Russia’s war in Ukraine, which will soon pass the 1000-day mark, and a little later the three-year mark, remains the biggest geopolitical crisis not only in Europe but also in the world. As some experts say, this war has already entered the stage of the Third World War.

Every day of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine is another day of bloody tragedy. The war is now in its third year. There is a sense of frustration in Western societies – why cannot we achieve quick victories? There are voices saying that Ukraine’s military victory by liberating the occupied territories can no longer be seen as a realistic option for ending the war in the near future. And that is why the debate on the ceasefire, on possible peace agreements with Putin, is gaining momentum. It seems to some that if we cannot achieve a quick victory in Ukraine, then we must strive for a quick peace, even on Putin’s terms. The election promise, popularised by US President Trump, to end the war within 24 hours is adding to the heat of the debate.

Alongside the real and tragic war on the Ukrainian front, there is a global psychological war of perception. That is, there is also a hybrid propaganda war of narratives about how the world should perceive this war and its course: Putin is making great efforts to spread the narrative that Ukraine is losing, that Ukraine is fighting a hopeless war and will be forced to concede anyway, that Russia is impossible to defeat, that for Ukraine, any peace is better than a desperate war, and so on and so forth.

This war of perceptions is also affecting some Western leaders, who are also starting to repeat the same narratives. This creates a dangerous narrative that Ukraine, with all the support of the West, is the weak side in this war, even though the combined West is economically 25 times stronger than Russia (Russia’s GDP in 2023 will be 2.0 trillion USD; while combined GDP of the EU and the US is USD 45.7 trillion).

This pervasive narrative of “Western weakness” is one of the greatest threats to the West’s own security, as it only creates temptations not only for Russia, but also for North Korea, Iran and even China to increase their aggressiveness.

The West must therefore be concerned not only with the material foundations of its defence and not only with how to develop its specific defence capabilities, but also with how to win, or at least not to lose, in today’s war of perceptions or narratives.

Peace on the European continent, including in Ukraine, is a natural aspiration of the European Union, its institutions and the majority of its citizens. Ukraine itself needs peace even more. The only question is: how will this peace be achieved and what content will it have?

It goes without saying that, in theory, peace (or the end of the war) in Ukraine can be achieved in two ways: by forcing Ukraine to surrender without giving it enough weapons; or, on the contrary, by forcing Putin to realise that he is not going to achieve anything, that he is waging a desperate war, and that he will have to withdraw from Ukraine. The only thing Putin needs today to come to such an understanding is clear evidence that the West will not tire of supporting Ukraine.

The first path to ending the war would be a victory for Putin and is completely unacceptable to Europe, because it would be a fairly exact repetition of the Munich Agreement of 1938, when, in order to achieve a supposed peace with Hitler, Western leaders forced Czechoslovakia, which was ready to take up arms in its defence, to accept Hitler’s occupation of part of its territory. This eventually led to World War II across the whole European continent.

The second path is the path of victory for Ukraine and the West, but it requires a new and determined effort in support of Ukraine throughout the West, and especially in the European Union. And such efforts must be based on a clear strategy.

Today’s ongoing bloody war is taking place in a context in which significant changes may be taking place in the democratic West: the new US administration is promising to bring the war in Ukraine to a halt very quickly, perhaps by simply forcing a freeze on the current front, and, according to the US experts, the instruments of US support for Ukraine may also be used to do so, with a warning to Ukraine, both publicly and in private, that such support may be suspended if Ukraine does not agree with the plans of the new US administration.

Meanwhile, the new European Commission announces that it will take significant initiatives to strengthen the European Union’s defence capabilities and to create a European Defence Union: for the first time in its history, the leadership of the European Commission, in its Mission Letters to the new Commissioners, openly states that the European Union must be prepared for the most extreme military contingencies, that is, for a potential military aggression against an EU Member State. This of course refers in particular to the aggression from Russia. And the likelihood of such an aggression is very closely linked to the course of the war in Ukraine.

After almost three years since the beginning of the war, it is clear that Russia has built up a large-scale “war economy” and is mass-producing weapons for the war, and that the Russian army (together with the North Korean troops) on the Ukrainian front is effectively learning how to fight modern warfare. Today, European Union and NATO intelligence agencies warn that Russia could be ready for aggression against any European Union country as early as 2030.

If the European Union allows Putin to see that the West is really weak and incapable of helping Ukraine to defend itself, if Ukraine is forced to sign up to the terms of a peace “on Putin’s terms”, it is clear that the chances of Russia being tempted to launch an aggression against an EU country could increase very significantly. If the war in Ukraine is brought to an end “on Putin’s terms”, Russia could start its aggression against the EU much earlier than 2030.

Meanwhile, if a joint Ukrainian-Western effort forces Russia to end the war on terms unfavourable to the Kremlin, then Putin’s current plans to choose an EU country as the next target of aggression could be irreversibly scuppered.

Thus, the likelihood, scale and likely date of a Russian aggression against the EU or NATO depend unequivocally on one factor: the course of Russia’s war against Ukraine. And that means – from the level of Western support for Ukraine.

Therefore, in order to avoid a potential Russian aggression, the European Union must have a clear strategy as to what specific objectives the European Union is pursuing in terms of supporting Ukraine’s defence potential with its own resources, because it is no longer enough to say that we will support Ukraine as much as it is necessary. Although the European Union’s overall support to Ukraine so far has been greater than that provided by the US, as the new NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, recently said: “So far, our support has kept Ukraine in the fight. But we need to do much more in order to shift the conflict’s trajectory”.

The European Union must first decide what further trajectory it itself will pursue in the conflict (Russia’s war against Ukraine), so that the likelihood of Russian military aggression is significantly reduced rather than increased. To do this, the EU must agree on a targeted “Ukraine strategy” to be implemented by the EU itself and it must find the necessary resources to implement such a strategy. Once such a strategy is in place, it would also be time to negotiate with our transatlantic partners on joint action to implement such a strategy. This would also allow the European Union itself to be ready to embark on the implementation of such a strategy if no agreement is found with its partners.

What kind of “Ukraine strategy” does the European Union need in terms of military support for Ukraine?

The answer is simple: we need a strategy that today shows Putin that the European Union is strong and ready to counter any aggressions by Putin. Such a demonstration by the European Union must begin with the European Union’s increasing support for Ukraine and end with a radical strengthening of the European Union’s own sufficient defence capabilities.

Putin’s aggressiveness is escalated by the evidence of our weakness he sees in the West, not by the evidence of our strength and readiness to defend ourselves. Putin must be shown that his aggression, both against Ukraine and against the European Union, will not bring him or Russia any victories or any success.

For the time being, Putin still thinks that he can achieve a military victory in Ukraine, that he can break through Ukraine’s defence front, that he can wait for the moment when the West tires of supporting Ukraine. Putin sees today’s situation on the Ukrainian front as evidence of the West’s weakness.

Putin’s expectations are triggered by the fact that not only has the West’s support for Ukraine so far been insufficient in scope, but the support itself has also appeared to lack a clear strategy, with no clear objectives and no long-term plans. All of this allows Putin to think and hope that the flow of such Western support will soon dry up.

To change this impression, we need a “Ukraine Strategy”: not only to guarantee greater and more effective Western military support for Ukraine, but also to make Putin finally realise that he will not be able to achieve any victories.

Such a “Ukraine strategy” must be an integral part of a “European Defence” strategy, which is also the focus of the new White Paper on European Defence, to be prepared by the new European Commission during its first 100 days in office.  The European Defence Strategy must provide for all the means at the European Union’s disposal (industrial, economic, financial, legal) to help the countries of the European Union to build up the necessary defence resources to be ready to counter any potential Russian aggression, as well as to provide Ukraine with the necessary military support. Such a European Defence Strategy is also needed so that Putin realises today that his dreams of testing the EU or NATO by attacking one of their members are futile – the EU together with NATO will defend itself.

The broader European Defence Strategy can be discussed later. The current text is primarily devoted to a more detailed discussion of the “Ukraine Strategy”. Both the “Ukraine Strategy” and the broader “European Defence” strategy must be seen as components of what former Finnish President S.Niinistö, in his recent report, identified as the EU Preparedness Strategy, which, according to the author, the European Union needs to develop and start implementing in the near future.

The “Ukraine Strategy” must be based on a clear understanding that European military support to Ukraine to date has been based on individual efforts by individual EU Member States, coordinated as far as possible by the so-called Ramstein format. This has helped to achieve a lot, but the time is coming when, without abandoning the Ramstein format, the organisation of assistance to Ukraine must gradually move from coordinated voluntary efforts to increasingly planned and strategic collective action. This would be the hallmark of the “Ukraine Strategy” – a collective EU effort to strengthen Ukraine’s defence and, by extension, the defence of Europe as a whole.

The “Ukraine strategy” does not have to be something very complicated: it simply has to provide for the volume of arms to be provided to Ukraine over the next few years, where they will be produced and how they will be financed.

The EU urgently needs a “Ukraine strategy” also in order to be adequately prepared in the near future for the dialogue and discussion, both with the new US administration and with Ukraine. The political priorities of the collective West and the EU’s support for Ukraine cannot depend solely on changes in the United States administration and its strategic priorities.

The “Ukraine strategy” can be developed in different ways: the strategy can be broader and more detailed, focusing on longer-term, broader objectives; but it can also be narrower in scope during its initial phase, focusing on the implementation of specifically defined military assistance objectives.

For example, it could focus on the EU assuming a specific responsibility to finance the production and supply of the military equipment needed to equip the new Ukrainian army brigades currently being trained (Ukraine is currently training 14 new brigades), including with heavy military equipment.

According to Western experts’ estimates, such armaments would require a considerable amount of weapons: 100-300 new tanks of the same model; up to 1 000 infantry fighting vehicles; about 500 new artillery systems (155 mm); up to 250 Gepard air defence systems to defend the army units; and a significant increase in the production of drones. There is also an urgent need to create and develop a Western logistical and industrial infrastructure in Ukraine itself, in order to be able to effectively maintain, repair and upgrade the military equipment produced in the EU defence industry and used on the Ukrainian front.

Such equipment could be produced by both European and Ukrainian military industries.  Three years of war have made it clear: which military equipment, produced where, is the most suitable and most needed by the Ukrainian army. Much of this equipment can also be produced by Ukraine’s own military industry, which is already capable of producing armaments of a quality in line with Western production standards. Another part would be produced by European companies or by Ukrainian-Western joint ventures, combining the technological know-how of modern warfare acquired by the Ukrainians with the industrial might of the West.

This would be particularly necessary in cases where, for example, the Ukrainians can produce modern “Bohdana” artillery systems, which are about twice as cheap to produce in Ukraine as similar artillery systems in the European Union, but the Ukrainians lack the self-propelled platforms on which the Ukrainian artillery systems have to be mounted. Such platforms could be produced in the EU and supplied to Ukrainian manufacturers. Similarly, the production of the various drones needed could be developed – the technological know-how acquired by the Ukrainians on the front line, combined with the potential of the EU defence industry, would guarantee a strong manufacturing breakthrough and a military advantage for Ukraine.

How much and which specific military equipment should be produced and supplied to Ukraine as a matter of priority is a matter for the Ukrainian military leadership to decide together with EU and NATO experts. However, this must be part of a strategic plan for production and delivery of the “Ukraine Strategy”, based on clear EU financial resources and long-term contracts with both the EU and the Ukrainian defence industry.

Preliminary calculations by Western experts on how much and what kind of equipment such a “Ukraine Strategy” should commit to producing and delivering to the Ukrainian army show that the initial cost of implementing such a strategy would be around 50 billion EUR.

EUR 50 billion is a large amount of money, but it is bearable for Western finance. Even if such funds were to be mobilised by the EU alone, it would be bearable, especially given that funds of this magnitude would not be spent in a single year.

It is worth remembering that in the almost three years of the war, the European Union’s military aid to Ukraine has already reached EUR 43 billion, and that of the United States of America has reached EUR 57 billion (while pledges already made in support of Ukraine’s other budget expenditures are as follows: the EU – EUR 84 billion; the United States – EUR 31 billion). So – in one year, the EU’s military support to Ukraine amounted to around EUR 14 billion and the United States’ to around EUR 19 billion. For both the EU and the US, this annual expenditure is just under 0.1% of their respective GDP.

Both the EU and the US are certainly economically capable of providing more military support to Ukraine, especially given that Russia spends 7% of its GDP on military expenditure, while Ukraine is forced to spend as much as 25% of its GDP on its defence.

Peace comes at a high price because, as the ancient Romans rightly said, if you want peace, prepare for war. It is expensive to prepare for military defence, but it is even more expensive to find oneself in the war without having prepared for it.

Europe’s readiness to face potential Russian aggression starts with today’s support for the defence of Ukraine. Such support is expensive, but it would be even more expensive not to support Ukraine and the consequences this “not support” would have for the whole of Europe.

It is worth repeating once again: we can only avoid Russian aggression if Putin first of all realises that he will achieve nothing in Ukraine, that he will not defeat Ukraine and that he will not subjugate Ukraine. Equally, that he will not overcome the will of the European Union and our will to support Ukraine. That is the true path to peace, both in Ukraine and on the entire European continent.

Whether we can overcome such a path depends above all on ourselves and on our political will to implement both the Ukraine strategy and the European Defence Strategy without delay.