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Tag: Ukraine

2024.11.18

Andrius Kubilius. On Peace In Ukraine And EU Military Support To Ukraine

Russia’s war in Ukraine, which will soon pass the 1000-day mark, and a little later the three-year mark, remains the biggest geopolitical crisis not only in Europe but also in the world. As some experts say, this war has already entered the stage of the Third World War.

Every day of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine is another day of bloody tragedy. The war is now in its third year. There is a sense of frustration in Western societies – why cannot we achieve quick victories? There are voices saying that Ukraine’s military victory by liberating the occupied territories can no longer be seen as a realistic option for ending the war in the near future. And that is why the debate on the ceasefire, on possible peace agreements with Putin, is gaining momentum. It seems to some that if we cannot achieve a quick victory in Ukraine, then we must strive for a quick peace, even on Putin’s terms. The election promise, popularised by US President Trump, to end the war within 24 hours is adding to the heat of the debate.

Alongside the real and tragic war on the Ukrainian front, there is a global psychological war of perception. That is, there is also a hybrid propaganda war of narratives about how the world should perceive this war and its course: Putin is making great efforts to spread the narrative that Ukraine is losing, that Ukraine is fighting a hopeless war and will be forced to concede anyway, that Russia is impossible to defeat, that for Ukraine, any peace is better than a desperate war, and so on and so forth.

This war of perceptions is also affecting some Western leaders, who are also starting to repeat the same narratives. This creates a dangerous narrative that Ukraine, with all the support of the West, is the weak side in this war, even though the combined West is economically 25 times stronger than Russia (Russia’s GDP in 2023 will be 2.0 trillion USD; while combined GDP of the EU and the US is USD 45.7 trillion).

This pervasive narrative of “Western weakness” is one of the greatest threats to the West’s own security, as it only creates temptations not only for Russia, but also for North Korea, Iran and even China to increase their aggressiveness.

The West must therefore be concerned not only with the material foundations of its defence and not only with how to develop its specific defence capabilities, but also with how to win, or at least not to lose, in today’s war of perceptions or narratives.

Peace on the European continent, including in Ukraine, is a natural aspiration of the European Union, its institutions and the majority of its citizens. Ukraine itself needs peace even more. The only question is: how will this peace be achieved and what content will it have?

It goes without saying that, in theory, peace (or the end of the war) in Ukraine can be achieved in two ways: by forcing Ukraine to surrender without giving it enough weapons; or, on the contrary, by forcing Putin to realise that he is not going to achieve anything, that he is waging a desperate war, and that he will have to withdraw from Ukraine. The only thing Putin needs today to come to such an understanding is clear evidence that the West will not tire of supporting Ukraine.

The first path to ending the war would be a victory for Putin and is completely unacceptable to Europe, because it would be a fairly exact repetition of the Munich Agreement of 1938, when, in order to achieve a supposed peace with Hitler, Western leaders forced Czechoslovakia, which was ready to take up arms in its defence, to accept Hitler’s occupation of part of its territory. This eventually led to World War II across the whole European continent.

The second path is the path of victory for Ukraine and the West, but it requires a new and determined effort in support of Ukraine throughout the West, and especially in the European Union. And such efforts must be based on a clear strategy.

Today’s ongoing bloody war is taking place in a context in which significant changes may be taking place in the democratic West: the new US administration is promising to bring the war in Ukraine to a halt very quickly, perhaps by simply forcing a freeze on the current front, and, according to the US experts, the instruments of US support for Ukraine may also be used to do so, with a warning to Ukraine, both publicly and in private, that such support may be suspended if Ukraine does not agree with the plans of the new US administration.

Meanwhile, the new European Commission announces that it will take significant initiatives to strengthen the European Union’s defence capabilities and to create a European Defence Union: for the first time in its history, the leadership of the European Commission, in its Mission Letters to the new Commissioners, openly states that the European Union must be prepared for the most extreme military contingencies, that is, for a potential military aggression against an EU Member State. This of course refers in particular to the aggression from Russia. And the likelihood of such an aggression is very closely linked to the course of the war in Ukraine.

After almost three years since the beginning of the war, it is clear that Russia has built up a large-scale “war economy” and is mass-producing weapons for the war, and that the Russian army (together with the North Korean troops) on the Ukrainian front is effectively learning how to fight modern warfare. Today, European Union and NATO intelligence agencies warn that Russia could be ready for aggression against any European Union country as early as 2030.

If the European Union allows Putin to see that the West is really weak and incapable of helping Ukraine to defend itself, if Ukraine is forced to sign up to the terms of a peace “on Putin’s terms”, it is clear that the chances of Russia being tempted to launch an aggression against an EU country could increase very significantly. If the war in Ukraine is brought to an end “on Putin’s terms”, Russia could start its aggression against the EU much earlier than 2030.

Meanwhile, if a joint Ukrainian-Western effort forces Russia to end the war on terms unfavourable to the Kremlin, then Putin’s current plans to choose an EU country as the next target of aggression could be irreversibly scuppered.

Thus, the likelihood, scale and likely date of a Russian aggression against the EU or NATO depend unequivocally on one factor: the course of Russia’s war against Ukraine. And that means – from the level of Western support for Ukraine.

Therefore, in order to avoid a potential Russian aggression, the European Union must have a clear strategy as to what specific objectives the European Union is pursuing in terms of supporting Ukraine’s defence potential with its own resources, because it is no longer enough to say that we will support Ukraine as much as it is necessary. Although the European Union’s overall support to Ukraine so far has been greater than that provided by the US, as the new NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, recently said: “So far, our support has kept Ukraine in the fight. But we need to do much more in order to shift the conflict’s trajectory”.

The European Union must first decide what further trajectory it itself will pursue in the conflict (Russia’s war against Ukraine), so that the likelihood of Russian military aggression is significantly reduced rather than increased. To do this, the EU must agree on a targeted “Ukraine strategy” to be implemented by the EU itself and it must find the necessary resources to implement such a strategy. Once such a strategy is in place, it would also be time to negotiate with our transatlantic partners on joint action to implement such a strategy. This would also allow the European Union itself to be ready to embark on the implementation of such a strategy if no agreement is found with its partners.

What kind of “Ukraine strategy” does the European Union need in terms of military support for Ukraine?

The answer is simple: we need a strategy that today shows Putin that the European Union is strong and ready to counter any aggressions by Putin. Such a demonstration by the European Union must begin with the European Union’s increasing support for Ukraine and end with a radical strengthening of the European Union’s own sufficient defence capabilities.

Putin’s aggressiveness is escalated by the evidence of our weakness he sees in the West, not by the evidence of our strength and readiness to defend ourselves. Putin must be shown that his aggression, both against Ukraine and against the European Union, will not bring him or Russia any victories or any success.

For the time being, Putin still thinks that he can achieve a military victory in Ukraine, that he can break through Ukraine’s defence front, that he can wait for the moment when the West tires of supporting Ukraine. Putin sees today’s situation on the Ukrainian front as evidence of the West’s weakness.

Putin’s expectations are triggered by the fact that not only has the West’s support for Ukraine so far been insufficient in scope, but the support itself has also appeared to lack a clear strategy, with no clear objectives and no long-term plans. All of this allows Putin to think and hope that the flow of such Western support will soon dry up.

To change this impression, we need a “Ukraine Strategy”: not only to guarantee greater and more effective Western military support for Ukraine, but also to make Putin finally realise that he will not be able to achieve any victories.

Such a “Ukraine strategy” must be an integral part of a “European Defence” strategy, which is also the focus of the new White Paper on European Defence, to be prepared by the new European Commission during its first 100 days in office.  The European Defence Strategy must provide for all the means at the European Union’s disposal (industrial, economic, financial, legal) to help the countries of the European Union to build up the necessary defence resources to be ready to counter any potential Russian aggression, as well as to provide Ukraine with the necessary military support. Such a European Defence Strategy is also needed so that Putin realises today that his dreams of testing the EU or NATO by attacking one of their members are futile – the EU together with NATO will defend itself.

The broader European Defence Strategy can be discussed later. The current text is primarily devoted to a more detailed discussion of the “Ukraine Strategy”. Both the “Ukraine Strategy” and the broader “European Defence” strategy must be seen as components of what former Finnish President S.Niinistö, in his recent report, identified as the EU Preparedness Strategy, which, according to the author, the European Union needs to develop and start implementing in the near future.

The “Ukraine Strategy” must be based on a clear understanding that European military support to Ukraine to date has been based on individual efforts by individual EU Member States, coordinated as far as possible by the so-called Ramstein format. This has helped to achieve a lot, but the time is coming when, without abandoning the Ramstein format, the organisation of assistance to Ukraine must gradually move from coordinated voluntary efforts to increasingly planned and strategic collective action. This would be the hallmark of the “Ukraine Strategy” – a collective EU effort to strengthen Ukraine’s defence and, by extension, the defence of Europe as a whole.

The “Ukraine strategy” does not have to be something very complicated: it simply has to provide for the volume of arms to be provided to Ukraine over the next few years, where they will be produced and how they will be financed.

The EU urgently needs a “Ukraine strategy” also in order to be adequately prepared in the near future for the dialogue and discussion, both with the new US administration and with Ukraine. The political priorities of the collective West and the EU’s support for Ukraine cannot depend solely on changes in the United States administration and its strategic priorities.

The “Ukraine strategy” can be developed in different ways: the strategy can be broader and more detailed, focusing on longer-term, broader objectives; but it can also be narrower in scope during its initial phase, focusing on the implementation of specifically defined military assistance objectives.

For example, it could focus on the EU assuming a specific responsibility to finance the production and supply of the military equipment needed to equip the new Ukrainian army brigades currently being trained (Ukraine is currently training 14 new brigades), including with heavy military equipment.

According to Western experts’ estimates, such armaments would require a considerable amount of weapons: 100-300 new tanks of the same model; up to 1 000 infantry fighting vehicles; about 500 new artillery systems (155 mm); up to 250 Gepard air defence systems to defend the army units; and a significant increase in the production of drones. There is also an urgent need to create and develop a Western logistical and industrial infrastructure in Ukraine itself, in order to be able to effectively maintain, repair and upgrade the military equipment produced in the EU defence industry and used on the Ukrainian front.

Such equipment could be produced by both European and Ukrainian military industries.  Three years of war have made it clear: which military equipment, produced where, is the most suitable and most needed by the Ukrainian army. Much of this equipment can also be produced by Ukraine’s own military industry, which is already capable of producing armaments of a quality in line with Western production standards. Another part would be produced by European companies or by Ukrainian-Western joint ventures, combining the technological know-how of modern warfare acquired by the Ukrainians with the industrial might of the West.

This would be particularly necessary in cases where, for example, the Ukrainians can produce modern “Bohdana” artillery systems, which are about twice as cheap to produce in Ukraine as similar artillery systems in the European Union, but the Ukrainians lack the self-propelled platforms on which the Ukrainian artillery systems have to be mounted. Such platforms could be produced in the EU and supplied to Ukrainian manufacturers. Similarly, the production of the various drones needed could be developed – the technological know-how acquired by the Ukrainians on the front line, combined with the potential of the EU defence industry, would guarantee a strong manufacturing breakthrough and a military advantage for Ukraine.

How much and which specific military equipment should be produced and supplied to Ukraine as a matter of priority is a matter for the Ukrainian military leadership to decide together with EU and NATO experts. However, this must be part of a strategic plan for production and delivery of the “Ukraine Strategy”, based on clear EU financial resources and long-term contracts with both the EU and the Ukrainian defence industry.

Preliminary calculations by Western experts on how much and what kind of equipment such a “Ukraine Strategy” should commit to producing and delivering to the Ukrainian army show that the initial cost of implementing such a strategy would be around 50 billion EUR.

EUR 50 billion is a large amount of money, but it is bearable for Western finance. Even if such funds were to be mobilised by the EU alone, it would be bearable, especially given that funds of this magnitude would not be spent in a single year.

It is worth remembering that in the almost three years of the war, the European Union’s military aid to Ukraine has already reached EUR 43 billion, and that of the United States of America has reached EUR 57 billion (while pledges already made in support of Ukraine’s other budget expenditures are as follows: the EU – EUR 84 billion; the United States – EUR 31 billion). So – in one year, the EU’s military support to Ukraine amounted to around EUR 14 billion and the United States’ to around EUR 19 billion. For both the EU and the US, this annual expenditure is just under 0.1% of their respective GDP.

Both the EU and the US are certainly economically capable of providing more military support to Ukraine, especially given that Russia spends 7% of its GDP on military expenditure, while Ukraine is forced to spend as much as 25% of its GDP on its defence.

Peace comes at a high price because, as the ancient Romans rightly said, if you want peace, prepare for war. It is expensive to prepare for military defence, but it is even more expensive to find oneself in the war without having prepared for it.

Europe’s readiness to face potential Russian aggression starts with today’s support for the defence of Ukraine. Such support is expensive, but it would be even more expensive not to support Ukraine and the consequences this “not support” would have for the whole of Europe.

It is worth repeating once again: we can only avoid Russian aggression if Putin first of all realises that he will achieve nothing in Ukraine, that he will not defeat Ukraine and that he will not subjugate Ukraine. Equally, that he will not overcome the will of the European Union and our will to support Ukraine. That is the true path to peace, both in Ukraine and on the entire European continent.

Whether we can overcome such a path depends above all on ourselves and on our political will to implement both the Ukraine strategy and the European Defence Strategy without delay.

2024.10.22

MEP P. Saudargas. Establishing the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism and providing exceptional macro-financial assistance to Ukraine

Mr President, dear colleagues,

we are talking about money here. I have a few questions for you. How much does a life cost? How much does one Ukrainian cost? Mother, father, daughter, son, sister, brother. Hundreds of thousands lost their lives in Ukraine. No billions can bring them back.

Second question: why does the war last so long? Because we have been debating for too long; about tanks and F-16s, about support and sanctions. We are too slow.

Third question: why do the sanctions fail to break the aggressor? Not only the third countries are to blame, but ourselves, because there are traitors and cheaters among us.

And the question of today: can we use Russian frozen assets to pay the needs of Ukraine? We have to do it. We owe it to Ukrainians. We are in big debt because it is not our sons and daughters dying out there, dying for us. This is the least we can do to make Russia pay. Slava Ukraini!

2024.09.23

A. Kubilius. Continued financial and military support to Ukraine by EU Member States

Mr President, dear colleagues, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has stressed not once that one of the most important priorities for new Commission will be defence and security of Europe, which is directly related to security of Ukraine.

I quote Commission President: ‘The best investment in European security is investing in the security of Ukraine.’

The first question is: are we investing enough in Ukraine security? My answer is very simple: we are investing a lot, but not enough.

Last year, all the Western military support to Ukraine reached only EUR 40 billion, when Russians spent for the war more than 120 billion. Even if we would be ready to spend not 40 billion, but 100 billion, we would have a problem to supply large amounts of weapons because capacities of our military industries are very low for the time being.

Even if we are giving weapons to Ukraine, we are – at least some of our countries – introducing red lines of restrictions not to use them against targets in Russian territory.

All those three reasons show very clearly we are not investing in the security of Ukraine and in our security enough. How to change the situation: we need immediately to find much larger financial resources for military assistance to Ukraine. And we can do it. We need to radically ramp up production of our military industry and to integrate Ukrainian military industry with European one. And we need to remove any red lines in defence of Ukraine security, which means in defence of our security.

2024.07.29

A.Kubilius. Ukraine And The Agenda Of The East of Europe In The Newly Elected European Parliament: Lithuania’s Challenge

We start our new mandate at the European Parliament. What challenges await Lithuania’s representatives? What should Lithuania strive for in the next five years of the new European mandate? Where can we, as Lithuania’s representatives, bring the greatest added value to the common European Union?

First impressions of the new European Parliament are that there are many new members and a great deal of interest from new members in issues of security, defence and Ukraine.

The European Parliament of this mandate seems to have a good international potential to work together jointly and to pursue key objectives and ideas. We need to be able to make good use of this situation so that, over the next five years, the European Union is able to achieve major breakthroughs in the security issues that are most important to us, all of which are related to Ukraine and to the Russian aggression.

The question naturally arises as to what specific objectives we, the representatives of Lithuania, will pursue in the European Parliament in this term of office, with a view to the whole period of this term of office up to 2029.

The experience of the first term of office suggests that, although we represent a small Lithuania, we can achieve a great deal and influence the overall policy of the European Union, provided that we are able to formulate clear ideas and clear objectives and that we are able to build coalitions of like-minded people who support such ideas.

It is therefore very important for the Lithuanian representatives in the European Parliament to agree at the very beginning of the new term of office on such common objectives that are most important for Lithuania and Europe. Then it will be easy to build a wider network of parliamentarians from different parties and different countries to influence common EU policies.

In this text, I will try to summarise how I see the main objectives that we need to achieve in this new European Parliament.

  1. Ukraine – A Strategic Priority For Europe

I remain convinced that during the next 5 the fate of Europe will be decided in Ukraine. And the fate of Lithuania. Ukraine’s victory in the war, reconstruction, membership of the European Union and NATO will be at the heart of European security policy. A secure and successful Ukraine is a key instrument of Western geopolitics, through which the European Union can influence positive change in the much wider Eastern European area, including Russia and Belarus. Change in this wider region is a key prerequisite for a sustainable peace on the European continent. And it is in these matters that we in Lithuania, together with our counterparts in other countries, can bring the most added value to Europe as a whole. And for our own security.

  1. The European Union Needs A “Ukraine Strategy” And A “Grand Strategy For Eastern Europe”

2.5 years after the start of the war, it is clear that Western military support to Ukraine so far has enabled Ukraine not to lose the war, but has been insufficient to achieve victory. One of the main reasons why aid to Ukraine from the West, which is much richer than Russia, has amounted to only 0.1% of the West’s total GDP, is that the West still does not have a clear “Ukraine strategy”, nor a clear “Europe East strategy”. In the absence of such strategic choices, the fear of Russian escalation and the fear of what will happen to Russia after Putin if Russia loses the war are the main obstacles to Western (including EU) decisions to provide more and more significant Western support to Ukraine.

In order for the West to overcome such fears, the European Union in particular needs to develop and start implementing the “Ukraine Strategy” and the “Grand Strategy for The East of Europe” without delay. They are interlinked and must be implemented together.

Lithuania’s representatives in the European Parliament, through their political groups, committees and delegations, must work together to make the European Parliament the epicentre for the development of such strategies.

  1. The Importance Of Networks Of Peers

Any political idea can only become a reality if the initiators of the idea are able to build a wide circle of like-minded people around the idea, which helps to make the idea a reality. This is how United for Ukraine, an international network of parliamentarians and experts, was able to come together during the previous parliamentary term. It has gained wide international recognition for its active role in providing Western support to Ukraine. Equally successful has been our informal “Friends of European Russia Forum”, which has brought together all those concerned about the future of democracy in Russia.

This experience and the networks of like-minded people that we have already built up make us hopeful that in the new European Parliament we will be able to bring together broader coalitions of representatives of major parties and countries, while at the same time inviting them to join us in our initiatives to develop a “Strategy for Ukraine” and a “Strategy for the East of Europe”.

  1. Strategy for Ukraine

The “Ukraine Strategy” should be a joint strategy, implemented by both Ukraine and the EU (together with the wider West), aimed not only at helping Ukraine to defend itself, but also at creating the preconditions for a fundamental political transformation in the wider Eastern European region, including Russia and Belarus. The “Ukraine Strategy” must consist of 2 essential parts: a “Ukraine’s Victory Strategy” and a “Ukraine’s Success Strategy”:

4.1. “Ukraine’s Victory Strategy”: a key element of the “Ukraine’s Victory Strategy” is the EU’s Roadmap for Ukraine’s Victory (as I have written about before). It must provide for at least €100 billion of Western military support to Ukraine each year (in 2023, this amounted to only €40 billion). Such funds must also be used to immediately and radically expand the production of weapons, both in Ukraine and in the EU.

A further plan to strengthen economic sanctions and the establishment of the International Tribunal for the Crime of War of Aggression must also be part of Ukraine’s victory strategy.

“The Ukraine’s Victory Strategy” must also include a global effort to force Putin to accept the peace terms drawn up by the international community, the key provision of which must be unchanged: the complete withdrawal of Russian troops from the occupied Ukrainian lands.

4.2. “Ukraine’s Success Strategy”: this is the EU’s strategy for building Ukraine’s economic, social and geopolitical success. Such success can only be achieved through the implementation of two strategies: the “Ukraine Reconstruction Strategy” and the “Ukraine’s EU (Euro-Atlantic) Integration Strategy”. The implementation of both is intrinsically linked. A strategy for Ukraine’s success is not only necessary for Ukraine, but also for the EU as a whole, as Ukraine’s example of success would play a key role in promoting change in the wider Eastern European area.

4.2.1 The strategy for Ukraine’s reconstruction will focus on three aspects:

– Adequate funds for reconstruction;

– the implementation of European rules (acquis communautaire) in Ukraine to make them applicable for reconstruction projects;

– the entry of Western private capital into Ukraine;

Ukraine’s reconstruction must be carried out in a way that synergistically promotes Ukraine’s modernisation, inclusive reforms and creates opportunities for Western businesses to see that Ukraine is the best destination for Western investment.

4.2.2 Ukraine’s EU integration strategy has two equally important strands: what Ukraine needs to do, and what the EU itself needs to do. Ukraine’s EU integration strategy will correlate very closely with those of the other candidates for EU membership, but the success of Ukraine’s strategy will have particular geopolitical significance, as Ukraine is an ice-breaker in opening the door to integration for the other candidates. The success of Ukraine’s integration will depend on many factors, only some of which are up to Ukraine itself. Many of these factors will operate outside the immediate format of the accession negotiations, but will have a very strong influence on the negotiations themselves. Our challenge is to find ways to strengthen those factors that can accelerate the integration process and to reduce the influence of those factors that can hinder integration.

What is most important on the integration path, will have to happen on the Ukrainian side:

– Ukraine will need European experience and European support for the necessary reforms, in particular focusing on the transposition of at least ten key European regulations (especially in the field of business operations), the creation or restructuring of the institutions necessary for their implementation, and the preparation of human resources for the implementation of such regulations; and Lithuania can play an important role in transferring its integration experience;

– For Ukraine and the other candidates, it will be essential to focus first on reforms that would lead to rapid integration into the Single Market, which would not only open the door for Ukrainian businesses to operate in a much richer market, but would also open the door for European businesses to invest much more confidently in the Ukrainian economy.

– The heavy investment in Ukraine by businesses from EU Member States is what could most effectively weaken the doubts or silent political resistance of some EU Member States to accelerated Ukrainian integration.

– It will be crucial for Ukraine to seek synergies with other candidate countries, both from the Eastern Partnership and the Western Balkans. This would significantly strengthen the geopolitical leverage of Ukraine and the other candidates on the EU Member States that will have to take decisions on integration, while reducing the scope for tensions or unhealthy competition between the candidates and the EU Member States supporting them.

Of course, it will be up to Ukraine itself to decide what strategy to pursue on the path of integration, but in trying to help Ukraine along the path in the most effective way, we need to agree among ourselves and with our peers in other EU countries on what strategic priorities we advise Ukraine to pursue. Because there is nothing worse than a cacophony of conflicting advice, even if the advice-givers mean well.

More important than our advice to the Ukrainian side is what we need to do and achieve on our side, that is, on the EU’s side, for the sake of Ukraine’s rapid integration. Because, up to now, EU enlargement and the integration of Ukraine and the other candidate countries have been stalling, first of all, because there has not been enough political will on the European Union’s side to carry out such enlargement. And it was only Russia’s war against Ukraine that fundamentally changed the situation on the EU side. On our side, however, there are more obstacles to enlargement, already known and still to come, than we dare admit to ourselves. Overcoming them requires preparation now and a collective effort by all stakeholders. Here are a few actions that should be the focus of our attention and efforts in the near future:

– A common political campaign must be launched in all EU Member States, explaining that the enlargement of the European Union, and in particular Ukraine’s membership of the European Union, is not only necessary for Ukraine itself, but is strategically necessary and beneficial for the European Union itself.

– In order to most effectively influence the consolidation of the political will needed for enlargement among EU Member States, the creation of a joint European Parliamentary/Expert Forum on European Enlargement should be initiated in the near future, bringing together like-minded people from EU Member States as well as from candidate countries. The global parliamentary/expert forum “United for Ukraine” (U4U), which we have initiated, works in a similar way.

– Central Europe may be the biggest obstacle to enlargement, even though it would seem that it is the countries of this region that should be the most enthusiastic about enlargement. Unfortunately, as the experience of both the last decades and the last few years shows, some Central European countries’ departures from basic rule of law and democratic values are turning the “old Europe” countries against enlargement, as they are beginning to fear that further enlargement will only increase the number of similarly behaving countries; some Central European countries are openly opposed to any support for Ukraine, including its EU membership; in recent years, it has become clear that many Central European countries fear economic competition (especially in agriculture) with Ukraine; Central European countries do not shy away from resolving their historical disputes with their neighbours by blocking the European integration processes of such neighbours; Central European countries are the biggest supporters of the veto right, which could be the most serious barrier to further enlargement.

Such obstacles to Ukraine’s accelerated integration, or potential obstacles, emanating from Central Europe, require special political attention and a specific strategy to remove, or at least to reduce, such obstacles. Such a strategy must be born and implemented in the Central European region itself. We belong to this region and we must not shy away from talking openly with our partners in the region about the obstacles that we ourselves pose to EU enlargement and how they need to be overcome.

– Although we have so far avoided talking about it, it is clear that EU enlargement will also require institutional and budgetary changes within the European Union itself. We need to be the ones looking for solutions, not the ones holding back the search for such solutions.

5. EU Grand Strategy for The East of Europe

The successful implementation of the “Ukraine’s Strategy” would be one of the key instruments for the equally successful implementation of the “EU Grand Strategy for the East of Europe”. The “EU Grand Strategy for the East of Europe” is essentially a strategy to help Europe’s East, in particular Russia and Belarus, to transform themselves into normal states.  This can only be achieved if the dictatorial and aggressive regimes of Putin and Lukashenko are no longer in place in either country. This requires a clear strategic objective of “regime change”, even though the West is both afraid and reluctant to talk about it and to use such a term. The West itself will not change the regimes in Moscow and Minsk, only the Belarusians and the Russians themselves can do that, but the West, and the European Union in particular, can create all the conditions for such a transformation to take place in the East of Europe. That is what the “EU Grand Strategy for the East of Europe” is all about.

Such a Grand Strategy must be subordinated to the EU’s “Ukraine’s Strategy”, because Ukraine’s victory and its subsequent success could be the main trigger that would lead to the collapse of the Putin regime and, for the Russians and the Belarusians themselves, Ukraine’s success could be the inspiration for transformation within themselves. The implementation of the “Ukraine’s strategy” is 99% dependent on the political will of the West and the resources it allocates to such a strategy. The West does not have the capacity to directly change the situation or bring about change in Russia or Belarus itself, but the West does have a unique and unique instrument that can bring about positive change in Eastern Europe (i.e. Russia and Belarus) – the implementation of the “Ukraine’s Strategy”.

Why does the West need change in Eastern Europe?

There are two main reasons why such change is needed, not only for ordinary Russians or Belarusians, but also for the European Union as a whole.

The first reason is that such changes in Russia and Belarus are the only way to eliminate the permanent threat of authoritarian Russia, in other words, they are the only way to a sustainable, permanent, real peace on the European continent, and not to imitate “peace” by accepting Putin’s conditions for such peace.

The second reason is that the formulation of the objectives of the “Grand Strategy for The East of Europe” and the implementation of such a strategy would help the West today to overcome the fear of a Ukrainian victory and a Russian defeat (and what will happen to Russia without Putin), which is the main obstacle to the West’s hesitation to provide more military support to Ukraine. The “EU Grand Strategy for The East of Europe” is therefore necessary for the West to finally achieve victory in Ukraine.

Such an “EU Grand Strategy for the East of Europe” would have five essential components: (a) a strategy for Ukraine’s victory; (b) a strategy for Ukraine’s success; (c) Ukraine’s invitation to join NATO; (d) support for the Russian and Belarusian opposition and civil society; and (e) a strategy for the EU’s future relations with a democratic Russia and a democratic Belarus, to be developed and published in the near future;

5.1 and 5.2. The first two parts – the “Ukraine’s Victory Strategy” and the “Ukraine’s Success Strategy” – are described above and their essential role is to act as a trigger and inspiration for change in the East of Europe. Their implementation depends entirely on the political will of the West.

5.3 The invitation to Ukraine to join NATO is necessary not only to guarantee Ukraine’s security, but also to send an unequivocal Western signal to the Russian elite and ordinary Russians – forget your dreams of “reclaiming” Ukraine; Ukraine has left Russia’s post-imperial space for ever and, with such an invitation, Ukraine becomes an integral part of a democratic West. This would begin to fulfil the prophecy formulated by Zbigniew Brzezinski: Russia, which has the opportunity to control Ukraine, will always remain an empire; Russia, which loses control of Ukraine, has the opportunity to become a democracy. Inviting Ukraine to become a member of NATO would help Russia to get rid of its imperial nostalgia for control of Ukraine and would help Russia to become a normal state in the long term.

5.4 Supporting the Russian and Belarusian opposition and civil society is something that the European Union and its Member States seem to be already doing intensively. This needs to continue and increase the volume of such support. There is a need to develop formal and informal dialogue structures between the institutions of the European Union and the Russian and Belarusian opposition. Such support and ongoing dialogue is also necessary for the West itself, so that it can return as quickly as possible to the belief that democracy is possible in Russia and Belarus. Only with such a return to faith will the West cease to fear Russia’s defeat, the collapse of Putin’s regime, and that a Russia without Putin will be even more aggressive. All these fears are widespread and deep in the thinking of Western leaders today, and this makes them fearful of a Ukrainian victory too.

It is essential that the Ukrainians take the lead in mobilising the combined political and intellectual potential of the Transformation Triangle (Ukraine, Russia and Belarus), to which the West would also contribute. Because the Ukrainians have the greatest interest in the eventual collapse of the Putin and Lukashenko regimes, and thus the disappearance of the threat to Europe as a whole, and to Ukraine in particular, that emanates from Eastern Europe.

5.5 A strategy for the European Union’s future relations with democratic Russia and Belarus is something that the European Union, in consultation with Russian and Belarusian civil society, should draw up and publish without delay. Ordinary citizens in Russia and Belarus need to know that after the fall of the Putin and Lukashenko regimes, they will have the opportunity to build their own success with the strategic support of the European Union, just as Lithuania, the Baltic States, Central Europe and now the EU candidate countries Ukraine, Moldova and the Western Balkan countries have done. The European Union must now make it clear that democratic Belarus will be invited to join the EU, and an Association Agreement with the future democratic Belarus could already be drafted now. Democratic Russia will not be offered formal integration into the European Union, but the economic and technical partnership between the EU and democratic Russia could be quite a deep partnership. Ordinary Russians must now believe that, together with the European Union, they will be able to realise the dream identified by Navalny as “the wonderful Russia of the future” in a democratic Russia after the fall of the Putin regime.

  1. Instead of conclusions: In the Beginning Was The Word

Some may think that the matter of the “Ukraine’s Strategy” and the “EU Grand Strategy for the East of Europe” may be important, but it is certainly not for little Lithuania to have the ambition to develop and implement such EU strategies. Because when Lithuania talks about this, it is beautiful and romantic, but at the same time it is naive, because Lithuania supposedly does not have the power and the ability to implement such strategies.

My answer to all such “disbelief” is very simple. I always urge you to remember the very precise first words of the Holy Scriptures: In the beginning was the Word. Scripture is the best textbook on political management to this day. The importance of the Word (or the idea) remains as primordial then as now. If the right word (idea) is born, then all the others follow.

Lithuania can be the birthplace of the right words on some of today’s most important geopolitical issues. Especially when it comes to Ukraine and Russian aggression. We are not only capable of being the progenitors of the right starting words (ideas) in these matters of Ukraine and Russia, but we are also capable of getting others to follow our word, in other words, we are capable of building broad coalitions of like-minded people around such right words (ideas).

So let’s do it! Let’s start by agreeing among ourselves on the right words. Then let’s try to translate them into the common faith of wider Europe.

It will not be easy.

But the easy way is not our way!

2024.07.25

Andrius Kubilius. Summer of Capitulation Shift

Andrius Kubilius, MEP, former PM of Lithuania

On 5 July, writing about the leadership problems of the Great West, from Macron to Biden, I said: “US President Biden is one step away from capitulation.”

Capitulation has happened. There are major political shifts taking place in America, both in the short term and in the long term. It is difficult to predict what they will bring. In the short term, only one thing is clear – Kamala Harry is predictable, Donald Trump is unpredictable.

Whatever the outcome of the elections in the United States, the key questions to be answered throughout the transatlantic community, and especially in the European Union, will remain the same: Ukraine and the Russian war. Only they may become even more acute. And they will require us to have clear arguments, which we need to start making now.

Looking at the whole picture, and in particular at the political debate in the United States, but also in the European Union and in Ukraine itself, there are two fundamental debates to be prepared for: a) on the scope and duration of Western military support for Ukraine, and b) on the terms and consequences of peace talks with Russia, both for Ukraine itself and for Russia and the West as a whole.

This debate could lead to major geopolitical shifts around the world, both in the East and in the West.

The two topics are closely interlinked: declining Western military support for Ukraine will inevitably force Ukraine to the negotiating table on terms that are unfavourable to it. The consequences of such negotiations will be catastrophic for both Ukraine and the West.

ON MILITARY SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE AND ON WESTERN CAPITULATION

On the American side, and especially in the Trump camp, it is often argued that the US should stop its military support for Ukraine, because the European Union should bear the entire burden of such support. And anyway, it is a hopeless business to provide Ukraine military support, because Russia will still produce more artillery shells than the West can produce. Therefore, according to those who talk like this, the only way forward is to do what Mr Trump is promising to do, which is to end the war in one day, by some miracle. This is how the fundamental difference is formulated: weapons and a costly war or a mystical peace without weapons.

And the main argument for the second option is very simple: there are no weapons in the West and there will be none. This argument most consistently was made by Senator J.D. Vance (now Trump’s choice for Vice President) in his famous speech to the US Senate this year. His main argument is that US industry has moved to China and that the US is therefore incapable of producing either the number of artillery shells or the number of air defences needed to defeat Russia in Ukraine.

Such arguments, combined with strong oratorical skills, sound impressive and convincing enough at the beginning. But very soon you realise their capitulatory shift.

Talks of the US or the European Union not being able to produce the number and type of weapons needed for Ukraine’s victory are in no way consistent with simple economic facts: the combined economic potential of the US and the European Union is 25 times stronger than Russia’s potential. The West produces a surplus of top-quality cars, passenger and military aircraft, and is on an unstoppable drive into the vastness of outer space, all of which is technologically and economically beyond the reach of the aggressor, Russia. Therefore, from an economic point of view, the explanation that the West is incapable of producing as many weapons as it needs sounds completely unconvincing. The only logical argument could be that if the West lacks the production of some weapons today, then tomorrow or the day after tomorrow that production must have already been developed.

Obviously, there are other (non-economic) reasons why such arguments are being put forward in the West: a general lack of understanding of the importance of the Ukrainian war; a lack of basic political will and leadership (“it’s no skin off my nose”); the fear that losing the war could make Russia more dangerous than it is today.

Each of these reasons can be analysed separately and in depth, but the kind of in-depth analysis that Western pundits love to engage in makes it easy to escape from the main, simple conclusion: if the West is unable to produce and supply Ukraine with enough weapons to force Russia to pull out of Ukraine, it will only mean that the West, despite the West’s economic power, is politically and geopolitically weaker than Russia. If it is weaker than Russia, that means it is also weaker than China. It would be difficult to understand why, in the face of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the West is incapable of producing the necessary weapons, but in the face of China’s aggression against Taiwan, it would already be capable of doing so. Moreover, if the West is not capable of repelling Russian aggression in Ukraine, why should Lithuanians believe that the West would be able to do so in the event of Russian aggression against Lithuania?

Capitulation by the West, and by the US in particular, to Russian aggression in Ukraine would only weaken the geopolitical potential of the US and encourage aggression not only from Russia but also from China. The shift towards capitulationist thinking in the West on Ukraine would be a shift towards the defeat of the fundamental geopolitical interests of the West, including the US.

ABOUT CAPITULATORY PEACE

The increasingly loud talk in the West about peace talks, diplomatic solutions and a mystical end to the war in one day is a “beautiful” continuation of the same arguments for not giving arms to Ukraine: we don’t need to give arms because we don’t have them and we can’t make them, and besides, arms only delay peace, and peace is the most important humanistic goal, no matter by what the means and with what consequences. We hear such arguments with increasing frequency. The apologists for such a peace do not explain how and under what conditions such a peace can be achieved, because it is enough for them to say that it can be achieved by diplomatic means. But it is clear that behind the so-called “humanist” arguments there is a simple logic: Ukraine must hand over the occupied territories to Russia, and in return, Russia will promise to cease its aggression, as if this will save thousands of lives and preserve the destruction of cities.

Putin will see such a peace as a victory for him and will treat it as a surrender by the West.

Any alleged commitment by Putin to guarantee the inviolability of the remaining territories of Ukraine will be completely null and void, like Hitler’s promises not to touch the remaining territory of Czechoslovakia after Chamberlain and Daladier promised to give up the Sudetenland to Hitler at the Munich Peace Conference (the real name of the “Munich Agreement”). Six months later, Hitler occupied the rest of Czechoslovakia, despite his earlier promise.

If not stopped in Ukraine, Putin will behave just like Hitler. Only in this case, the “new Hitler” of the 21st century will have been created by the West, by choosing the path of conscious or unconscious capitulation.

Putin will become ten times more aggressive after such a “peace” and the Russian victory. And he will choose new targets in the neighbourhood. Putin will certainly not become a peace dove. China will take its cue from Russia and consider the West to be just as politically and geopolitically weak. The West’s geopolitical weakness has so far only served to strengthen the aggressiveness of an authoritarian Russia or China.

Peace is absolutely necessary for Ukraine and Europe. But not just any peace. A Western capitulatory peace with Putin on Putin’s terms would not be a peace for Ukraine, but an incitement to Putin’s aggression. It would only fan the flames of war even further.

The West must finally realise that a real peace with an undefeated Putin is impossible, especially if there is a capitulatory slide towards peace on Putin’s terms.

HOW TO AVOID CAPITULATION SHIFT?

It is now 2.5 years since the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine. The West has had enough time to wake up to the fact that Putin’s Russia is the greatest threat to European security, and to reflect on what strategy to pursue in this war. Unfortunately, no clearer strategy has emerged so far. Or no one is naming one.

Simple common sense tells us that if you are attacked by an enemy who is your greatest threat, your strategy can only be threefold: a) capitulate and surrender; b) defend and wait for the enemy to tire; and c) attack and destroy the threat yourself.

So far, despite the plethora of strong and loud statements and visits to Kiev, the West has essentially balanced only between the first two options: some have suggested that Ukraine should not be armed and that it should pursue a capitulatory peace; others have looked for ways to help Ukraine defend itself. And all the military support given so far has been just enough to barely allow Ukraine to defend itself.

Why is Ukraine not receiving more support?

It is not because the West is economically incapable of providing such support. I have already written about this.

My answer is that it is only because the West still does not dare to have a strategy for attacking and destroying the threat. And in the West they themselves are getting tired of their own timidity and their own political and leadership impotence. And, feeling increasingly tired of their impotence, they themselves are moving closer and closer to capitulation without noticing it.

This summer must be the “last summer” in which the West still lives without such an offensive strategy. If the West does not soon develop a strategy of destroying the threat and attacking it, it will have to start calculating which summer will be the “last summer” for the West.

The threat of Putin’s Russia can be eliminated, first and foremost, if Putin’s regime falls. Let us dare to talk about the fact that the West’s strategic objective with regard to Russia is a “regime change” in the Kremlin, which will be implemented by the Russians themselves, but only the West can create the conditions for this if it defeats Putin in Ukraine.

The capitulatory shift in the West will only be halted if the West finally starts to shift towards a strategy of destroying the threat. The West must finally realise that Russia and Putin are on a long-term path of self-destruction that could be bloody and dangerous for everyone around them, while Russia, which the West would help to free from Putin, would have the opportunity to become a normal state.

Lithuania has the potential to influence Western strategic thinking. But to do so, it needs to be able to think strategically itself. And to act. Otherwise, we will inadvertently find ourselves in a capitulatory shift, occasionally still repeating in the standard way that we support Ukraine, that we are concerned and that we condemn Putin. The West, too, will do exactly the same thing when it finds itself in a capitulatory shift.

We need to learn to swim against the tide…

The easy way is not our way!

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