getting tired of their own timidity and their own political and leadership impotence. And, feeling increasingly tired of their impotence, they themselves are moving closer and closer to capitulation without noticing it.

This summer must be the “last summer” in which the West still lives without such an offensive strategy. If the West does not soon develop a strategy of destroying the threat and attacking it, it will have to start calculating which summer will be the “last summer” for the West.

The threat of Putin’s Russia can be eliminated, first and foremost, if Putin’s regime falls. Let us dare to talk about the fact that the West’s strategic objective with regard to Russia is a “regime change” in the Kremlin, which will be implemented by the Russians themselves, but only the West can create the conditions for this if it defeats Putin in Ukraine.

The capitulatory shift in the West will only be halted if the West finally starts to shift towards a strategy of destroying the threat. The West must finally realise that Russia and Putin are on a long-term path of self-destruction that could be bloody and dangerous for everyone around them, while Russia, which the West would help to free from Putin, would have the opportunity to become a normal state.

Lithuania has the potential to influence Western strategic thinking. But to do so, it needs to be able to think strategically itself. And to act. Otherwise, we will inadvertently find ourselves in a capitulatory shift, occasionally still repeating in the standard way that we support Ukraine, that we are concerned and that we condemn Putin. The West, too, will do exactly the same thing when it finds itself in a capitulatory shift.

We need to learn to swim against the tide…

The easy way is not our way!

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