2025.01.01

R. Juknevičienė. About Georgia and Beyond

Georgia has risen up against the anti-European regime of Bidzina Ivanishvili, Rasa Juknevičienė, Permanent Rapporteur on Georgian Affairs at the European Parliament, writes.

What is happening now in Georgia is not just a local dispute on the periphery of Europe.

It is one of the episodes in Russia’s centuries-long imperial actions and Putin’s hybrid war against democracies.

It is worth looking at the broader picture of recent decades to understand the essence of these events.

The Georgian President, Salome Zourabichvili, referred to the parliamentary elections held in October as a Kremlin special operation.

This is more than just the manipulation of election results manipulation, a common practice in autocracies.

Even Putin’s rise to power in Russia was a special operation, using the imperial Chechen card. At the time, the world was still captivated by the collapse of the USSR, so the destroyed Grozny, bombed by fighter jets, and the thousands of Russian citizens killed in the Republic of Ichkeria failed to move the democratic world.

Following Putin’s speech in Munich, the Kremlin’s special operations against neighboring states intensified around 2007. By that time, the President of the Russian Federation had consolidated power internally taking control of the political system, raw material resources, and major television channels.

The Munich speech essentially signalled what was to come: reclaiming former imperial lands in Europe.

Georgia became the first victim of military aggression immediately after the NATO summit in Bucharest, where three NATO members blocked the Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Ukraine and Georgia. This was a clear signal to the Kremlin to take as much as it could.

Following the annexation of parts of Georgia, the Kremlin orchestrated its next operation with Viktor Yanukovych in Ukraine. In 2010, with significant Kremlin support (remember the poisoning of President Viktor Yushchenko), the Kremlin’s puppet won the presidential elections. Yanukovych’s visit to Brussels quickly followed, where he rejected Ukraine’s NATO membership aspirations, extended Russia’s military base agreements in Crimea for another 45 years, imprisoned former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, appointed pro-Kremlin ministers with Russian citizenship to key positions, abolished conscription, and undertook other measures to subordinate Ukraine to Russia.

Similar processes unfolded in Moldova, where Putin’s allies corrupted the country to the point where EU support was suspended.

Incidentally, similar operations also took place in my country, Lithuania.

The most notable and successful Kremlin special operation in Lithuania was the 2012 referendum on the Visaginas nuclear power plant. Unfortunately, operational security data on this operation was filed away in secret drawers, and those who participated from the Lithuanian side were never held accountable.

Among all Kremlin attempts to subjugate states to its will and influence, Georgia was the most successful operation until this recent Georgian revolution.

Having brought billions from Russia, Bidzina Ivanishvili (known as Boris in Russia) began his dirty work in 2012. First, he established a party with the romantic name “Georgian Dream”, reminiscent of the romanticism of Kremlin-style parties in Lithuania, such as “Nemuno Aušra” (Dawn of Nemunas) led by an anti-Semitic figure.

Gradually, step by step, the oligarch Bidzina took control of all state institutions—the national broadcaster, law enforcement, and security forces. He became a smaller clone of Putin.

His party publicly advocated for EU membership until the recent elections. Why?

Because around 80% of Georgians support the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration. Ivanishvili’s party deliberately manipulated pro-European public sentiment while steering the country in the opposite direction.

Elsewhere, Putin’s special operations were less successful.

In Ukraine, the Kremlin failed to retain its puppet Yanukovych. Moldova has regained some stability. Romania endured, albeit with difficulty, and the Baltic States have so far resisted, though vulnerabilities remain in Lithuania.

The Kremlin’s most significant defeat recently occurred in Syria. Let’s hope that Syria serves as a lesson for some African leaders who have established corrupt ties with Russia.

Georgia is a critical part of the broader picture of Russia’s war against Europe.

The most important battle is, of course, taking place on Ukrainian soil. However, the war against democracies, fought without artillery fire, is no less significant. It involves poisoning minds and stirring emotions during elections.

This war is already happening in the depths of the Baltic Sea through acts of sabotage against critical infrastructure. It manifests in orchestrating waves of migrants and terrorist attacks.

So, now we understand the essence, we must decide: what do we do?

The choices are few—either resolve to win or accept the existence of an aggressive empire.

That is why, if we want to remain honest with history and avoid repeating Chamberlain’s fateful mistake in Munich in 1938, we have only one choice— we must help Georgians defend themselves against the Russian empire.

The U.S. has taken a significant introductory step by imposing stringent sanctions on Ivanishvili and recognizing him as a tool of Russian policy in Georgia.

Now it’s time for the EU to act.

Putin aims to seize as much control over the Black Sea as possible. Georgia is a golden prize for him. Georgians do not want this.

So why is the EU so hesitant? Clearly, the interests of the Georgian people and the EU align—the European continent must be as united as possible in the family of democracies.

Yes, the European Commission does not have independent foreign policy powers; this falls under the jurisdiction of member states.

This is where Putin’s calculations come into play: why it was worth starting wars. He believes democracies cannot withstand wars of this magnitude. Viktor Orbán, Robert Fico, and the elections in Germany, followed by France, seem like a paralysis of democratic procedures.

However, there is an opportunity for leadership by those who understand the consequences of paralysis. These are the Nordic and Baltic countries, with Poland taking over the Presidency of the Council of Europe.

On November 28, the European Parliament fulfilled its significant role by adopting a historic resolution that sets the main directions of EU policy regarding the Georgian government. Policymakers in some member states are now using this resolution.
RC-10-2024-0179_EN).

Mikheil Kavelashvili is only a puppet and the Presidential inauguration show is just a parody. Salome Zourabichvili remains the only legitimate leader of Georgia.

Only new, transparent elections that meet all the standards of democracy can lead the country out of this crisis and end Georgia’s subordination to Russia.

How to do this can be decided by Georgian society itself, with the support of the European Union. EU institutions have to act as mediators. And the sooner, the better.

2024.11.30

Rasa Juknevičienė: Georgia in crisis

As a true believer in European values, and a friend of democratic Georgia, I cannot just silently watch what is happening now in Georgia.
Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze and Bidzina Ivanishvilli, Georgia’s sole oligarch who has managed to capture the state of Georgia, have created a deep political crisis in the country. This crisis was created because both of them betrayed Georgia’s European path, enshrined in its constitution, and legitimised the use violence against protesters. All this is done either deliberately or because of stupidity.
Kremlin is happy.
All responsible Georgians – even those in the ruling “Georgian Dream” party, the opposition, civil society, President Salome Zourabichvili – and the international community of friends of a democratic European Georgia should immediately start negotiations on a political way out of this crisis.
The first steps should be:
An immediate decision by the Government of Georgia to stop the violence of police and special forces;
Immediate resignation of Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze and Minister of Internal Affairs Vakhtang Gomelauri;
Establishing of an interim technocratic Government of National Unity, the process to be led by President Salome Zourabichvili;
An EU-led international investigation of the crimes of brutality against journalists, opposition representatives, and protesters;
Immediate individual sanctions by the EU and transatlantic partners against Bidzina Ivanishvili, Irakli Kobakhidze, Vakhtang Gomelauri, and those bearing political responsibility for the crimes of brutality;
Agreement of Georgian political parties on new Parliamentary elections to be held in three months’ time, the organization of which will be carried out with the assistance of democratic partners from the international community.
Political preparation for the formation of a National Unity Government following the new Parliamentary elections.
Providing assistance by international partners and EU representatives in the negotiations and in achieving the agreement among the Georgian political forces and civil society on a way out of the dangerous political crisis in Georgia.

2024.11.26

Inputs to White Paper on European Defence

Andrius Kubilius, MEP, Commissioner-Designate for Defence and Space

In my Mission Letter as a new Commissioner for Defence and Space I got a task, together with High Representative Kaja Kallas, during the first 100 days to prepare a “White Paper on European Defence”, which will define how EU is readying itself and Member States for the most extreme military contingencies. Preparedness is the task for everybody: for EU leadership and for national governments, for industries, experts and citizens. That is why in each meeting which I have with different people or different communities, I am asking everybody to give us their input into forthcoming White Paper.

The first input, which we got came from the very important partner – from ASD (European AeroSpace, Security and Defence industries Association), with a lot of very valuable ideas. Thanks to ASD and welcome to everybody else who is ready to follow ASD example and to send their ideas to us. We are ready to discuss them.

Input of European AeroSpace, Security and Defence industries Association to the White Paper on European Defence.

Other inputs:

Input of the Wilfried Martens Centre.

2024.11.20

Andrius Kubilius. Keynote Speech At The Berlin Security Conference

Andrius Kubilius, MEP, Commissioner-Designate for Defence and Space

Berlin, 20.11.2024

Dear Participants of the Berlin Security Conference,

Let me thank the organizers of the Conference for inviting me, at the moment still just a Commissioner-designate.

Nevertheless, it is quite certain – the EU will have its first-ever EU Commissioner for Defence and Space.

Until now the European Union was not considered an important player in European defence issues.

However, this notion is changing.

I will not elaborate on why the EU needs a Commissioner for Defence. Putin’s war against Ukraine provides the biggest share of answers to this question.

Let’s concentrate instead on what the European Union needs, wants, and can do to strengthen European defence.

Until now it looked like the European defence is a business for NATO and Member States only.

But the times are changing.

For me, it is crystal clear – no matter the changes in our security environment, one thing will not change: the European Union has never competed, is not competing, and will not compete with NATO on European defence. It is NATO that prepares and implements our defence plans, it is NATO that takes care about high military command. The EU does not seek to compete with NATO on those issues.

What the EU can do, is to bring added value to assist EU Member States (that are also NATO members) in developing defence capabilities and defence resources needed for the implementation of NATO defence plans. The EU can do what NATO cannot: raise additional funds for defence and introduce new legal regulations, which can help Member States to develop their defence resources.

What are those capabilities and resources that the EU can help to develop and sustain?

There are four types of defence resources, necessary for defence both before and during the course of a war:

– defence equipment and services, including space services; they must be ready and available at the stage of preparation for defence;

– trained military personnel, which could be mobilised in case of war;

– military mobility and logistics;

– military industry capability on European soil, able and ready to produce what is needed, located close to a frontline, if the war comes;

As things stand, we in Europe have some challenges with regard to all those capabilities and resources.

To better understand those challenges, we need to look into threats to our security:

First of all, as you may know, the Mission letter, which I received from the Commission President, tasks me, together with High Representative Kaja Kallas, during the first 100 days of our mandate to prepare and publish a “White Paper on European Defence”. This White Paper shall define the measures to help Europe to ready itself for “the most extreme military contingencies”. In other words, the White Paper must describe how the EU will prepare itself for the possibility of Russian aggression against EU Member states.

This is a strong, open, and realistic language about the biggest threat that we are facing.

As you know, various recent intelligence assessments, including a German one, suggest that Russia may test the resolve of the EU or NATO by the end of this decade, meaning until 2030 at the latest.

The Kiel Institute, also a German research centre, in its recent paper has revealed a sobering conclusion – Russia, with its war economy, in a 6 month period can produce everything the German Army has in its stocks.

According to another expert assessment, if evaluated in Purchasing Power Parity terms, in the next year Russia will spend more for its military than all EU-27 MSs will.

On the other hand, analysis of our own defence capabilities’ situation demonstrates that we are quite below the so-called NATO Capability Targets.

As openly articulated in the Report of President S.Niinistö: “Currently, the collective inventory of the capabilities of EU Member States (most of which are also NATO allies) continues to show serious gaps and shortfalls, including long-standing dependencies on the US, especially in high-intensity operations. As identified in recent experiences and reflected in capability planning processes, the EU-27 are lacking in nearly everything from ammunition and strategic enablers to high-end capabilities.”

In the light of low level of our preparedness, there are two strategic factors, that we need to have in mind when discussing Europe’s defence needs:

firstly, we must urgently prepare ourselves for the possibility of Russian aggression against the EU;
secondly, we need to prepare for a longer-term challenge, that the US will be forced to shift more and more from defence of Europe towards mitigation of China’s rising military power.

In my personal view, that is what our “White Paper on European Defence” will need to be about: how we will prepare to meet, deter, and defend ourselves against the most extreme military contingencies in such a “reality landscape”, both in the short term and also in the longer-term timeframe.

Today, I will concentrate my comments on the short-term challenge. That means Russia, its war against Ukraine and the possibility of Russia’s aggression against the EU.

Personally, I would like to see the upcoming White Paper to focus on 3 most important blocks, where we need to come to an agreement on urgent common decisions, necessary to be implemented either to diminish the threats or to be ready to defend ourselves.

Those 3 blocks should focus on:

1. our military support for defence of Ukraine;

2. ramping up our defence industry production in order to meet NATO Capability Targets not until 2044, but by 2030;

3. defence financing – how will we finance the urgent needs of our defence preparedness.

Before moving to a short description of the content of those 3 building blocks, I would like to remind you that, if you feel the need to employ your intellectual potential during Christmas vacation, you are welcome to use it on drafting some of your ideas and proposals for the White Paper. I cannot promise you, that we will be able to include all of your ideas, but we will be very grateful for your input.

Now, let me share with you my own thoughts on those 3 building blocks of the White Paper.

First of all – on Ukraine.

Why defence of Ukraine is such an important part of our plan for our readiness to meet the most extreme military contingencies, i.e. Russia’s military aggression against the EU?

First, because Ukraine’s defence depends exclusively on the Western, including the EU’s, military support.

Second, if we fail in our support, and Ukraine is forced to surrender and accept the so-called “peace” treaty, drafted according to Putin’s conditions, Russia can turn against the EU or NATO much sooner than we are expecting.

As NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has recently commented in “Politico”: “So far, our support has kept Ukraine in the fight. But we need to do much more in order to shift the conflict’s trajectory”.

That is why, when we are talking about our readiness to “meet the most extreme military contingencies”, first of all, we need to do everything to “shift the trajectory of Russia’s war against Ukraine”. We need to understand that such a shift depends only on us. Our support for Ukraine must be larger and more effective. As the Commission President has declared in the Political Guidelines for the new Commission: “The best investment in European security is investing in the security of Ukraine.” Let’s start to invest much more in the security of Ukraine!

Few thoughts on the Second building block: on ramping up defence industry production to meet NATO Capability Targets until 2030, instead of the current target date of 2044;

First of all, within the EU we need to build a clear understanding on what is the actual gap between the so-called NATO Capability Targets (which NATO is currently redefining after 3 years of Russia’s war against Ukraine), and the currently available defence capabilities of the EU Member States. As President Niinistö has warned us, there are “serious gaps and shortfalls” in the defence capabilities of EU Member States. After some exchange of information, which I had with some experts and officials, I would like to stress: those are “very, very serious gaps and shortfalls”.

Recently “Die Welt” published an article on the upgrade of NATO defence plans. It is said that NATO is asking its Member States to prepare additional 49 brigades, which will need further 1200 tanks, 900 pieces of artillery, 2700 Infantry Fighting Vehicles, 3000 Armoured personnel carriers; 1170 Anti-aircraft ground-based units, etc.

If we fail to fill the gaps and shortfalls between what is and what should be, we will continue to create a temptation for Putin to test us.

Once we have a clear quantitative evaluation of the gaps across the capabilities and types of weapons, we must answer a clear political question – how will we fill those capability gaps most urgently?

Should we continue as before, slowly and incrementally? Such development of defence capabilities has led us to the gaps and shortfalls we are discussing today.

Or should we rather start to radically change our way of doing things in defence and understand the need of a radical “overhaul” of the European defence, as the Commission President urged all of us in her statement for the Globsec Conference in Prague this summer?

A threat analysis I quoted earlier, warns all of us, that Russia can be ready to test us before the end of this decade. The warning was issued. We don’t have the luxury of proceeding with incrementalism in defence any longer. The challenge and the urgency of the “overhaul” of the entire defence system requires a kind of “Big Bang” approach.

Such a “Big Bang” approach requires producing a clear Industry Output Plan, based on the analysis of capability gaps according to NATO evaluations and covered by European production of defence equipment where we have capability gaps, with a clear target date to fulfil this Plan around 2030.

The most politically sensitive issue will be how we will approach the European defence industry with the European Industry Output Plan: should we continue as before – each Member State decides how to fill its capability gaps and traditionally approaches the industry on its own; or should we push and incentivise Member States to use more of the joint procurement, which will then lead to an incremental improvement of the situation; or should we go for the “Big Bang” approach – all the Member States agree for immediate joint procurement of all the needed defence equipment for Member States? A similar approach was used by EU Member States during the pandemic when the Commission had a mandate from all the Member States to procure the needed vaccines.

The “Big Bang” approach will have several very important advantages: the European industry will see our united and clear vision, it will see what is needed and how big is the aggregated demand, and that will bring long-term contracts to the industry, as a real much-needed guarantees to the industry for the expansion of their production capacities; and because of the scale economy, it will significantly cut the costs of production and the equipment price for Member States.

We need to agree that we can accomplish the “Big Bang” in our defence. And we need to declare it publicly and loudly now, to send a message to Putin that he will lose the war, which he wages against Europe.

In addition to the “Big Bang” on conventional capabilities, which demands prompt and large-scale ramp-up of our industry production capabilities, we need to decisively move into the area, where our defence capabilities can be created only with realisation of Defence projects of Common European Interest, such as “European Air Defence Shield” or “European Space Defence Shield”, which cannot be realised by any country alone. The same goes for filling the gap on strategic enablers, achieved only if we work together. The same goes for modernisation and innovations in our defence industry: we can do it only together or if not, we will continue losing in competition to the United States or China.

Togetherness is a very practical thing, – with togetherness, we can replenish and build up much more of what we need in terms of traditional and advanced defence capabilities with the same amount of money when comparing with what we can procure if we continue to do it separately each on our own.

As it was said by a well-known historical personality decades ago: “it’s the economy, stupid!”

And finally – on the Third building block of the White Paper: financing of defence – how will we finance our urgent needs for defence preparedness?

In my view, defence financing is the most important block among the 3 building blocks, because without proper investment into defence we will achieve nothing: there will be no much-needed support for Ukraine’s defence and no “Big Bang” in overhaul of European defence systems.

There are 3 issues, of the same importance, which we need to tackle without delay as regards the defence finances:

1. Defence spending line in the next MFF, which will become operational in 2028. This defence spending line should be significantly larger comparing with the same line in the current MFF (only 10 bln EUR for defence);

2. It is obvious, we have no luxury to wait until the new MFF comes into force in 2028. During 2025, we need to agree on how we will finance the so-called “additional 500 bln euros for defence during next decade”, as it was argued in the Draghi Report. We need to understand – either we all find an agreement on a financial defence package, or we will stay unprepared to meet those urgent, most extreme military contingencies. We need to remember, that preparedness costs a lot of money, but non-preparedness costs much, much more.

3. Finally, we need to find a constructive solution on how to convince the EIB, other IFIs and private banks in Europe not to be afraid to invest more actively into the European defence industry. The deficit of such financing is one of the most painful obstacles for European defence industry plans to expand their production lines and capabilities. It puts European industry into a totally uncompetitive environment compared with the defence industry in the United States.

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These are my thoughts on the forthcoming White Paper on European Defence.

Once again, I invite you to use your Christmas break to produce an intellectual contribution to the White Paper. I am very pleased with the very first such contribution sent to us by the European Defence and Space Industry Association and containing a number of interesting suggestions.

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Let me conclude by stressing again: we ALL are in the same boat – militaries, industries, CEOs and politicians, citizens of the EU, and citizens of Ukraine, all of us. And we find ourselves in very stormy waters.

So, either we row in a synchronised way and by joining all our forces to overcome the storms of today, or each one of us will stay alone at the mercy of the storms and our aggressive adversaries.

I am in favor of rowing together. I am in favor of the “Big Bang” approach! And I am strongly in favor of putting such a strategic language in the upcoming White Paper on European Defence!

Thank you for your attention.

2024.11.18

Andrius Kubilius. On Peace In Ukraine And EU Military Support To Ukraine

Russia’s war in Ukraine, which will soon pass the 1000-day mark, and a little later the three-year mark, remains the biggest geopolitical crisis not only in Europe but also in the world. As some experts say, this war has already entered the stage of the Third World War.

Every day of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine is another day of bloody tragedy. The war is now in its third year. There is a sense of frustration in Western societies – why cannot we achieve quick victories? There are voices saying that Ukraine’s military victory by liberating the occupied territories can no longer be seen as a realistic option for ending the war in the near future. And that is why the debate on the ceasefire, on possible peace agreements with Putin, is gaining momentum. It seems to some that if we cannot achieve a quick victory in Ukraine, then we must strive for a quick peace, even on Putin’s terms. The election promise, popularised by US President Trump, to end the war within 24 hours is adding to the heat of the debate.

Alongside the real and tragic war on the Ukrainian front, there is a global psychological war of perception. That is, there is also a hybrid propaganda war of narratives about how the world should perceive this war and its course: Putin is making great efforts to spread the narrative that Ukraine is losing, that Ukraine is fighting a hopeless war and will be forced to concede anyway, that Russia is impossible to defeat, that for Ukraine, any peace is better than a desperate war, and so on and so forth.

This war of perceptions is also affecting some Western leaders, who are also starting to repeat the same narratives. This creates a dangerous narrative that Ukraine, with all the support of the West, is the weak side in this war, even though the combined West is economically 25 times stronger than Russia (Russia’s GDP in 2023 will be 2.0 trillion USD; while combined GDP of the EU and the US is USD 45.7 trillion).

This pervasive narrative of “Western weakness” is one of the greatest threats to the West’s own security, as it only creates temptations not only for Russia, but also for North Korea, Iran and even China to increase their aggressiveness.

The West must therefore be concerned not only with the material foundations of its defence and not only with how to develop its specific defence capabilities, but also with how to win, or at least not to lose, in today’s war of perceptions or narratives.

Peace on the European continent, including in Ukraine, is a natural aspiration of the European Union, its institutions and the majority of its citizens. Ukraine itself needs peace even more. The only question is: how will this peace be achieved and what content will it have?

It goes without saying that, in theory, peace (or the end of the war) in Ukraine can be achieved in two ways: by forcing Ukraine to surrender without giving it enough weapons; or, on the contrary, by forcing Putin to realise that he is not going to achieve anything, that he is waging a desperate war, and that he will have to withdraw from Ukraine. The only thing Putin needs today to come to such an understanding is clear evidence that the West will not tire of supporting Ukraine.

The first path to ending the war would be a victory for Putin and is completely unacceptable to Europe, because it would be a fairly exact repetition of the Munich Agreement of 1938, when, in order to achieve a supposed peace with Hitler, Western leaders forced Czechoslovakia, which was ready to take up arms in its defence, to accept Hitler’s occupation of part of its territory. This eventually led to World War II across the whole European continent.

The second path is the path of victory for Ukraine and the West, but it requires a new and determined effort in support of Ukraine throughout the West, and especially in the European Union. And such efforts must be based on a clear strategy.

Today’s ongoing bloody war is taking place in a context in which significant changes may be taking place in the democratic West: the new US administration is promising to bring the war in Ukraine to a halt very quickly, perhaps by simply forcing a freeze on the current front, and, according to the US experts, the instruments of US support for Ukraine may also be used to do so, with a warning to Ukraine, both publicly and in private, that such support may be suspended if Ukraine does not agree with the plans of the new US administration.

Meanwhile, the new European Commission announces that it will take significant initiatives to strengthen the European Union’s defence capabilities and to create a European Defence Union: for the first time in its history, the leadership of the European Commission, in its Mission Letters to the new Commissioners, openly states that the European Union must be prepared for the most extreme military contingencies, that is, for a potential military aggression against an EU Member State. This of course refers in particular to the aggression from Russia. And the likelihood of such an aggression is very closely linked to the course of the war in Ukraine.

After almost three years since the beginning of the war, it is clear that Russia has built up a large-scale “war economy” and is mass-producing weapons for the war, and that the Russian army (together with the North Korean troops) on the Ukrainian front is effectively learning how to fight modern warfare. Today, European Union and NATO intelligence agencies warn that Russia could be ready for aggression against any European Union country as early as 2030.

If the European Union allows Putin to see that the West is really weak and incapable of helping Ukraine to defend itself, if Ukraine is forced to sign up to the terms of a peace “on Putin’s terms”, it is clear that the chances of Russia being tempted to launch an aggression against an EU country could increase very significantly. If the war in Ukraine is brought to an end “on Putin’s terms”, Russia could start its aggression against the EU much earlier than 2030.

Meanwhile, if a joint Ukrainian-Western effort forces Russia to end the war on terms unfavourable to the Kremlin, then Putin’s current plans to choose an EU country as the next target of aggression could be irreversibly scuppered.

Thus, the likelihood, scale and likely date of a Russian aggression against the EU or NATO depend unequivocally on one factor: the course of Russia’s war against Ukraine. And that means – from the level of Western support for Ukraine.

Therefore, in order to avoid a potential Russian aggression, the European Union must have a clear strategy as to what specific objectives the European Union is pursuing in terms of supporting Ukraine’s defence potential with its own resources, because it is no longer enough to say that we will support Ukraine as much as it is necessary. Although the European Union’s overall support to Ukraine so far has been greater than that provided by the US, as the new NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, recently said: “So far, our support has kept Ukraine in the fight. But we need to do much more in order to shift the conflict’s trajectory”.

The European Union must first decide what further trajectory it itself will pursue in the conflict (Russia’s war against Ukraine), so that the likelihood of Russian military aggression is significantly reduced rather than increased. To do this, the EU must agree on a targeted “Ukraine strategy” to be implemented by the EU itself and it must find the necessary resources to implement such a strategy. Once such a strategy is in place, it would also be time to negotiate with our transatlantic partners on joint action to implement such a strategy. This would also allow the European Union itself to be ready to embark on the implementation of such a strategy if no agreement is found with its partners.

What kind of “Ukraine strategy” does the European Union need in terms of military support for Ukraine?

The answer is simple: we need a strategy that today shows Putin that the European Union is strong and ready to counter any aggressions by Putin. Such a demonstration by the European Union must begin with the European Union’s increasing support for Ukraine and end with a radical strengthening of the European Union’s own sufficient defence capabilities.

Putin’s aggressiveness is escalated by the evidence of our weakness he sees in the West, not by the evidence of our strength and readiness to defend ourselves. Putin must be shown that his aggression, both against Ukraine and against the European Union, will not bring him or Russia any victories or any success.

For the time being, Putin still thinks that he can achieve a military victory in Ukraine, that he can break through Ukraine’s defence front, that he can wait for the moment when the West tires of supporting Ukraine. Putin sees today’s situation on the Ukrainian front as evidence of the West’s weakness.

Putin’s expectations are triggered by the fact that not only has the West’s support for Ukraine so far been insufficient in scope, but the support itself has also appeared to lack a clear strategy, with no clear objectives and no long-term plans. All of this allows Putin to think and hope that the flow of such Western support will soon dry up.

To change this impression, we need a “Ukraine Strategy”: not only to guarantee greater and more effective Western military support for Ukraine, but also to make Putin finally realise that he will not be able to achieve any victories.

Such a “Ukraine strategy” must be an integral part of a “European Defence” strategy, which is also the focus of the new White Paper on European Defence, to be prepared by the new European Commission during its first 100 days in office. The European Defence Strategy must provide for all the means at the European Union’s disposal (industrial, economic, financial, legal) to help the countries of the European Union to build up the necessary defence resources to be ready to counter any potential Russian aggression, as well as to provide Ukraine with the necessary military support. Such a European Defence Strategy is also needed so that Putin realises today that his dreams of testing the EU or NATO by attacking one of their members are futile – the EU together with NATO will defend itself.

The broader European Defence Strategy can be discussed later. The current text is primarily devoted to a more detailed discussion of the “Ukraine Strategy”. Both the “Ukraine Strategy” and the broader “European Defence” strategy must be seen as components of what former Finnish President S.Niinistö, in his recent report, identified as the EU Preparedness Strategy, which, according to the author, the European Union needs to develop and start implementing in the near future.

The “Ukraine Strategy” must be based on a clear understanding that European military support to Ukraine to date has been based on individual efforts by individual EU Member States, coordinated as far as possible by the so-called Ramstein format. This has helped to achieve a lot, but the time is coming when, without abandoning the Ramstein format, the organisation of assistance to Ukraine must gradually move from coordinated voluntary efforts to increasingly planned and strategic collective action. This would be the hallmark of the “Ukraine Strategy” – a collective EU effort to strengthen Ukraine’s defence and, by extension, the defence of Europe as a whole.

The “Ukraine strategy” does not have to be something very complicated: it simply has to provide for the volume of arms to be provided to Ukraine over the next few years, where they will be produced and how they will be financed.

The EU urgently needs a “Ukraine strategy” also in order to be adequately prepared in the near future for the dialogue and discussion, both with the new US administration and with Ukraine. The political priorities of the collective West and the EU’s support for Ukraine cannot depend solely on changes in the United States administration and its strategic priorities.

The “Ukraine strategy” can be developed in different ways: the strategy can be broader and more detailed, focusing on longer-term, broader objectives; but it can also be narrower in scope during its initial phase, focusing on the implementation of specifically defined military assistance objectives.

For example, it could focus on the EU assuming a specific responsibility to finance the production and supply of the military equipment needed to equip the new Ukrainian army brigades currently being trained (Ukraine is currently training 14 new brigades), including with heavy military equipment.

According to Western experts’ estimates, such armaments would require a considerable amount of weapons: 100-300 new tanks of the same model; up to 1 000 infantry fighting vehicles; about 500 new artillery systems (155 mm); up to 250 Gepard air defence systems to defend the army units; and a significant increase in the production of drones. There is also an urgent need to create and develop a Western logistical and industrial infrastructure in Ukraine itself, in order to be able to effectively maintain, repair and upgrade the military equipment produced in the EU defence industry and used on the Ukrainian front.

Such equipment could be produced by both European and Ukrainian military industries. Three years of war have made it clear: which military equipment, produced where, is the most suitable and most needed by the Ukrainian army. Much of this equipment can also be produced by Ukraine’s own military industry, which is already capable of producing armaments of a quality in line with Western production standards. Another part would be produced by European companies or by Ukrainian-Western joint ventures, combining the technological know-how of modern warfare acquired by the Ukrainians with the industrial might of the West.

This would be particularly necessary in cases where, for example, the Ukrainians can produce modern “Bohdana” artillery systems, which are about twice as cheap to produce in Ukraine as similar artillery systems in the European Union, but the Ukrainians lack the self-propelled platforms on which the Ukrainian artillery systems have to be mounted. Such platforms could be produced in the EU and supplied to Ukrainian manufacturers. Similarly, the production of the various drones needed could be developed – the technological know-how acquired by the Ukrainians on the front line, combined with the potential of the EU defence industry, would guarantee a strong manufacturing breakthrough and a military advantage for Ukraine.

How much and which specific military equipment should be produced and supplied to Ukraine as a matter of priority is a matter for the Ukrainian military leadership to decide together with EU and NATO experts. However, this must be part of a strategic plan for production and delivery of the “Ukraine Strategy”, based on clear EU financial resources and long-term contracts with both the EU and the Ukrainian defence industry.

Preliminary calculations by Western experts on how much and what kind of equipment such a “Ukraine Strategy” should commit to producing and delivering to the Ukrainian army show that the initial cost of implementing such a strategy would be around 50 billion EUR.

EUR 50 billion is a large amount of money, but it is bearable for Western finance. Even if such funds were to be mobilised by the EU alone, it would be bearable, especially given that funds of this magnitude would not be spent in a single year.

It is worth remembering that in the almost three years of the war, the European Union’s military aid to Ukraine has already reached EUR 43 billion, and that of the United States of America has reached EUR 57 billion (while pledges already made in support of Ukraine’s other budget expenditures are as follows: the EU – EUR 84 billion; the United States – EUR 31 billion). So – in one year, the EU’s military support to Ukraine amounted to around EUR 14 billion and the United States’ to around EUR 19 billion. For both the EU and the US, this annual expenditure is just under 0.1% of their respective GDP.

Both the EU and the US are certainly economically capable of providing more military support to Ukraine, especially given that Russia spends 7% of its GDP on military expenditure, while Ukraine is forced to spend as much as 25% of its GDP on its defence.

Peace comes at a high price because, as the ancient Romans rightly said, if you want peace, prepare for war. It is expensive to prepare for military defence, but it is even more expensive to find oneself in the war without having prepared for it.

Europe’s readiness to face potential Russian aggression starts with today’s support for the defence of Ukraine. Such support is expensive, but it would be even more expensive not to support Ukraine and the consequences this “not support” would have for the whole of Europe.

It is worth repeating once again: we can only avoid Russian aggression if Putin first of all realises that he will achieve nothing in Ukraine, that he will not defeat Ukraine and that he will not subjugate Ukraine. Equally, that he will not overcome the will of the European Union and our will to support Ukraine. That is the true path to peace, both in Ukraine and on the entire European continent.

Whether we can overcome such a path depends above all on ourselves and on our political will to implement both the Ukraine strategy and the European Defence Strategy without delay.

2024.11.07

Opening statement of Andrius Kubilius during Confirmation Hearings

Opening statement

Mr Andrius Kubilius, Commissioner-designate for Defence and Space

Honourable Chairs,

Honourable Members of the European Parliament,

Dear colleagues,

Being twice a former Prime Minister and member of the Lithuanian and the European Parliaments for the last 32 years, I am humbled to return to this House and stand in front of you today as the European Union’s first-ever Commissioner-designate for Defence and Space.

***

As you know, Defence is one of the top priorities for the next Commission.

The Mission letter tasks me to help Europe prepare itself for “the most extreme military contingencies”. Which means – to prepare for possibility of Russian aggression against EU Member states.

Are we ready for such contingencies?

Today we are facing urgent and long-term challenges for European Defence:

First, we face existential and emerging threats, including conventional warfare, cyber warfare, hybrid attacks, and the militarisation of space:

Recent intelligence assessments suggest Russia may test the resolve of the EU or NATO by the end of this decade. That is why, we must urgently enhance the EU’s readiness for potential military aggression. This is the way how we can deter it.
Despite the fact that for time being it is difficult to predict what will be the policies of new United States administration in the nearest future, nevertheless we can predict that during forthcoming decades, the US is likely to increase its focus on the strategic challenge posed by China. This longer-term shift necessitates a more self-reliant European defence structure.

Second, EU Member States have accumulated significant underinvestment in defence – more than €1 trillion over the past decades. Such chronic underinvestment has left critical gaps in our capabilities and readiness

Third, the European Defence Equipment Market remains highly fragmented, which leads to inefficiencies, duplication of efforts, and lack of interoperability. Our defence capabilities are lagging behind from what is needed for our preparedness, as it is stressed in President Niinisto Report.

Fourth, our adversaries and strategic rivals are rapidly outpacing Countries like Russia and China have seen much more substantial increases in their defence budgets than in the EU27 over the past two decades. It looks like, that Russia in 2025, in Purchasing Power Parity terms, for military needs will spend more than all EU27 are spending for defence.

To address these challenges, I count on your support to bring a genuine European Defence Union to life. As President Niinisto says – we need European Defence Union not to wage war, but to maintain peace.

This calls for a paradigm change and systemic overhaul of European defence, based on close cooperation between us, Member States and with NATO.

There is no competition between NATO and the EU on defence issues, on the contrary.

The EU needs to use its unique budgetary and legislative powers to help develop the capabilities and resources needed for the implementation of NATO military deterrence and defence plans.

The three reports of Enrico Letta on the single market, of Professor Draghi on competitiveness and of President Niinistö on preparedness have provided food for thought. We now need to act and implement those recommendations.

We find ourselves at a time, when our peaceful future is challenged not only in Defence, but also in Space, which is becoming more and more important for our defence capabilities

We need urgent and bold solutions to ensure that future.

Such solutions demand maximum unity on our side.

That is why I look forward to work closely with you in achieving this task.

If I am confirmed, within the first 100 days of my mandate I will present, together with the High Representative, a White Paper on the Future of European Defence.

It will frame a new approach to defence and identify investment needs to deliver full-spectrum European defence capabilities based on joint investments and readying the EU and Member States for the most extreme military contingencies.

We must ensure a closer alignment between the identification of the EU’s defence capabilities needs and the corresponding investments.

We need to spend more, spend better, spend together, and spend European.

That is why I propose:

Immediate actions to continue implementation of ASAP and European EDIRPA programms , as well as of the new European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP). I stand ready to provide all the support needed to deliver on this key file.

Scaling up EU defence equipment production and demand by fostering information exchange between EU, Member States and NATO on defence resources and capability needs, in such a way potentially creating an aggregated EU defence industry output plan. By promoting joint procurement, with the possibility to scale up aggregated demand, we can help lower prices and stimulate longer-term contracts. We should also explore options for readiness pools and joint stockpiling based on EU military security criteria.

Long-term planning for the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). We need to maximise the impact of the Union action, leverage the EU budget to deliver on key urgent EU priorities, give predictability to investment, strengthen synergies and simplify the EU financial landscape.

Proposals for urgent defence investment needs. According to Draghi report, Europe’s defence industry needs additional €500 billion over the next decade in order to remain competitive and meet current demand.We shall look into how to optimise EU financial support, increase national investments and leverage existing assets, now, even before the next MFF.

Innovative financing options. The European Investment Bank must play a larger role in defence financing, through further expanding it’s lending policy. This will also help to change lending policies of other European financial institutions.

I will work closely with Member States and the High Representative towards the design and implementation of Defence Projects of Common European Interest, including a European Air Shield and Enhanced cyber defence capabilities, which cannot be developed by any country alone.

We need to significantly increase both public and private investment in defence research and development while preserving defence specificities and we need to reinforce the European Defence Fund. We should also explore means to better mobilise EU support for high-risk, high-reward research projects, like it is done by DARPA agency in United States.

And most important: purchasing across borders within the EU should be equivalent to purchasing nationally. We must achieve a true Single Market for Defence.

This will involve:

Further promoting the use of agreed civil and defence standards (NATO STANAG), and supporting mutual recognition of certification to ensure interoperability with Allies.

Reviewing and strengthening the directives on defence procurement.

Improving market access for all companies, especially SMEs, to foster innovation.

Fostering more cross-border cooperation to create economies of scale.

Military mobility is vital for European security and defence, and we must speed up action. The EU can add significant value by facilitating movement across the EU and supporting necessary infrastructures and logistics.

And finally, as stressed by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, the best investment in European security is investing in the security of Ukraine.

As NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte recently said in “Politico”: [Quote] “So far, our support has kept Ukraine in the fight. But we need to do much more in order to shift the conflict’s trajectory”. [End of quote].

Through urgent implementation of European Defence Industry Programme and with the help of the European Innovation Office in Kyiv, we will further strengthen our assistance and we will support mutual integration of the EU and Ukrainian defence and space industries.

That is one of the ways how we can do more…

***

Now I want to focus on Space, where till now the EU has developed world-class strategic space assets and worldwide recognised industrial competencies and know-how, such as Galileo, Copernicus and forthcoming IRIS², which are crucial also for our defence.

Our space capabilities are a great example of what the EU Member States can achieve working together in an area where none of them alone would succeed.

Looking into the future, according to experts, in 10 years, the global market for Space industry can be larger than €1 trillion.

As some experts are saying, the Space economy is now playing the role that 20 years ago was played by the Internet economy.

Europe must be part of this Space Revolution.

However, we are confronted with a new set of challenges:

Our space industry’s competitiveness is at risk. Due to lack of growth funding, we risk losing industrialisation and commercialisation of innovative European space start-ups. Our fragmented regulatory landscape further complicates matters.

Our space assets face increasing security pressures and vulnerability to hostile activities, our supply chains risk falling under unfriendly control.

Space remains underused in defence, despite its critical role in modern military operations.

To address these challenges, and with your support, if confirmed I will continue advancing the EU space flagships – Galileo, Copernicus, and IRIS², also enhancing their capabilities to provide special governmental services for our security needs.

I will work closely with European Parliament, Member States and the space industry.

I will rely on EU Agency for Space Programme and European Space Agency, striving for improving efficiency and effectiveness in implementation.

In addition to exploitation of established services, we shall concentrate on five key initiatives:

Ensuring European autonomous access to space. We must diversify the European launch service solutions and go for more competition. I expect positive outcome from the recent “Flight Ticket”, “Launch Challenger” and other initiatives, announced by the European Space Agency and the Commission, which will stimulate new launching projects. We need to step up the efforts for securing autonomous access to space to secure our European sovereignty.

Tabling the EU Space Law, to create single market for space and provide a common framework for security, safety, and sustainability in space that would ensure a consistent and EU-wide approach.

Building upon Draghi’s report, we must support the competitiveness of the EU space industry. It includes fostering the space data economy, boosting public investment in research and innovation, and intensifying support to innovative start-ups and scale-ups, including through agile and fast procurement.

Preparing the legal framework of the EU space policy for the next MFF, reflecting a new level of ambition of the Union as a global space power and international partner.

Preparing our space assets to respond to all threats in the space domain that may affect the security of the EU and its Member States, including the most extreme military contingencies. We shall build upon the EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence of 2023, in close cooperation with the High Representative. We shall further enhance our cooperation with Ukraine in the field of space.

These initiatives will enable European leadership in Space, thereby enhancing our technological sovereignty, competitiveness, and our security and defence capabilities and ultimately our strategic autonomy.

Till now our achievements in space were unique.

The EU space policy achievements demonstrate what we can achieve through unity, ambition, and strategic foresight. Let’s continue to be ambitious.

It should also inspire our approach to European defence.

***

And to conclude:

We do not want war. We want peace. Therefore, we must become ready for defence, both on land and in space, so that our challengers are not tempted to test us.

Only working together, we can build a stronger, more resilient and more autonomous European defence and space sector.

So that the EU is ready for the most extreme military contingencies, from wherever they will come. This is the only way to peace.

Thank you for your attention.

I stand ready to answer your questions.

(Photo: EPP Group)

2024.10.24

R. Juknevičienė. Situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia

Mr President, dear colleagues,

this year’s Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded to scientists who demonstrated that societies with poor rule of law and institutions that exploit their population do not generate prosperity or positive change. The South Caucasus region is now exactly the place where this theory can be tested. While today it may appear that regimes – like the Aliyev regime – trampling on the rule of law and democracy are strong, we need to take the long view.

That is why Armenia’s shift away from Russia and towards a European way of life must be a priority for the European Union. This weekend showed the toxic role the Kremlin played in Moldova’s elections, and revealed the extent of its infiltration in Georgia’s current government. We also clearly see how Putin is exploiting long-standing historical tensions between Azeris and Armenians.

Therefore, today we agreed among the groups on a resolution, and we are very clear: the European Parliament condemns the direction that the Aliyev regime continues to take and expresses clear support for Armenia’s chosen European way of life.

2024.10.23

MEP P. Saudargas. Managing migration in an effective and holistic way through fostering returns

Madam President, dear colleagues,

Europe is full.

In parallel with a strategic and cautious integration policy – which is a long‑term solution – the only answer is fostering returns. We should be especially alert in the context of instrumentalised immigration. During Lukashenko’s hybrid attack on Lithuania, Latvia and Poland, around 150 000 illegal crossings were registered in a short‑time slot, and these crossings were accompanied by the special forces of Belarus, which in some cases forced the migrants to enter the European Union using their brutal armed force. Any kind of further escalation is possible in such a context. Our countries faced a need for an urgent solution.

We Lithuanians built a physical barrier on our own account in a record time, but what we really lacked was the common European‑wide approach to returns. The negotiations with third countries on admitting their nationals, for example Iraq, were complicated. Only together as the EU, we can do it.

To demolish Schengen and to build walls between ourselves is not a European solution. To strengthen the external borders and to foster the return process, this is the answer.

2024.10.22

MEP P. Saudargas. Establishing the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism and providing exceptional macro-financial assistance to Ukraine

Mr President, dear colleagues,

we are talking about money here. I have a few questions for you. How much does a life cost? How much does one Ukrainian cost? Mother, father, daughter, son, sister, brother. Hundreds of thousands lost their lives in Ukraine. No billions can bring them back.

Second question: why does the war last so long? Because we have been debating for too long; about tanks and F-16s, about support and sanctions. We are too slow.

Third question: why do the sanctions fail to break the aggressor? Not only the third countries are to blame, but ourselves, because there are traitors and cheaters among us.

And the question of today: can we use Russian frozen assets to pay the needs of Ukraine? We have to do it. We owe it to Ukrainians. We are in big debt because it is not our sons and daughters dying out there, dying for us. This is the least we can do to make Russia pay. Slava Ukraini!

2024.10.10

P. Saudargas. The crisis facing the EU’s automotive industry, potential plant closures and the need to enhance competitiveness and maintain jobs in Europe

Mr President, Commissioner, dear colleagues,

after the resurrection from COVID, the automotive industry of Europe faces new big challenges. And this is really painful because we were always leading industry in the world.

Dear colleagues, if I would ask you to close your eyes and imagine a car of your dreams, I am sure that most of you would imagine the European brand.

There are many obstacles. Commissioner Dombrovskis mentioned energy prices, labour market and raw materials. But I think there are more.

First of all, China’s technological invasion. But what bothers me most: the enormously high sustainability targets. The global warming is a major problem, but we cannot solve it alone. We have to have America, Asia, Africa on board.

Here I would like to address one paradox. We are quite innovative and leading in some green solutions: wind power, hydropower, hydrogen technologies and others, except solar. But we ourselves are in much greater demand of these products – because of the goals – than the rest of the world. Hence, once again, we are consumers and not the producers. We massively import solar panels and Chinese electric cars. We trap ourselves in an economic greenhouse. More import than export.

Dear colleagues, we can deal with China only if we stand united. The approach towards Chinese electric cars should be unanimous.